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Summary
Dodd, P. C. E. (1978) An analysis of Ideological demar­
cation in the German Democratic Republic, with particular 
respect to the period 1970-1973, Ph.D. Thesis, University 
of Surrey. The leadership of the German Democratic Republic 
(DDR) has been faced with the problem of legitimising its 
rule. It is argued that legitimacy depends of the level 
of support for the ideology of the leadership, Marxism- 
Leninism. The acceptance of this ideology by East Germans 
has been hindered by affect for the liberal democracy of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. The concept of ideolog­
ical demarcation, defined as a defence mechanism for the 
protection of ideological socialisation within the DDR, is 
the .central element of the thesis. It is suggested that 
ideological demarcation has been principally concerned 
with countering the demand from East German citizens for 
the national unity of the two German states. The DDR 
leadership initially claimed that it alone represented the 
German nation, and, when this policy failed, proclaimed a 
separate East German nation. Between 1970 and 1973 the DDR 
emerged from its relative isolation from the Federal Republic. 
The function of ideological demarcation at this time is 
evaluated.
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An analysis of ideological demarcation in the German 
.Democratic Republic, with particular respect to the 
period 1970-1973
Introduction
This thesis examined the role of ideological demar­
cation in the DDR. It is argued that a policy of ideo­
logical demarcation has been consistently pursued by the 
East German leadership, with the aim of -countering ideo­
logical pressures, which,, in the leadership’s view, were 
likely to have a potentially destabilising effect upon the 
East German state.
Tn the case of the DDR, ideological demarcation is relat­
ed to the leadership’s task of nation building, which is 
understood in Carl J. Friedrich’s terms as ’a matter of 
building group cohesion and group loyalty for internat­
ional representation and domestic planning’ Here two 
factors are significant: firstly, the East German leader­
ship has introduced and developed a Marxist-Leninist rev­
olution within the territory under its control, based on 
the Soviet model. Secondly, the DDR is one of two German 
states established after the defeat of Nazi Germany. The 
citizens of the DDR and of the Federal Republic of Germany
1. Quoted from Nation-Building, ed. Karl W. Deutsch and
William J. Foltz, Chicago, 1971*
had formerly lived within a united Germany, although time 
has caused the percentages of the populations of the two 
successor states horn after these states were established 
to increase. The two states diverged, the one following 
a liberal democratic and the other a Marxist-Leninist path 
However, because of continuing affect for a united Germany 
and because of cross-frontier family ties, the East German 
leadership has found it difficult to obtain support from 
East German citizens. This led to what has been described 
as a 'LegitimationsdefizitT for the East German regime.
The consolidation of the structural changes introduced 
within the DDR depended on popular support for the leaderr 
ship, which in turn required the internalisation by the 
general population of the leadership's belief system. In 
Marxist-Leninist terms, a cultural revolution was required 
to complement these structural changes. Whereas in the 
other Eastern European states which underwent a Marxist- 
Leninist revolution it has been possible for each leader­
ship to allude to patriotism and national unity to support 
its claims to legitimacy, this has not been so simple a 
matter in the DDR, since the German national question has 
hindered legitimation. Accordingly, official East German 
ideological demarcation has been directed principally aha 
progressively against the concept of all-German unity
2. Peter Christian Ludz: Deutschlands doppelte Zukunft,
Munich, 197^ 4-•
3. For an East German definition of a socialist cultural 
revolution see Philosophisches: Worterbuch, ed. Georg 
Klaus/Manfred Buhr, Leipzig, 197U> P» 686ff.
(except on terms which would have meant the establishment 
of an all-German Marxist-Leninist state). The ideological 
demarcation of the DDR leadership is understood as a defence 
mechanism protecting the legitimation of the leadership from 
the attraction of all-German unity.
The thesis suggests a general definition of_demarcation, 
before considering specifically its East German variant.
I have attempted to demonstrate that East German ideological 
demarcation, although not initially formulated as a con- . 
scious policy, originated in 19k5 after ’the defeat of the 
Nazis, when an administration headed by German communists 
was set up in the Soviet zone of occupation.
The Abgrenzung campaign which was introduced in the DDR 
in 1970 is taken as a case study. It is argued that the 
causes of this campaign were to be found in the events of 
the previous year, when the East German leadership came 
under pressure to regularise its relations with the Fed­
eral Republic.. Pressures for normalisation of relations 
between the two German states came both from the USSR, 
which desired this as part of its aim of legitimising the 
post war status quo in Europe through a European security 
conference,^ and from the Federal Republic, which wished 
to stop the divergence of the two states. The first high-
l±. For the development of East-West proposals for a security 
conference see Michael Palmer: The Prospects for a Eur­
opean Security Gonference, London, 1971-
level governmental contacts between the two German states
followed in 1970. The discussions which took place at this
time made clear the opposed aims of the two states: whereas
the Federal Republic wanted rapprochement with the DDR, the
latter sought West German acceptance of the fact that the
two states were diverging. For the DDR leadership, Ab-
5grenzung was the opposite of Annaherung.
There had been no diplomatic relations between the two 
states, and their relative isolation from each other had 
facilitated their growing-apart. Nevertheless, the desire 
for some links between the two states remained strong, if
r
declining, among their respective populations. It is 
suggested that the principal purpose of the Abgrenzung 
campaign of 1970 was to counter any reactivated desires 
for all-German rapprochement among East German citizens, 
to persuade them that the establishment of relations with 
the Federal Republic did not mean any change in the leader­
ship’s German policy. After a period of intense diplomatic 
activity which include a four power agreement on Berlin 
in 1971? relations were regularised, short of full diplo­
matic recognition, between the two German states, in the 
Basic Treaty which came into force in 1973 • In the same 
year the DDR leadership signalled the end of the Abgrenzung
5* This opposition was stressed by Willi Stoph in Neues 
Deutschland on October 7th, 1970.
6. Some evidence of the desires by East and West German 
citizens for intra-German links may be gathered from 
the surveys presented by Gebhard Schweigler in National-■ 
bewuBtsein in der BRD und in aer DDR, Dusseldorf, 1973*
campaign and repeated that the German question was no Ion 
open."^
This study concentrates on examining the nature of off­
icial East German demarcation and the pressures against 
which the policy was directed, in the period 197011973* 
The measures undertaken to counteract these perceived 
pressures will be considered. Finally, the relative suc­
cess or failure of the policy will be assessed.
7• Honecker' at the 9th SED plenum of May 1973•
1* The Concept- of Demarcation
i. A general definition
In initially considering demarcation in general terms, a 
number of types will be suggested which may serve to clarify 
the specific East German case. Demarcation is interpreted 
as an aspect of inter-group relationships.1 As part of his 
or her wider socialisation, the individual commonly identi­
fies with one or more positive referents; the individual 
may, for instance, develop a sense of belonging to a tribe, 
city, region or nation, or to some specific interest or 
attitude group which forms only part of the population of 
a given community, but which may have adherents throughout 
the world. In addition, individuals may belong simultan­
eously to one or more groupings. However, in learning to 
belong, the individual also learns to differentiate, and to 
exclude. Thus the members of a given group may believe 
that the group represents their shared interests, which 
differ from the interests of other groups.
Here, a form of group prejudice may arise, if a group 
believes that its essential interests are being threatened, 
and, under conditions of strain, a sense of hostility 
towards outside groups may develop. The outward-directed 
hostility of the in-group may be defined as a function of 
its insecurity. Where the nation state is defined as a
1. For an examination of group theory, and of reference
groups, see the International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences, Crowell Collier and Macmillan Inc., 1968.
group, and under conditions of relative security, such 
prejudice may he satisfied by, say, support for the national 
football team. On the other hand, extreme group prejudice 
at the level of the state may lead to war. Accordingly, 
demarcation is understood as the means of expressing the 
prejudice of the in-group; it is an attempt to set limits 
to the levels of cooperation with other groups, in order to 
protect the perceived interests of the in-group.
The various factors influencing the demarcation of one 
group from another may be found singly or in combinations.
The forms in which demarcation expresses itself may be 
mainly racial (South Africa), linguistic (Belgium), relig­
ious (Northern Ireland), or, in the case of the differing 
interests of associations of employers and employees, econ­
omic. These examples do not exhaust the list of apparent 
causes of group prejudice.
The apartheid policy of the government of the Republic 
of South Africa is an overt form of demarcation, which is 
aimed at a wide-ranging differentiation between the minority 
groups of European origin holding power and the majority 
groups of non-European origin. Formerly, when there had 
been less fear of the non-Europeans, demarcation had existed 
between Afrikaners and Anglo-Saxons; the former had expressed 
their group prejudice through a ’laager mentality’. Today, 
these formerly mutually hostile European groups have combined,
without completely abandoning their mutual prejudice, in 
the face of what the believe to be a greater common threat 
from the African majority. From this example it may be 
concluded that the size and combination of groups may change, 
and that for a given subject the object may become a rela­
tively positive rather than a relatively negative referent, 
and vice-versa.
What is common to most of the examples of demarcation
given above is that each group wishes to preserve what it
believes to be its particular culture or sub-culture. In
these cases it would be possible to describe the group
hostility as cultural demarcation. However, this term will
2
be avoided becausb of its ambiguity. I will use the con­
cept of ideological demarcation, defining ideology broadly 
in Edward Shils' terms as a ’pattern of beliefs’, in the 
first place because the group is seen'to defend what it
2. East German cultural demarcation was suggested by Linde- 
mann#>and Muller in the restricted sense of the arts. 
Auswartige Kulturpolitik der DDR. Bonn-Bad Godesberg,
1974* Again, in the DDR culture is either defined widely 
...» ’die Kultur entsteht sowohl in der okonomischen Basis 
als auch im ideologischen Uberbau (Kleines Politsches 
Worterbuch, p. 472) - or narrowly, where it forms a section 
of 1978 editions of Neues Deutschland largely related to 
the arts. I am defining culture in the wider sense as ..* 
'die Gesamtheit der typischen Lebensformen einer B'evol- 
kerung, einschlieBlich der sie tragenden Geistesverfas- 
ung...’ (Worterbuch der Soziologie, Stuttgart, 1969? P- 
568) - interpreting ’Geistesverfassung’ as the sum of. 
values, norms and beliefs.
3* International' Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.
1 9 p. 66. Alternatively, East German sources define 
ideology as a system of ideas. (Kleines Politisches 
Worterbuch, p. 343*
believes to be its interests, and, secondly, because the 
dominant ideology, Marxism-Leninism, claims to be compre­
hensive, and to permeate the socialist culture of the DDR.^
In examining any example of demarcation two main ques­
tions may be posed; (i) Which group believes its :interests 
to be threatened, and from where does it believe the threat 
comes? and (ii) How does the group define its own interests 
and the nature of the threat to those interests? T’o answer 
these questions briefly with respect to the DDR, the East 
German leadership is identified as the group which believes 
its interests to be threatened, and this group further claims 
to be threatened by pressures from the West, particularly 
from the- Federal Republic of Germany., Secondly,, the- DDR 
leadership claims that the ideological expression of its 
interests is threatened by Western, and particularly West 
German liberal democratic ideas, which it :defines in .its 
own ideological terms as the bourgeois ideology ;of capital­
ism (or imperialism). These answers must be qualified as 
follows:
1. East German ideological demarcation has to be considered 
within the framework of a European cleavage between the 
Eastern and Western power blocs, led by the USSR and the 
USA respectively. The former, similarly views the East-
4. For an East German definition of socialist culture see 
Kulturpolitisches Worterbuch, Berlin (East), 1970, 
pp. 320-324.
West opposition in ideological terms as a contest between 
socialism and imperialism. In formulating its policies 
the DDR recognises Soviet ideological preeminence.
2. As within other states, the DDR leadership claims to 
represent and act on behalf of the whole population. The 
state represents a peculiar form of grouping, in that its 
leadership claims a monopoly of force within the area'it 
administers. With the founding of the DDR its rulers,' 
although possessing the capability to enforce their will, 
had to gain the support of the general population for 
their policies, and ultimately for the ideology moti­
vating these policies, if they wished to achieve legit­
imacy.
3. legitimation was hindered by the feeling of belonging 
together (Zusammengehorigkeitsgefuhl) which was widely 
shared by the populations of the two German states.
This expressed itself in the form of a demand for the
unity of the German nation. Both states claimed to be 
the sole representive of the German nation, and each
denied the legitimacy of the other. In the early 1970s
the DDR integrated the national question within its 
ideological system by developing a class-based two 
nation theory.
ii-. A preliminary view of East German demarcation
The international framework within which East German 
demarcation operates was originally determined by factors 
outside the control of either German state. After the 
second world war, Soviet power had extended physically 
into the middle of Germany. The USSR was and remains 
greatly concerned with the security of its Western fron­
tiers, and with the stabilisation and legitimation of its 
enlarged sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. 
In its desire for security the USSR demarcated this area 
from the West through an iron curtain. Initially;, the USA 
did-'not' accept' the. post'war expansion- of Soviet influence 
in Europe. The Cold War developed, and the two parts of 
Germany found themselves devided by a general East-West 
demarcation. Given the ideological differences between 
the Soviet Union and the Western powers, it might be argued 
that the pattern of future demarcation was set before the 
end of hostilities, when the frontiers of the American, 
British and Soviet zones of occupation were agreed.
The territories which came under Soviet military occ­
upation were subjected to a policy of coordination. Among 
the Eastern European allies of the USSR, the extent of 
their adoption of Soviet models and of policy coordin­
ation may be judged from the communiques issued at the
international meetings of the Moscow-oriented Marxist- 
Leninist ruling parties, from the proceedings of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the Polit­
ical-Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organ­
isation and other regional bodies, and also by noting the 
similarities Of constitutions,:party.programmes and party 
statutes of the Eastern European states to those of the 
Soviet Union.
Coordination on the Soviet pattern was imposed within 
the Soviet Zone of Germany. In April 1945 a ready-made 
elite of German communists, the 'Ulbricht Group', was 
flown in from Moscow to direct the preparations for the 
civilian administration of the Soviet Zone. Demarcation 
developed soon after the Nazi capitulation, when the 
four zones of occupation 'came to resemble independant 
countries, with frontiers almost impassible for men and 
materials alike'. The division and divergence of the 
Western and Eastern parts of Germany continued with the 
currency reform introduced in 1948 in the three Western 
zones, to which the USSR responded by stopping interzonal 
traffic and starting the Berlin blockade, with the found­
ing of the two German states in the following year, with 
their subsequent remilitarisation and integration into 
the Western or Eastern power bloc, and with the building 
of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
5*- Alfred Grosser: Germany in Our Time, London, 1971*
In view of the manner in which the DDR is ruled, the 
DDR leadership may be considered to be practically iden­
tical with the SED leadership. Decision-making within 
the higher party organs was regulated according to the 
principles of inner-party democracy and democratic cen­
tralism. Party control of the state was based on the 
Soviet model, with the lines of authority extending down­
ward from the central to the regional and local levels, 
and, at each level, control was extended horizontally over 
the equivalent representative and executive bodies.
Party control at all levels was strengthened through 
the Nomenklatur system, again borrowed from Soviet exper­
ience, through which party cadres were placed in key 
positions^. From 1949 the mechanisms of control were 
further perfected by the introduction of the Soviet- 
type system of voting for a single list of approved 
candidates for representative bodies.
The DDR differs from the Soviet Union in that, although 
perhaps de facto, it is not de jure a one party state.
From 1945 the policy was.to.colonise rather than to pro­
hibit non-communist parties, which were however forced 
to join in an ’anti-fascist bloc', under communist domin­
ation, Moreover, those leaders of the non-communist
6. A detailed exposition of the methods of control in 
the DDR is given in the fourth section of a book by 
Georg Brunner; Kontrolle in Deutschland, Cologne, 
1972, pp. 559-506.
parties whose behaviour displeased the Soviet military
administration were removed. The anti-fascist bloc
became an umbrella organisation, a 'transmission belt'
for mobilising support for the DDR leadership, and came
to include not only all political parties, but all mass
organisations, such as the trade unions," (FDGB). and the
SED youth movement (FDJ). Within the bloc, the KPD
merged with the Hast German SPD to form the SED, which,
at its first congress in January 1949, overtly became a
Marxist-Leninist 'Partei Neuen Types'. In the same year
the bloc was renamed 'Nationale Front des demokratischen
Deutschland!. lit was the Nationale Front, rather than the
SED, which became responsible for the mobilisation of
7
support at house and street level. ’ The name of this
organisation was significant; one DDR source described'
it as the ’Sprecher der patriotischen Krafte-in ganz *
Deutschland’. However, its function of mobilising support
within the DDR was more effective than its effect upon the
West German population. The- organisation’s role was. defined
by the same source as follows:
The Nationale Front ’...stiitzte sich auf das Zusammen- 
wirken der Partein, bezog jetzt aber auch viele politisch 
nicht organisierte Burger, darunter bisher abseits stehende 
Kreise aus dem Burgertum, der Intelligen2 sowie ehemalige 
Mitglieder der NSDAP und frtihere Offiziere der Hitlerwehr- 
macht, die keine Kriegsverbrechen begangen hatten, ein.! 8
7. Winfried Reichert: Die Deutsche Frage, Wurzburg, 1974,
p. 18. For the colonisation of parties and mass organ­
isations by the SED see Gerhart Binder: Deutschland .■: ■
seit 1945, Stuttgart, 1969, pp. 152-157.
8. Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland. Handbuch. 
Berlin (East), 1969, p. 21.
It might also be noted that it was the Nationale Front, 
rather than the SED, which was responsible for the pre­
paration of election manifestos.-and the organisation of
9
a single list of candidates for representative bodies.
Having consolidated its control, the leadership sought 
legitimacy from the East German population. The formal, 
but dubious legitimacy conferred by electoral participation 
and Volkskammer majorities in favour of the Nationale Front 
of almost 100$ was not enough.^ An East German source of 
1973 claimed that the founding of the DDR had been legit­
imised in. law by putting, into effect the provisions of 
the Potsdam agreement, and had been historically legitimised 
by making the goals for which progressive forces in Germany 
had long fought the lav/ of the land (Staatsgesetz)
However, these claims to legitimacy had to be substan­
tiated. The legitimation of state power implied the 
replacement of. coercion by persuasion, and the general 
acceptance of the authority of the leadership. In Et- 
zioni's terms, the need was to move from coercive to
9. Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, pp. 
130-146.
10. See, for example the results of the 1971 Volkskammer 
elections, where 98*48$ of the electorate voted, and the 
Nationale Front gained 99*85$ of the votes cast. Die 
Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 6. 
Wahlperiode, Berlin (East), 1972, pp. 765-785*
11. Karl-Heinz Schoneburg: Staat und Recht in der Geschiche 
der DDR,. Berlin (East), 1973? P* 129*
12remunerative power, and then to normative power-, with 
the predominance of the latter indication the general 
achievement of legitimacy. Coercive power alone might 
become self-defeating, and hinder legitimation.
Prom the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, legitimation 
might be interpreted as a progression from the dictator­
ship of the proletariat to the state of all the people,
where public self-administration would eventually lead
13to the withering away of the state. In other terms, 
legitimacy would be achieved when the belief system of 
the leadership was internalised by the majority of the 
population, with coercive power remaining in the background 
as. an ultimate sanction against deviant minorities.
Public self-administration might be defined in non- 
Marxist-Leninist terms, as a situation where the citizens 
of a state follow without direct supervision the policies 
of the leadership. To return to Etzioni's matrix, three 
levels of involvement might be seen: (i) alienative involv-
ment, through fear of sanctions, (ii) calculative involvement, 
and (iii) moral involvement through identification with the
12. Amitai Etzioni: A Comparative Analysis of Complex
Organisations, New York, 1961.
13• Programma kommunisticheskoi partii sovietskogo soyuza, 
Moscow, 1961, pp. 100-102. Klaus and Buhr categorise 
three periods in the development of the socialist state. 
Philosophisches Worterbuch, pp. 116^-1165• A further 
source described the third period as the state of all 
the people which, it was claimed, had only been reached 
by the TTSSR. Worterbuch zum sozialistischen Staat,
Berlin (East), 197k9 P* 301.
leadership's policies, as a result of the internalisation 
of the belief system which motivates: these policies. The 
third level would represent the highest degree of legit­
imacy. With the internalisation of the leadership's 
ideology, support for the leadership might become self­
regulating. The internalisation of the official ideol­
ogy by the individual might also imply a form of self­
censorship, in that the selection and classification of 
information might also become self-regulating. In the 
case of Marxist-Leninist ideology, this would suggest that 
both processes might be influenced by the theory of an­
tagonistic classes, the socialist/bourgeois cleavage.
Given that Marxism-Leninism views socialism and capital­
ism as opposites, it may be understood how this would tend 
to facilitate a self-regulating ideological demarcation 
among committed .supporters of DDR official ideology.
Within those states where the leadership enjoys a high 
and stable level of diffuse support, the dominant ideology 
tends to be considered uncontroversial, and to be taken 
as given. Under such conditions ideology may come to be 
considered unimportant, or irrelevant, because of its im­
plicit nature. This I would consider to be the main reason 
for the mistaken claim of the 'end of ideology' in the 
Western world.^
14. Here I would agree with Edward Shils. International 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7» P« 75*
Conversely, continual explicit references to the role of 
ideology are characteristic of Marxist-Leninist states, 
including the DDR,, as a motivation for the planned trans­
formation of the state; it is argued that the revolution 
only begins when power is assumed, being accompanied by a 
cultural revolution. Ideological demarcation expresses 
itself in the constant reference to the perceived threat 
from the ideology of capitalism. The concern for ideolog­
ical rectitude was explained by Rudiger Thomas as follows:
’Da die SED als die bestimmende gesellschaftliche Instanz 
ihre Politik durch die Prinzipien des als ’wissenschaftliche 
Weltanschauung’ begriffenen Marxismus-Leninismus legiti- 
miert, ist sie permanent benotigt, ihr eigenes Handeln als 
• konsequente Verwirklichung einer vorgegebenen ideologischen 
Programmatik einsichtig werden zu lassen, die ihrerseits 
in veranderten realgeschichtlichen Situationen jeweils neu 
zu definieren ist’. 15
In this was the DDR leadership is a prisoner of its own id­
eology, since an attack on the ideology is an attack on the 
leadership. Again, reversals of policy have caused problems, 
since both the old and new policies have to be ideologically 
justified. This has often been done not by argument, but 
by the use of a convenient quotation from Marx or Lenin.
The danger was that these authors would become treated as 
infallible deities, rather than thinkers, leading to what 
Ludz described as the ’Leerformelhaftigkeit.of official 
ideology.
15. Modell DDR, Munich, 1978, p. 11.
16. Deutschlands doppelte Zukunft, Munich, 197k•
Since the leadership’s claim to legitimacy was derived 
from Marxism-Leninism, legitimation depended on the success 
ful socialisation of the general population into that ideol 
ogy. This was facilitated by the leadership’s control of 
the education system and of the internal mass media. The 
importance of the education system for the leadership was 
shown by the dismissal of all teachers who had been assoc­
iated with the Nazis, whether actively or passively, and 
their replacement by ideologically reliable but pedagog-
ically untrained Neulehrer. The strict selection and
17control of teachers might be contrasted with the wide 
appeal for cooperation with the government made by the 
Nationale Front to all former Nazis who were not war 
criminals.
The main hindrance to the legitimation of the DDR 
leadership was the question of the German nation. In the 
DDR national sentiment was dysfunctional, since it was 
shared by the citizens of both German states. East Germans 
tended to take the Federal Republic as a reference point, 
and compare it with the DDR, to the latter’s disadvantage. 
In an attempt to check the attraction of the Federal Re­
public, the DDR leadership had felt obliged to follow a 
more intense demarcation policy that was the case with 
its Eastern European allies.
17. Note the strict control of East German teachers shown 
by the section: Aufgaben, Pflichten una Rechte of the
current conditions of employment for teachers in the 
DDR. Arbe^tsordnung fur padagogische Krafte. Sozial- 
istisches Bildingsrecht. Volksbildung. Berlin, 1973 >
pp. 168-170.
The difficulties caused by West German attraction were
increased by the fact that the DDR leadership, to a far
greater extent than its Eastern European neighbours, did
not enjoy a monopoly of information. With the exception
of the Dresden area and the extreme North-East, most parts
of the DDR can receive West German television transmissions,
and all areas can receive radio broadcasts from the Federal
Republic. Television has been used by West German pol-
19iticians to appeal directly to DDR citizens. Moreover, 
the two West German radio stations which broadcast internat­
ionally, Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk, have the stat-
20utary duty of broadcasting to the DDR. It was generally 
not possible for the DDR to jam programmes which were in­
tended to be heard or seen within the Federal Republic.
18. Lothar Loewe: Abends kommt der Klassenfeind, Frank­
furt/M, 1977, p. 47 • The title was taken from an off­
icial DDR slogan: ’Abends urn 19 Uhr kommt der Klassen-
feind ins Wohnzimmer’. .
19* See, for example, Kiesinger’s speech on German unity 
of September 1967, which began: ’Meine lieben Lands-
leute in beiden Teilen Deutschlands!’ Texte zur Deutsch- 
landpolitik, Vol. 1, pp. 158-159* In addition, Loewe 
(p. 102) mentioned that the West German television chan­
nel ARD had arranged to broadcast Wolf Biermarm’s Cologne 
concert on November 19th, 1976, at 10.25 in the evening, 
the best time for reception in the DDR. On January 24th, 
1978, the presenter of the ARD programme, Report, which 
reviewed the anti-leadership manifesto published in Der 
Spiegel in January, declared that, if what he was doing 
was interference in the internal affairs of the DDR, 
he accepted the charge.
20. Staatsbiirgerliche Arbeitsmappe der Zahlenbilder aus 
Politik, Y/irtschaft, Kultur. Berlin (West), 1976,
p. 436/210.
The result of the influence of the West German electronic 
media has been to cause the official East German interpret­
ation of events to be argued more convincingly than else-
21where in Eastern Europe. The suppression of internal 
news has become almost impossible since West German news­
men were permitted to be stationed in the DDR.
A distinction might' be made between ideological demar­
cation in the restricted sense - as a defense mechanism 
against dysfunctional ideas and beliefs - and the physical 
demarcation, the control over persons and goods, which is 
represented in an extreme form by the Berlin Wall. How­
ever, it is argued that these defence measures are ultim­
ately expressions of ideological demarcation, since they 
v/ere ideologically motivated.
21. Note, for example, Karl-Eduard von SchnitzlerTs pro­
gramme on DDR television, which shows and then comments 
on extracts from West German television.
2. East German ideological demarcation in the wider 
East-West context
The demarcation policy followed by the DDR leadership 
against external pressures which are believed to hinder 
the international and domestic legitimation of the DDR 
operates on two levels: firstly, there is a specific
demarcation directed against real or imaginary dysfunc­
tional influences from the Federal Republic, and, secondly, 
a more general demarcation may be indentified, against 
the West. Here the DDR forms part of the Eastern European 
power bloc, led by the USSR, which has put into practice 
a collective demarcation policy against Western pressures 
which are belived to threaten the stability of the social­
ist camp. These two levels of East German demarcation 
are. linked, since the rivalry between the two German 
states has lain at the centre of the.conflict of inter­
est between the two super powers, supported by their re­
spective allies, in Europe. This chapter examines East 
German ideological demarcation at the wider, international 
level.
This view of the relations between the two power blocs 
in Europe is somewhat over-simplified, since in ignores 
the possibilities of intra-bloc disagreements. However, 
the DDR leadership had particular interest in bloc cohe­
sion, in view of its instability, which had largely
resulted from its cultural proximity to the Federal Re­
public, and by the general withholding of international 
recognition, outside of the Eastern bloc, before the Basic 
Treaty between the two German states was signed in 1972.
For the greater part of the post war period Soviet 
policy towards the Federal Republic had appeared to accord 
with that of the DDR, but the DDR leadership nevertheless 
had to face the possibility that the interests of the USSR 
and of the other people’s democracies might diverge from 
those of the DDR. Two examples are given which may have 
served to justify the insecurity of the DDR leadership; 
there were the unsubstantiated rumours current in the 1950s 
that the Soviet Union may have been prepared to consider 
an ’Austrian solution’ for Germany^ - i.e., to sacrifice 
the East German Marxist-Leninist state in exchange for 
all-German neutrality. Secondly, in the second half of 
the 1960s, when the Federal Republic introduced its new 
policy towards Eastern Europe, the DDR feared that its 
allies might enter into agreements with the Federal Re­
public, without insisting on concessions favourable to
2
the DDR as a prerequisite for such agreements. The 
weakness of the DDR leadership’s internal control was 
made clear by the internal disturbances of 1953? where
1. This claim was made by Isaac Deutscher. Russia,
China and the West, 1953-1966, Oxford, 1970.
2. Philip Windsor: Germany and the Management of
Detente, London, 1971*
3Soviet armed support was required to restore order.
The USSR was responsible for the establishment of a 
Marxist-Leninist state in its zone of occupation in Ger­
many. Further, as the dominant member of the Eastern 
bloc, it has exercised the greatest influence upon the . 
wider demarcation policy of the DDR. Accordingly, the 
nature of Soviet ideological demarcation will be con­
sidered briefly before examining its influence upon the 
DDR policy. At the strategic, aspirational level, the 
Soviet Union has claimed that its actions have been 
governed by Marxist-Leninist principles, from v/hich the 
Soviet leadership, like that of the DDR, derives its 
legitimacy.
In accord with the historical determinism of Marx's 
Communist Manifesto, the Soviet leadership claims that 
the whole world will inevitably come to live under a 
communist system. However, at the tactical, operational 
level, this world view may be modified by the short term 
needs of state security. In early Soviet history, examples 
of this phenomenon may be seen in the Treaty of Brest Li- 
tovsk and the New Economic Policy. Similarly, there was 
a certain ambivalence in Soviet policy towards the bellig­
erents on both sides. The USSR was ideologically con­
sistent in categorising both Nazi Germany , on the one
3« Robert Havemann gave an eye-witness account of the
uprising in Berlin in his autobiography Fragen Antworten 
Fragen, Munich, 1970, pp. 109-116.
hand, and the USA and the United Kingdom, on the other, 
as capitalist states, and in distinguishing between the 
bourgeois leaderships of these states and their working 
class general populations. For short term reasons of 
state the Soviet Union cooperated with the Third Reich, 
in order to avoid or delay a possible Nazi invasion, 
and, when the Nazis had invaded the USSR, the latter 
joined the Western allies in an anti-Hitler coalition.
But for ideological reasons Soviet cooperation with the 
Western powers was conditional, and ceased after the Na.zi 
capitulation.
The conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and 
the Western powers after the second world war resulted from 
the Soviet desire to secure the frontiers of the European 
territories it had occupied, which conflicted with the 
American aim of removing Soviet influence from these 
territories. Super power conflict first manifested itself 
in Europe in the series of Berlin crisis which began in 
19U8. Perhaps, as shown by its ambivalent attitude to­
wards its; Western allies during the war, the USSR was 
more aware of potential ideological disagreement than 
were the Western powers. The differing interpretations 
of the democratisation of Nazi Germany, as laid down at 
Potsdam in 1 9 would suggest that the conflict of in­
terests between the two sides was ultimately ideological 
in nature.
The Soviet Union viewed its security problem in Central 
Europe in ideological terms, as a contest between capital­
ism and socialism. In accord with the dialectical method 
of reasoning characteristic of Marxism-Leninism, they 
were considered mutually exclusive. The dangers of nuclear 
war were recognised in the Soviet party programme of 1961, 
which claimed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
the USSR had contributed to the maintenance, of peace, since 
it could no longer be attacked with impunity.^ The pro­
gramme declared that the fundamental question of the time
was the question of war and peace, and that imperialism
5was the sole source of the danger of war.
i. Peaceful coexistence
Having emerged from its pre war relative isolation, 
the USSR found itself with the responsibilities of a 
global power, as the leader of the Eastern European states 
which it had caused to be established on Marxist-Leninist 
principles after the war. The interests of the USSR came 
into conflict with those of the USA and its allies in 
Europe. In order to avoid the danger of war through the 
opposed interests of the two super pov/ers, to avoid 
moving from cold war to hot war, some level of understan­
ding between the two powers was necessary.
/+. Programma kommunisticheskoi partii sovietskogo soyuza, 
Moscow, 1961, p. 59•
5* Tbid, p. 57*
It might he argued that it was easier for the Soviet 
Union to stabilise its relations with the USA than was 
the case in the opposite direction. Here the dialectical 
training of the Soviet Union was heuristically advantag­
eous. Marxism-Leninism tended to regard conflict between 
opposites as the norm, and, as shown by Soviet behaviour 
towards the belligerents in the second world war, it v/as 
possible for the leadership to make a clear distinction 
between military and ideological conflict. Conversely, 
as Brzezinski and Huntington have pointed out, the Amer­
ican political system operated on compromise, and funda- 
mental cleavages tended to produce crises. Thus, after 
the USA came to realise that the behaviour of its former 
ally was not subject to compromise, the reaction of some 
American statesmen, particularly John Poster Dulles, was 
to view the USSR in fundamentalist religious terms, as 
.the embodiment of evil.
For the Soviet Union, the attempt to avoid a fight 
situation in its relations with the United States and 
its allies was justified in ideological terms by the 
’Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states 
with differing social systems1. In the post war period 
this policy has been consistently quoted and elaborated 
by the Soviet Union and its allies, including the DDR."^
6 . Brzezinski and Huntington: Political power: USA/
USSR, Hew York, 1962+.
7 . For an East German definition of peaceful coexistence 
see Philosophisches Worterbuch, ed. C-eorg Klaus/Manfred 
Buhr, Leipzig, 197U> p« U35ff • See also H. Kroger and
H. Wunsche: Friedliche Koexistenz und Volkerrecht, Berl 
(East), 1975.
The 1961 CPSU programme declared that peaceful coexistence 
between socialist and capitalist states was an objective 
necesssity in the development of human society, and that 
war could not and must not serve as a means of solving 
international disputes. It was further claimed that his­
tory had posed the question of peaceful coexistence or a 
catastrophic war. However, if the West were to start an­
other war, the peoples of the world would sweep away and 
bury imperialism.
The Soviet view of international conflict resolution
was explained in the party programme as follows:
’Peaceful coexistence proposes: the rejection of war as
a means of solving questions in dispute between states, 
and their settlement by negotiations; equality of rights, 
mutual understanding and trust between states, taking 
each other’s interests into account; non-interference in 
the internal affairs (of other states - P.D.), the recog­
nition that each people has the exclusive right to decide 
all questions affecting its country; strict respect for 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all count- 
tries; the development of economic and cultural cooper­
ation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.’
On the face of it, the above quotatation appears to advo­
cate a form of conflict resolution similar to Rapoport’s
9concept of a debate situation. However, since the early 
history of the USSR, when a dual foreign policy was con­
ducted by Narkomindel and the Comintern, Soviet policy 
tov/ards capitalist states has simultaneously aimed at 
day to day cooperation with the governments of those
8 . Programma kommunisticheskoi partii sovietskogo soyuza, 
p. 59*
9* Anatol Rapoport: Fights, Games and Debates, Ann Arbor,
I960.
states, while supporting some groups within those states 
which wished to achieve internal socialist revolutions.
The rejection of war and the offers of economic and cul­
tural cooperation contained in the policy of peaceful 
coexistence did not mean ’a weakening of the ideological 
struggle’, in the words of the programme, where it was 
further declared:
’Peaceful coexistence serves as a basis for peaceful 
competition between socialism and capitalism on an inter­
national scale and is a specific form of the class strug­
gle between them. . . Under conditions of-peaceful coex­
istence more favourable possibilities are created for the 
struggle of the working class in capitalist countries...’ 9
I would view peaceful coexistence as the generalised form 
of ideological demarcation practised by the Soviet Union 
and its allies against the West. It was made clear that 
cooperation between East and West does not affect the id­
eological conflict between the two world systems, a con­
flict whose outcome is believed by the Marxist-Leninist 
states to be historically determined in their favour.
On the contrary, it is argued that peaceful coexistence is 
the means of facilitating the ideological struggle, by 
allowing it to proceed under conditions of relatively 
stable relations between the two blocs. It is in this 
light that Soviet proposals for normalising relations in 
Europe, and, more specifically, East German proposals for
9 . Programma kommunisticheskoi partii sovietskogo soyuza, 
p. 59-
the normalisation of relations between the two German 
states, must be considered. Peaceful coexistence is an 
expression of ideological demarcation because it claims . 
that the ideological differences between East and West 
are irreconcilable.
The SED programme of 1963 repeated the definition of 
peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle between 
socialism and capitalism, and' continued that ’... dieser 
Kampf wird als okonomischer, politischer und geistig- 
kultureller Wettstreit zwischen den beiden entgegen- 
gesetzten Systemen ausgetragen, auch in Deutschland.’1^ 
From this it appeared that peaceful coexistence offered 
both conflict and cooperation, particularly in the econ­
omic and cultural spheres. It was to be conditional co­
operation, carefully regulated in order not to exercise 
a negative influence upon the competition between the two 
systems. Because of the thinking of the leaderships of 
the Marxist-Leninist states, all areas of life are claimed 
to be influenced by the dominant ideology. Again, as 
Picaper has suggested,11 there-may be a-.tendency for these 
leaderships to assume that there is a similar centralised 
control, which is consciously ideologically motivated, in 
the Western states. This may explain why the leaderships
10. Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutsch- 
lands. Berlin (East), 1963? p. 57*
11. Jean-Paul Picaper: Kommunikation und Propaganda in
der DDR. Stuttgart, 1976, pp. 66-67*
of the Eastern European people's democracies sometimes 
appear to infer pressures upon the ideological stability 
of their states from economic and cultural exchanges which 
are apparently neutral. Such inferences may be justified 
by the suggestion that the citizens of the Western states 
have successfully internalised the dominant ideologies of 
their states, that they are unconscious bearers of liberal 
democratic ideology.
The need for ideological demarcation w/as of more immed­
iate importance for the DDR than for the Soviet Union.
In the latter case the problem was rather one of stabilis­
ing Soviet control in the newly occupied territories, 
which formed a buffer zone between the USSR and the West. 
The ideological demarcation to which Soviet citizens were 
subjected in some ways resembled the operation of the 
’official ideology’ of Nicholas I in the early 19th cen­
tury; in both cases the introduction of dysfunctional 
information from the West was hindered by physical dis­
tance and by differences in culture and language. More­
over, Marxist-Leninists had controlled Russia since 1917* 
Here it was a question of maintaining an ideological 
status quo, whereas in the DDR the ideological socialis­
ation of the population,.on which the leadership’s legit­
imacy depended, had been practised for a much shorter 
time, and had been accepted by a relatively lower per­
centage of the population.
The apparent contradiction between cooperation and con­
flict contained in peaceful coexistence was resolved by 
the DDR leadership in the cultural sphere through a policy 
of cultural demarcation, where cultural exchanges, both
in the Federal Republic and in other Western states, were
12used for political ends. The DDR also appeared to have 
been relatively successful in separating economic cooper­
ation with the West from any ideological contamination.
In particular, the trade links benefical to the DDR were
13expressly excluded from the area of ideological conflict.
The economic reforms introduced by Ulbricht from 1963
appeared to place efficiency before ideology, by giving
greater importance to monetary controls.1^ On the other
hand, Philip Windsor noted that the DDR had reproached
Czechoslovakia and Hungary for permitting the development
of pluralism within their societies, as a consequence of
economic reforms based on the theories of the Soviet econ-
15omist Liberman.
12. Hans Lindemann/Kurt Muller: Auswartige Kulturpolitk
der DDR, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 197^ -
13* Note Stoph's neutral comment on intra-German trade at
the 13th SED plenum of June 1970. Texte zur Deutschland- 
politik, Vol. 5? P« 308.
li+. For a West German evaluation of the New Economic System 
(N0S), 1963-71967? and the subsequent Economic System of 
Socialism (CSS), see DDR Handbuch, Cologne, 1975? P« 596 
and p. 629ff«
15* Germany and the Management of Detente, London, 1971*
It is argued that the ideological demarcation of the 
Warsaw Treaty member states was directed against the intro­
duction of dysfunctional information from the West. This 
process was described by the USSR and its allies as ’id-
16eological sabotage’, leading to ’ideological subversion’. 
Greater stress began to be placed on this factor in the 
early 1960s, with the move from cold war to detente, when 
nuclear confrontation began to be increasingly modified 
by the mutual desire of the two super powers to control 
the growth of thermo-nuclear weapons.
An East German article of 1973? which was typical of the
collective Eastern European viewpoint, claimed to explain
the reasons why the United States had begun its policy of 
* 17detente. It was argued that the USA had been obliged to 
abandon its doctrine of strategic superiority as a result 
of changes in the international balance of power ’zugunsten 
des Sozialismus’. The article analysed the concept of 
national interest as allegedly perceived by the American 
dominant elite, and suggested that the national interest 
of the USA was divided into three elements; the protection 
of territorial frontiers, the protection of the socio­
political status quo in the USA and the maintenance and 
creation of international relations which were favourable 
to the development of American capitalism. It was argued
16. See the definition -of ideological sabotage in Kleines 
Politisches WOrterbuch, Berlin (East), 1973? P« 3k5?£•
17• Gunther Urban: Aspekte der Anpassung in der Strategie
des US-Imperialismus an das internationale Krafte- 
verhaltnis. Deutsche AuBenpolitk, 1973? P* 1159ff.
further that the role played by military power in the safe­
guarding of the Americian national interest was becoming 
less effective, that the second inaugural speech of Pres­
ident Nixon, delivered on January 20th, 1973? had repre­
sented a change in the American leadership:1 s perception 
of the national interest, by suggesting competition through 
the force of ideas rather than of arms - i.e., that he 
was proposing arrangements somewhat similar to peaceful 
coexistence.
A further East German source of 1969 had suggested that 
American policy was being pursued by ideological rather 
than military means, under the changed conditions of de­
tente. It was declared:
*'•••- der endgiiltige Zusammenbruch aller Zusammenbruchs:- 
illusionen, das Scheitern der Hoffnungen auf ein „roll 
back”, das Piasko der „Politik der Starke” haben zu einer 
Umorientierung der gesamten Strategie. und Taktik des 
Imperialismus gegenuber dem sozialistischen Lager ge- 
fuhrt. Politisch driickt sich die daraus neu hervor- 
gegangene Linie in der „Neuen Ostpolitik” und der Politik 
des lfBruckenschlages” aus. Auf ideologisch-theoretischem 
Gebiet^wird sie von der Entwicklung der psychologischen 
Kriegfiihrung und von der Anwendung der Methode der Diver­
sion auf ideologischem Gebiet begleitet...f 18
The suggestion might be raised here that ideological
sabotage is the Western contribution to the ’geistig-
kultureller Wettstreit’, which the 1963 SED programme
claimed was a part of peaceful coexistence. However,
the ideological filters which conditioned the thought
18. Herbert MeiBner. Konvergenztheorie und Realitat, 
Berlin (East), 1969? P* 122.
ii. Gonvergence and allied theories
The Moscow oriented people’s democracies maintained that 
socialism and capitalism v/ere irreconcilable. Moreover, 
for reasons of legitimacy they claimed that only their own 
brand of Marxism-Leninism was valid, categorising other 
.forms of socialism as left or right opportunism, and firm­
ly declaring that social democracy- or social democratism, 
as DDR sources called it - was a form of bourgeois ideol­
ogy. Accordingly, the.theories of the industrial society, 
which was claimed to show common traits in both its soc­
ialist and capitalist form, and of the convergence of the 
two systems, associated with the names of such writers as
Galbraith, Sorokin and Tinbergen, which began to gain
19currency in the West from the end of the 1950s, J were, 
viewed in Eastern Europe as a particularly dangerous form 
of ideological subversion, since they appeared to reject 
the Marxist-Leninist class-based differentiation between 
the two systems. In its original .form convergence theory, 
claimed that the industrialised countries in both East 
and West would, in the course of technological develop­
ment, be obliged to follow similar patterns of economic
19* For a detailed East German analysis of the development 
of convergence theory and its relationship to the 
theory of the industrial society see Gunther Rose: 
ylndustriegesellschaft” und Konvergenstheorie, Berlin 
(East.), 197^* Rose examined the development of these 
theories both in the international and the intra-German 
context.
processes of the official commentators of the Eastern 
bloc did not permit this conclusion to be drawn. It is 
possible to argue a good/bad distinction between the 
propaganda of the two sides, the one being fgesetzmaLig’ 
and ’parteilich’, and the other ’counter-revolutionary’, 
provided that one accepts the value-loaded terminology 
in which the Eastern European case is presented. If 
a distinction which is not expressed in value-loaded terms 
is attempted, it is perhaps that the former is largely 
defensive, and the latter largely offensive, and that both 
have the aim of influencing the citizens of the people’s 
. democracies.
The preservation of the official ideology is of vital 
importance for the stability of the Eastern European 
people’s democracies. Since the leaderships of these 
states claim that the ’scientific’ principles of Marxism- 
Leninism, as interpreted by themselves, offer them the 
sole correct guide to action and interpretation of events, 
then any attack on their belief system and any alternative 
ideology will tend to be interpreted by the rulers and 
ruled as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the 
former. This is one reason why the reactions in the 
Eastern bloc to Western propaganda have been greater than 
any Western reactions to Marxism-Leninism, and this ideo­
logy is generally freely and legally propagated in the 
West.
and social organisation, which might eventually produce 
a convergence of their political systems. In some ver­
sions of the theory it was argued that these political 
systems would converge towards a type of liberal democ-'. 
racy. Convergence theory has been applied particularly 
to comparative studies of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The theory would appear to be based on principles 
similar to the Marxist concept of base and superstructure, 
if the organisation of the economy were equated with the 
base and the political system with the superstructure, 
for both Marxist and convergence theory suggested that 
the one influenced the other. This might explain why
Brzezinski and -Huntington described convergence theory
20as ’anti-Soviet Marxism’. Convergence theory further 
suggested that industrialisation would result in grow­
ing pluralism and diversity within a given society, so 
that within the peopleTs democracies each ruling party 
would lose its power of direction, and would be obliged 
to assume the role of a mediator between competing in­
terests. It might be argued that differing views be­
tween party theorists, military and economic specialists 
are as inevitable in the East as in the West, but in 
pracise signs of disagreement tend to be excluded from 
the official media of the Marxist-Leninist states, as 
if disagreement meant weakness, the leading role of the
20. Brzezinski and Huntington. Political "power: USA/
USSR, New York, 1962+ •
ruling party is constantly stressed, and pluralism is con­
demned as Teine Klasse idealistischer Weltanschauung’, 
which denies, ’das Wirken allegemeingultiger GesetzmaBig- 
keiten’.21
In addition, convergence theory claimed that the increa­
sing affluence produced by industrialisation would lead to 
a decline in the importance of ideology (Entideologisierung), 
within both camps. This appeared to suggest that the prin­
ciples upon which the Eastern European ruling elites 
based their legitimacy would cease to be important. And 
worse still, Brzezinski and Huntigton declared that the 
Chinese communists, who also claimed to be the leaders 
of Marxism-Leninism, were accusing the USSR of convergence 
with; the West.22
One way in which economic convergence between East and
West might be argued is by comparing Eastern European
command economies with the growth of the state sector
of the economy in most Western countries - state monopoly
capitalism, in Marxist-Leninist terms. In a East German
23definition of state monopoly capitalism it was declared
21. Xleines Politisches Worterbuch, Berlin (East), 1973? 
p. 652ff.
22. Political power: USA/USSR, p. 9* See^also an East
German critique of Maoism as a ’kleinbiirgerlich ver- 
wurzelte politis.ch-ideologsische StromungVin Philo- 
sophisches Worterbuch, ed. Georg Klaus/Manfred Buhr, 
Leipzig, 197U? PP« 737-738.
23* Kleines Politisches Worterbuch, pp. 828-830.
that, as the privately owned economies of the capitalist 
states became more complicated through the application of 
advanced technology and the growth of monopolies, enormous 
investments in science, research and education were re­
quired, ‘ which the private owners were unable to provide. 
These investments, it was argued, were found through tax­
ation by the state in the interests of monopoly capitalism. 
State monopoly capitalism meant the end of free compet­
ition and the replacement of liberal democracy by a form 
of totalitarian domination.
But was not the expropriation of private industry during 
the initial phase of the revolution in Marxist-Leninist 
states, the dictatorship of the proletariat, also a form 
of totalitarian domination? Did not each ruling party 
aspire.to total control of all areas of society? Here 
the Marxist-Leninist answer would be that it was a dic­
tatorship of the proletariat rather than of the bourgeoisie.
This distinction - in whose interests?: - was one of the 
main arguments used in the attempt to refute convergence
2ii
theory. An article by Kurt Zeisler^- declared that there 
was a ’cardinal theoretical error’ in the Western concept of 
the industrial society and of the early forms of conver­
gence theory, because, ’... while on the one hand they
2l±. The Theory of Current Imperialist Strategy. German
Foreign Policy, Vol. X, . 1971/1 • The class-based dis­
tinction' between the two systems was also stressed 
by Herbert MeiBner: Konvergenztheorie. Dokumente der
Zeit, 1969/6.
(Western theorists - P.D-) construe a causality between 
the development of the productive forces and the super­
structure of society, they on the other hand largely ig­
nore the significance of the social and economic- basis for 
the character of the social system, i.e. the relations of 
production and the basic question of who owns the decisive 
means of production’.
In defining a ’theory of current imperialist strategy’, 
which had allegedly resulted from a change in the world 
balance of power to the benefit of the socialist coun­
tries, Zeisler had noted that early convergence theory 
had been found wanting in the West by Brzezinski and 
Huntington. Zeisler argued that they had only condemned 
its most obvious illusions, and thereby propounded ’a 
more flexible but also more aggressive variation of the 
convergence theory’. Brzezinski and Huntington had pre­
dicted evolution (or erosion), rather than convergence, 
having declared that ’••* in reality, most convergence 
theories postulate not a convergence of the systems, but 
the downfall of the other system...’ Such thinking would 
appear especially relevant to the relations between the 
two German states, and throw some light on East German 
suspicions of rapprochement and'’bridge-building’ with 
the Federal Republic, seeing this as an attempt to 
annex the DDR.
According to Zeisler, imperialist strategy was clearly 
based on a counter-revolutionary model of evolution, and 
had tried to avoid the previous error of underestimating 
questions of political power and the role of production 
relationships, when investigating social developments in 
the people’s democracies. He claimed that there was the 
possibility of a cultural lag in the social consciousness 
of the producer in a socialist society under conditions of 
rapid change, whith the danger of the reactivation of 
’petit bourgeois’ modes of thinking on account of the up­
heavals caused by change. The aims of current imperialist 
strategy further included the ’de-ideologisation’ of the 
people’s democracies, the elimination of the leading role 
of the ruling party, Zeisler argued, with the growth of 
pluralism, the destruction of democratic centralism and 
the end of centralised planning. He declared!that the 
counter-revolutionary process would begin in the super­
structure and then extend to the production relationships 
at the base.
25A further East German writer, Herbert MeiBner, ^ linked 
convergence theory with ideological sabotage, declared 
that, after the rethinking which had led to the nev/ Ost- 
politik, Western Soviet and Eastern European specialists 
had come to accept the socialist system as historically
23. Herbert MeiBner, Konvergenztheorie und Realitat.
legitimate, and that the main tactical thrust of their ar­
gument was now aimed at improving socialism. This was to 
be seen in the proposals for ’market socialism’, ’humane 
(menschlich) socialism’, ’democratic socialism’, ’liberal 
socialism’ and so on.
While appearing to understand the concern of some Western 
specialists as well-meaning, but misguided, such develop­
ments were condemned by MeiBner:
’Bei manchen progressiven biirgerlichen intellektuellen 
mogen solche Uberlegungen tiber die Weiterentwicklung des 
SQzialistischen Systems sogar durchaus ehrlich gemeint 
sein. Gesellschaftlich relevant wird aber nicht ihre 
gute Absicht, sondern ihre im Prinzip antisozialistische 
Tendenz. Hier wird das G'esetz der ideologischen Integra­
tion wirksam, nach./welchem Auffassungen progressive Au- 
toren, die nicht vollig den Interessen der Monopolbour- 
geoisie entsprechen, aber auf der Grundlage burgerlicher 
Ideologie und Weltanschauung aufbauen, in das reaktionare 
Gesamtsystem des Imperiaiismus integriert werden. Grund- 
satzlich sind all die theoretischen Bemiihungen urn eine 
„Verbesserung” des. Sozialismus ein Ausdruck jener neuen 
Methoden des ideologischen Kampfes, die als ideologische 
Diversion zu bezeichnen sind.’ 26
When condemning these attempts to modify socialism, it 
is likely than MeiBner had in mind not only ’progressive 
bourgeois intellectuals’, but also the proposals for re­
form from within the socialist camp, and expecially the 
Czechoslovak experiment which was stopped in 1968. In 
this connection it would seem useful to examine the views 
of Ota Sik, an economist who had formerly been a member of
26. Konvergenztheorie und Realitat, pp. 122-123*
the DubSek administration, and who now lives in Switzerland. 
§ik suggested a ’third way’ between socialism and capital­
ism. In his book, ’der Dritte Weg’, he called for a demo­
cratic, humane socialism which rejected the fundamental 
principles of communism, the dictatorship of the prolet­
ariat, the one-party system, state ownership of industry and
27dirigiste central planning. The workers who had suffered
under capitalism became even less free after the revolution;
socialist ownership of property was defined as a ’staats-
28monopolistische Aneignungsweise'.
§ik saw conservative forces on both sides. The black-and- 
white positions of the dogmatists of capitalism and comm­
unism were claimed to be on the same methodological plane:
’Die konservativen Ideologen beider; Seiten ..* werden 
vor allem. den Theoretiker verfolgen, der versucht, diese 
Kluft innerhalb einer Wissenschaft zu iiberbriicken. Wie 
den konservativen Politikern beider Seiten geht es ihnen 
vor allem urn die Erhaltung Hires-Reiches - diesen urn ihr 
geistiges, den anderen urn ihr sehr materielles politisches 
Reich. Trotz heftigster gegenseitiger Bekampfung werden 
sich die Vertreter der entgegengesetzten Systeme jeweils 
mit der Existenz der Ideologie des anderen so weit abfinden, 
als ihr eigenes Reich dabei unangetastet bleibt. In diesen 
Sinn werden daher konservative Ideologen beider Systeme 
einander in einer Hinsicht sehr gut verstehen: in ihrer
Verteufelung aller Reformer und aller Konvergenz-Ideen. 
Solche Ideen untergraben ihre Machtpositionen und sind 
viel gefahrlicher als die alien gegnerischen Ideen, die 
. man schlieBlich recht zuverlassig unterdruckt und tot- 
geschwiegen hat.’ 29
27* Der Dritte V/eg. Die marxistisch-leninistische Theorie 
und die moderne Industriegesellschaft. Hamburg, 1972.
28. Argumente fur den Dritten Y/eg. Hamburg, 1973
29. Der Dritte Weg, p. 15-
Whereas Sik had his long experience as a member of a 
ruling communist party on which to base his judgement of 
the attitudes of party theorists towards convergence theory 
and proposals for reform, the extent to which it could be 
claimed that this situation was paralleled in the West was 
doubtful. Party theorists do not have the same standing 
and influence in the West, convergence theory was the 
creation of Western political theorists, and may now be 
discredited by some writers, but it is not officially 
condemned as anathema. However, Sik could argue that -some 
radical critics and would-be reformers have been persecuted 
in the West, if one includes not only the liberal democra­
cies but also the dictatorships included under the heading 
of capitalist states. But within the liberal democracies 
leading the Western bloc radicals are more likely to be 
valued as original thinkers, as happened to the socialist 
§ik in capitalist Switzerland. No radical thinker in the 
liberal democracies was ever subjected to the. treatment 
which Rudolf Bahro received in 1977 from the Bast G-erman 
authorities.
Although the leaderships of the people’s democracies 
have been hostile to internal or external attempts to 
challenge the ideological bases of their legitimacy, some 
ideological evolution, under party control, has taken 
place since Stalin’s death. The stagnation and emptiness 
of Stalinist official ideology has to some extent been
complemented by new theories which have taken account of 
the growth of the social sciences, especially systems and 
information theory.
These developments in the social sciences would appear 
to offer both potential advantages and disadvantages to 
the party leaderships; it was therefore important that 
the introduction of social science-based theories should 
be under party control. The economic reforms associated 
with Liberman, which were first introduced in the DDR in 
1963 in the New Economic System of Planning arid'Control 
(nGs )v might be viewed as a means of attaining greater 
economic efficiency - or as a step towards the reintro­
duction of a capitalist market economy. Events in Czecho* 
Slovakia, where economic and political reform went hand 
in hand, might be seen by the party leaderships as a 
warning.
I would suggest that Ulbricht, often wrongly portrayed
as the most Stalinist of the Eastern European party
leaders, had been remarkably successful in controlling
and furthering the process of ideological adaptation
within the DDR, sometimes himself formulating concepts
■50
which differed from those of his allies. On the one
30. See Harmut Zimmermann on Ulbricht’s reinterpretation 
of socialist theory. The GDR in the 1970s, Problems 
of Communism, March-April 1978, pp. 8-9 .
hand contacts with the West were more strictly limited 
after 1961 than was the case with the other Eastern Eur­
opean states, and a close ideological uniformity had been 
maintained in the media and education system; on the other 
hand, the concept of inner-party democracy had been inter­
preted to permit some freedom of discussion on fundamental 
issues among restricted and trusted groups. An example 
of this was seen in a 1961; symposium on the effects of
technological change upon the official, ideology, where
31differing viewpoints were presented.
Ernst Richert suggested that the permitting of some
expression of' differing views followed Kadar’s dictum:
32*wer nicht wider uns ist, ist fur uns’. Again, Peter
Christian Ludz has written of DDR ’institutionalised 
33revisionism’-, under which a new generation,of TMarxist- 
Leninist theoreticians were permitted to reinterpret the 
official ideology in terms of cybernetics, provided that 
they remained;:within~ bounds 'acceptable to the SED leader­
ship. The leadership’s acceptance of the interesting
32.
theories of Georg Klaus^ may be contrasted with its
31• Theoretische Probleme der wissenschaftlich-technischen 
Revolution. Univeristat Rostock, Protokoll einer Ar- 
beitsberatung der Fachrichtung Philosophie des Instituts 
fur Marxismus-Leninismus am 3* und £;• September 1961;*
32. Die DDR-Elite Oder Gnsere Partner von morgen? Reinbek 
bei Hamburg, 1968.
33. The changing party elite in East Germany, Cambridge, 
Mass, 1972.
3k* See, for example^ Sprache der Politik, Berlin (East),
1972, and Kybernetik und Gesellschaft, Berlin (East),
1973.
treatment of Robert Havemann. Havemann relates in his
called for greater freedom and an end to dogmatism at a 
hostile party meeting, but had received the support of 
Ulbricht himself. However, Havemann would not play the 
part of an ’institutionalised revisionist’, despite his 
good connections with the SED leadership, and suffered 
exclusion from the party, loss of job and police super­
vision.
In the case of Klaus it might be argued that the leader­
ship saw his theories as a means of attaining greater ad­
ministrative efficiency and more, effectives social control 
- in the words of Ludz, the offered the possibility of a 
refunctionalisation, rather than the annihilation of the 
prevailing ideology. At present the main source of dys­
functional ideologies appears to be the DDR itself, with 
the anti-Leninist theories of Havemann and Bahro, which 
is complemented by the growth of eurocommunism, itself 
arguably anti-Leninist, within Western communist parties. 
It remains to be seen how the DDR and the other people’s 
democracies will cope with this challenge.
after the XX CPSU congress, he had
35* Fragen Antworten Fragen. Aus der Biographie eines 
Deutschen Marxisten. Munich, 1970.
3- The development of East German ideological demarcation 
from the Federal Republic, in the period up to 1969
i. Early signs of ideological demarcation
The divergence of the Eastern and Western zones of oc­
cupation in Germany began with the Nazi, capitulation, with 
the establishment in the Soviet zone of an ’anti-fascist - 
democratic’ administration led by German communists, headed 
by Ulbricht, who had been flown in from the Soviet Union.
This period was characterised by the ’democratic land re­
form’, the division of large estates among the peasantry, 
and: by the expropriation of large-scale industry.^ These 
measures were accompanied by the beginnings of a cultural 
revolution, the most important being the ’democratic school 
reform’ of 1945* which placed the education system under 
Marxist-Leninist control. The cultural policy of the time 
was described by an East German source of 1974 as follows:
’Ein energischer Kampf wurde fur die geistig-kulturelle 
Erneuerung, zur Ausrottung des faschistischen und mili- 
tarischen Ungeistes, gegen den tiefverwurzelten Anti- 
kommunismus gefuhrt••. Nach dem Jahrzehnte wahrenden 
Feldzug der Reaktion gegen den wissenschaftlichen Kommu- 
nismus konnten die Ideen von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels 
und Wladim'ir Iljitsch Lenin ungehindert verbreitet werden’ .
1. For a West German account of these events, with the sys­
tematic elimination of all opposition, see Die-Deutsche 
Frage, Wurzburg, 1964* See also Part I of the SED pro­
gramme of 19o3« A popular description is given in DDR. 
Werden und Wachsen. Berlin (East), 1974*
2. 25 Jahre Deutsche Demokratische Republik - ein Viertel- 
jahrhundert Kampf fur Frieden, Demokratie und Sozialismus 
Berlin (East), 1974*
With the establishment of the DDK in 1949? the building
of a Marxist-Leninist society, based on the Soviet model,
became the overt policy of the new regime. This goal had
been expressed in the manifesto addressed to the German
people on the occasion of the founding of the Socialist
Unity Party in 1946? where it was declared:
’Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands will aber 
bei dem Aufbau einer antifaschistisch-demokratischen Re- 
publik nicht stehenbleiben. Ihr Ziel ist die sozialis­
tische Gesellschaftsordnung..•’ 3
The aim was a socialist society in the whole of Germany,
since the manifesto was meant for all Germans.
However, the SED only controlled part of Germany, and only 
within the Soviet zone could it begin to propagate effective­
ly the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and to suppress all 
counter-ideologies. The party leadership had to deal with 
the problem of socialising the rank-and-file members of the 
SED, as opinion leaders, before it had the capacity to con­
centrate on the political education of the general population 
Some of the difficulties faced by the leadership were to be 
seen in a commentary of 1949:
’... das sehr niedrige theoretische Niveau der Mehrzahl 
unserer Parteimitglieder und die in den Jahren 1946/47 
noch sehr mangelhafte Orientierung der Partei auf die 
Betriebsarbeit und die schwache organisatorische und 
ideologische Arbeit der Parteileitungen in den Betrieben 
sind eine weitere wichtige Ursache fur die qualvoll 
langsame Befreiung aus der Ideologic des Kapitalismus 
und die ideologische TJmstellung der Arbeiterklasse und
3. Manifest des Vereinigungsparteitages an das deutsche. 
Volk. (Reprinted in Einheit, 1961/4? p. 517)-
groBe Teile unserer Mitgliedschaft• Hinzu kam eine^tlber- 
lastung der relativ kleinen Zahl von Parteifunktionaren 
mit rein praktischer Arbeit, die sie hinderte, ihr theo- 
retisches Wissen zu vertiefen.’ 4
Officially promoted socialisation was hindered, both from 
within the DDR, and from the West, especially from the Fed­
eral Republic, with whose citizens the majority of East 
Germans retained strong affective ties. The problem of 
possible ideological subversion from these sources was posed 
in the SED programme of 1963:
’Der Mensch der sozialistischen Gesellschaft entwickelt 
sich' in dem konflik.treichen ProzeB der Auseinandersetzung 
mit den ideologischen Nachwirkungen der kapitalistischen 
Vergangenheit und mit den Einfliissen feindlicher Ideolo- 
gien, die vor allem aus Westdeutschland in die Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik getragen werden. Die Zerschlagung 
der imperialistischen Ideologien ist ein entscheidender 
Teil der geschichtlichen Aufgabe der deutschen Arbeiter- 
klasse und ihrer Vorhut in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik.’ 5
Among the negative Western influences condemned by the SED,
particular hostility was directed towards West German
social democracy. The programme continued:
’Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands bekampft 
die antisozialistische Ideologie jener rechten sozial- 
demokratischen Fiihrer, die aufs engste mit den westdeutschen 
Imperialisten und Militaristen zusammenarbeiten. Sie setzt 
sich mit dem modernen Revisionismus und Reformismus ausein- 
ander, der die Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 
entstellt und die Arbeiterklasse vom konsequenten Kampf urn 
die Erfiillung ihrer geschichtlichen Aufgabe abzuhalten 
versucht.’
4* Kurt Benda: Neue Aufgaben - Neues BewuBtsein. Einheit,
19U9/1, p. 26.
5* Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutsch­
lands, Berlin (East)? 1963? P* 127*
It was perhaps important for the DDR leadership to make 
a sharp distinction between West German social democracy 
and Marxism-Leninism - and the controversy may be traced 
back through the inter-war years to the revisionism of 
Eduard Bernstein - since the two movements had shared com­
mon roots, and it might therefore be argued that there were 
historical grounds for the West German SPD to claim to 
offer an alternative socialist path. In the contemporary 
East German view two trends had developed in the German 
SPD in the first half of the 20th century; it was claimed 
that there was a bourgeois side to the party, whose leaders 
had postulated a non-Marxist ’third way’ to socialism, and 
a proletarian side, the members of which in the Eastern zone 
of occupation had joined the German communists to form the 
SED. It was argued that contemporary social democracy 
(usually described by DDR sources as ’social democratism’
- P.D.) ’... propagiert einen „demokratischen Sozialismus”, . 
als angebliche ,,Alternative zum Kommunismus'” , with the 
function of ’Diversion gegen die sozialistische Staaten- 
gemeinschaft durch „modernisierten” Antikommunismus und
Schiirung des Nationalismus* and ’ideologische „Aufweichung"
6der sozialistischen Staaten...’ The post war history of 
the West German SPD and the behaviour of SPD ministers in 
the Federal government from 1966 would appear to justify 
some part of the East German claims. In particular, since
6 . Kleines Politisches Worterbuch, pp. 754-758.
the G-odesberg Programme of 1959? in which the SPD finally 
abandoned the Marxist variant of socialism, there would 
appear to be little in common between West German social 
democracy and East German Marxism-Leninism.
An example of early anti-SPD propaganda is found in an 
Einheit article of 1949? where an SED group in Thuringia 
was accused of nationalistic deviations and anti-Soviet be­
haviour, denying the fact that the Soviet army had freed 
Germany from fascism, and had given great assistance in 
the development of a new democratic order in the Soviet 
zone. The party secretariat for Thuringia, it was declared:
’...zeigte eine ungenugende Y/achsamkeit in ideologischen 
Fragen und hat die propagandistische und organisatorische 
Tatigkeit der Schumacher-Agenten und anderer feindlicher 
Krafte nicht gemigend zum AnlaB genommen zu einem ent- 
entschlossenen ideologischen Kampf in den Betrieben und 
demokratischen Massenorganisationen.’ 7
Organisational measures were not enough to combat these 
deviations, it was argued. What was required was fund­
amental and systematic ideological work, to raise the 
ideological level of the whole garty membership. There 
were several articles published at this time attacking 
the West German SPD, which possibly was associated with .
DDR and Soviet hostility to the events leading up to the
8founding of the Federal Republic of Germany.
7. tlber die Gefahr nationalistischer Abweichungen. Einheit, 
1949/6, p. 484-
8 . For instance, two articles in Einheit 1949/7* Wach- 
samkeit und politische Y/eitsicht. Die Gefahren des 
Trotzkismus und Sozialdemokratismus, p. 590ff, and 
Feindliche Bruder, p. 623ff•
The national question
The early forms of East German ideological demarcation 
were not directed against the West German population, but 
against its leadership, including the leaders of the SPD 
opposition. The East German leadership claimed that it 
alone represented the interests of the whole German na­
tion, that the solution of national questions was to be
9
found in socialism. Within each German state, a shared 
sense of national unity found its expression in a.general 
desire for unification, and this was recognised by both 
governments. The goal of ’staatliche Einheit’ was included 
in both the West German Basic Law of 1949 and the SED pro­
gramme of 1963* Article 1 of the first DDR constitution 
of 1949 had declared that Germany was an ’unteilbare.'Re- 
publik’ and that there was only one German nationality 
(Staatsangehorigkeit).
National consciousness was potentially both advantageous 
and disadvantageous for the legitimation of the two German 
governments. This was shown by an apparent contradiction 
in the policies of the two states. Both professed a desire 
for unification, but on the other hand both were following 
diverging paths, which appeared to make the realisation 
of this goal more difficult. This contradiction might be
9# ’Dieses Ziel, die Losung der nationalen und sozialen
Lebensfragen unseres Volkes, kann nur durch den Sozial- 
ismus erreicht werden.’ Bokumente der Einheit, Berlin 
(East), 1946.
explained by the fact that the legitimation of the two gov­
ernments would have been greaty impeded if unification had 
not been presented as a basic aim of their policies. How­
ever, both states placed the stabilisation of their rule 
before unification. Both sides considered that stabilis­
ation would best be served by adapting the social systems 
of their respective states to those of their allies, by 
integration within the international organisations of the 
two power blocs.
Each side had to feel sufficiently sure of internal sup­
port before it would consider engaging in negotiations for 
unification. With both states placing stabilisation and 
bloc cohesion above the question of national unity, where 
both claimed the sole right to represent the interests of 
the German nation, and each state further declared that the 
government of the other was illegal. Both states attempted 
to force unification on their own terms; for instance, 
Article li+6 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic de­
manded the ’free decision’ of the German people on this 
question - i.e., according to a liberal democratic voting 
system - whereas the East German Prime Minister, Otto 
Grotowohl, had declared at the time the DDR was founded:
’Die Bildung dieser Regierung ist der Ausdruck der Tat- 
sache, daB die demokratischen Krafte unseres Volkes nicht 
gewillt sind, sich mit der Spaltung unseres Vaterlandes 
und der Versklavung seiner westlichen Teile abzufinden, 
sondern daB sie von dem eisernen Willen beseelt sind,
beharrlich den Kampf urn die Wiedererlangung der Einheit 
Deutschlands und seiner Souveranitat auf demokratischer 
(in the Marxist-Leninist sense - P.D.) und friedlicher 
Grundlage zu fiihren. 10
Some months before the founding of the two German states,
an article in Einheit posed the question whether for the 
DDR national policy was inoppportune, concluding that it 
was not."^ rt was declared that the German people had to 
solve the elementary tasks of restoring national unity and 
national sovereignty. In the Eastern zone the Soviet oc­
cupying forces had placed no obstacles in the way of a
national policy. The article continued:
’Durch die Bodenreform und die Enteignung der Kriegs- und 
Naziverbrecher wurden die Voraussetzungen der nationalen 
Katastrophe in der Ostzone beseitigt••• So ist die Ost- 
zone heute die Keimzelle einer kunftigen deutschen Ein­
heit, die Basis des Kampfes fur die deutsche Einheit und 
Souveranitat.’ 12
The Western parts of Germany, it was argued, were dominated 
by the imperialist powers. Anti-national German politicians 
had the upper hand in the Western parts of Germany, agree­
ing to everything the imperialists desired. In an attempt 
to link the national quest ion,, with a class-based Marxist- 
Leninist analysis, it was declared that the German working 
class was leading the struggle for German unity, although 
at this time a social, rather than socialist revolution 
was envisaged in Germany:
10. Die Regierungserklarung des Ministerprasidenten Grote- 
wohl vom 12.10.1949* Dokumente der Deutschen Politik 
und Geschichte, Berlin (West), Vol. VI, p. 435*
11. Gunther Kerzscher: Ist nationale Politik unzeitgemsu3? 
Einheit, 1949/2, p. Il8ff.
12. Ibid, p. 127*
’Der nationale Befreiungskampf gegen die imperialistische 
Unterdruckung der westlichen Teile Deutschlands muB zugleich 
ein sozialer Befreiungskampf sein. Denn er muB sich gegen 
die deutschen Monopolkapitalisten richten und sich die 
Durchfiihrung der demokratischen Reformen zum Ziele setzen.
Das Banner der sozialen Revolution und des antiimperialis- 
tischen Kampfes fuhrt uns zur Einheit Deutschlands, und 
das nationale Banner zur sozialen Revolution. Die deutsche 
Arbeiterklasse, die an der Spitze der nationalen Befreiung 
steht, dient -gleichzeitig der internationalen Aufgabe der 
Arbeiterklasse^’ 13
However, at this time the goal of national unity was also
being questioned in the DDR. In 1949 Alexander Abusch
claimed that there was a cultural split between the two
German states. He declared:
’Obwohl starke Krafte auch in Westdeutschland traditionell 
und aktuell fur die Einheit der deutschen Kultur wirksam 
sind, muB eine lange Zeit der kultureilen Spaltung zu 
einer immer fiihlbareren Entfremdung, zur Entwicklung von 
zwei unterschiedlichen Kulturen fiihren. Bei langerer 
Dauer wird dies zu einer todlichen Gefahr fur den Bestand 
der* Nation.’ 14
It appeared that Abusch was deploring, rather than approving 
of his prediction. Nevertheless, the DDR leadership came 
to consider national unification more and more unlikely, and in 
January 1970 Ulbricht denied the existence of a single 
German nation.
The two German states, while following diverging policies, 
continued to appeal to each others’ citizens over the heads 
of their rulers, with the claim made by each state that it 
represented the German nation. For each state the demand 
for national unity became a powerful means of gaining sup-
13* Kerzscher, p. 127*
14* Stalin und die Schicksalsfragen der deutschen Nation,
Berlin (East),' 1949* Quoted from Lindemann and Muller: 
Auswartige Kulturpolitik der DDR, p. 24-
port for its own legitimacy and for the destabilisation 
of the other state, since, if the unification proposals 
of the one side were,to prevail, it would mean the extinc­
tion of the other state.'
This trial of strength was won by the Federal Republic, 
whose liberal democratic polity' was legitimised through 
free elections, which also showed a decisive rejection 
of the KPD, before it was declared unconstitutional and 
banned in 1956. The stabilisation of the Federal Republic 
was assisted by American aid and by the rapid economic 
growth which followed the currency reform of 1948. In­
dicators of the relative success or failure of the DDR • 
leadership’s claims to legitimacy are limited; DDR elec­
tion results ceased to show this after the introduction of 
the Soviet pattern of voting for a single list of can­
didates in 1949* The data assembled by Gebhard Schweigler, 
based on polls conducted among DDR citizens in West Berlin 
before 1961, have suggested that the level of support was
increasing, although it was far lower than West German
15support for the Federal government. ^
The Federal government had acquired legitimacy more rapid 
ly than the DDR leadership. I would agree with Philip Wind 
sor that Adenauer’.s chancellorship corresponded with ’a
15* NationalbewuBtsein in der 3RD und in der DDR, Diissel- 
dorf, 1973* Chapter III, p. 66ff, considers the 
attitudes of East German citizens to the nation and 
national consciousness.
period in.the post-war history of the Federal Republic when 
all its interests - economic, .political and military - 
combined in a general national interestT The citizens
of the Federal Republic had legitimised a political system 
which developed from the traditions which had been unsuc­
cessfully applied in the Weimar Republic; the Fasic Law 
might be viewed as an improved version of the Weimar con­
stitution, Furthermore, the widely believed possibility 
of Soviet expansion westwards acted both as a force for 
integration within the Western bloc, and as a source of 
hostility towards the DDR regime. There is little evidence 
that a parallel fear of the Federal Republic and of the USA. 
existed among East Germans, although the officially con­
trolled media in the DDR tried to create such an impres­
sion. The legitimation of the DDR leadership was faced 
with difficulties caused by the need for the East German 
population to adapt to the rapid structural changes of 
the continuing Marxist-Leninist revolution. Here the im­
position of a single belief system invited comparisons 
with the coercion and coordination (Gleichschaltung) of 
the discredited Nazi past.
The government of Dr Adenauer had been in a stronger 
position to use the national question as a means of de­
stabilising the East German state. With the support of
16. Germany and the Management of Detente.
its allies, the Federal government had brough about the 
diplomatic isolation of the DDR outside of the Eastern 
bloc. The DDR was to be ignored; the anavoidable con­
tacts between the two German states were conducted at
sub-ministerial level, and the arrangements governing
17these contacts were often kept secret. The DDR reacted 
to its isolation by continually demanding international 
recognition '(vo-lkerrechtliche Anerkennung), and this was 
made a prerequisite for any negotiations on unification, 
such as Ulbricht’s proposals for a confederation, which 
appeared in the 1963 SED programme. These overtures had 
been ignored by Adenauer; there seemed to be no need to 
pay the price of recognition, when it was believed that the 
policy of non-recognition was impeding the legitimation of 
the DDR leadership. The Federal Republic had established 
diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1955* However, 
after this Ulbricht succeeded in blocking further diplo­
matic links between the Federal Republic and its Eastern 
European allies — with the exception of Romania - until 
the early 1970s, when the diplomatic isolation of the DDR 
came to an end.
During Adenauer’s period of office a stalemate had been 
reached between the two German states on the national ques­
tion. East German demands for recognition in international
17* Vertrage Bundesrepublik Deutschland-DDR, ed. Rolf 
Ehlers, Berlin (West), 1973? P* 5*
law, which represented the denial of international legit­
imacy, had been frustrated. On the other hand, the DDR 
had made this a precondition for any movement towards a 
negotiated rather than an enforced unification. Aden­
auer’s policies had not led to the collapse of the DDR; 
given the existing super power relationships, this could 
only have had any chance of success of the Federal Re­
public had been able to exercise sufficient pressure on 
the USSR. Similarly, DDR proposals for a united ’demo­
cratic ’ -Germany could not but fail, since the USA would 
not have permitted the Federal Republic to enter the 
Soviet sphere of influence.
It might be argued that Adenauer’s policy of non-recog­
nition represented a form of demarcation in reverse - 
and the 19 4^-8 currency reform was clearly a form of economic 
demarcation. However, the strategic position of the DDR 
made its survival important for the Soviet Union. The 
Berlin Wall, which had to be built in 1961 because West 
German attraction was so successful, causing mass flight 
from the DDR, represented a defeat for the Federal Republic, 
which was powerless to intervene. The latter’s dependence 
on the United States was also demonstrated; the USA, al­
though prepared to defend West Berlin, was not prepared to 
risk war by attempting to stop the closure of the DDR’s 
last frontier with the West.
The Berlin Wall facilitated economic stabilisation in 
the DDR, and brought further advantages for the DDR lead­
ership which were less easily quantified. It had the 
psychological effect of making it clear to those East Ger­
man citizens who were opposed to the political system of
the DDR that the option of Republikflucht no longer ex- 
18isted. With the elimination of the direct economic 
pressures on the DDR through West Berlin, particularly 
the losses of highly qualified personnel, West German 
ideological attraction through radio and television re­
mained as the principal external influence upon East 
German citizens. Again, after the wall had been built,
East Germans were not permitted to visit the Federal.
Republic or West Berlin until 1961+,-when pensioners were
iq
allowed to visit their relatives in the West. J
For the East German leadership, the problem raised by 
West German ideological attraction lay not so much in the 
orientation of Bast Germans tov/ards the Federal Republic, 
as in the fact that the Federal Republic was for them a 
relatively positive referent. This was so, despite the 
attempts by the DDR media to argue the contrary. Schweigler
18. In 1968 the East German commentator Stefan Dornberg># 
described the Berlin Wall as feine Schocktherapie fur 
alle diejenigen, die den Sinn unserer Epoche und das 
•wahre Krafteverhaltnis in der Welt und in Deutschland 
nicht begriffen hatten Oder nicht begreifen wollen’ . 
Quoted from NationalbewuBtsein in der BRD und in der 
DDR, p. 72.
19• Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundes- 
republik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik. Bonn, 197k9 P« 55*
quoted a question.addressed to East Germans between 1956
and I960: „Welche Seite halten Sie in der gegenwartigen
geistigen Auseinandersetzung fur erfolgreicher: den Osten
20Oder den Wester?1' Although the effectiveness of official 
DDR socialisation might be shown from the fact that the 
highest number of East Germans who thought the West was 
moresuccessful .than the East was 87% in 1956, but steadily 
declined to 52% in i960, with the lowest number of East 
Germans who were of the opinion that the East was more 
successful being 10% in 1956 and rising to 17% in I960, 
it was clear that the East was at a disadvantage, since 
over this period those who thought the West more success­
ful varied between.87-U5%» while those claiming that the 
East was more successful varied betv/een 5-22%. This would 
suggest that at least half the population were not con­
vinced by the policy statements of the DDR leadership in 
the field of ideology. In rejecting the DDR, they were 
also rejecting the Soviet Union, which was presented in 
the East German media as a positive'.model to be copied 
by the DDR. Again, the flight of those DDR citizens who 
had been attracted by the way of life of the Federal Re­
public meant thatthay had chosen.to reject the socialist 
system of the DDR and of the other people’s democracies, 
this however had the advantage of reducing the internal 
opposition to the regime.
20. NationalbewuiBtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 91*
After 1961 a series of documents and policy statements 
published in the DDR demonstrated the leadership's desire 
to further the divergence between the two German states.
The first of these was the Rationales Dokument’, of March 
25th, 1962, which, was concerned with the future of Germany.
21The document proposed a confederation between the two states.
However, it also declared that the DDR ’... kann mit der
Vollendung des Aufbaus des Sozialismus, mit der Erfullung
dieser ihrer historischen Mission nicht warten, bis die
friedliebenden Krafte in Westdeutschland unter Fuhrung<der
22Arbeiterklasse den Sieg errungen habenT. It was argued
that the Federal Republic had abandoned all claims to
1 eine nationalstaatliche, souverane und friedliche
Existenz des deutschen Volkes...’, and that accordingly
the future of Germany was a matter for the SED. Eberhard
Schneider declared that the National Document served as
a basis for the definitive demarcation between the two
German states. It had spoken of the 'in zwei Staaten
gespaltene Nation’, and represented the final rejection
23of reunification. ^
21. For the history of DDR proposals for joint Federal 
Republic-DDR governmental institution, which may be 
traced back at least to 1950, see Die Deutsche Frage, 19&4-* 
p. lOlff. Here it was argued that the purpose of these 
proposals v/as to demonstrate the existence of two Ger­
man states.
22. Die geschichtliche Aufgabe der DDR und die Zukunft 
Deutschlands, Berlin (East), 1962.
23* Eberhard Schneider: Die DDR, Stuttgart, 1975? P* k3 •
The National Document was followed by the first SED pro­
gramme of 1963> and in 1964 by a new DDR constitution, which 
declared that the DDR was a ’sozialistischer Staat deutscher 
nation’. The SED programme advocated a ’sozialistisches 
deutsches Vaterland’, a ’sozialistisches NationalbewuBtsein’ 
and a ’sozialistische Nationalkultur’. In the promotion of 
a separate DDR national consciousness , an important role 
had been assigned to the East German education system. The 
programme declared with reference to the education system:
’Sie hat die Aufgabe, das sozialistische NationaTbewuBt- 
sein der Jugend zu entwickeln, die Jugend zur Liebe der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, zu bewuBten Erbauern 
des Sozialismus im Geiste der sozialistischen Mova.1, des 
proletarischen' Internalionalismus und zur festen Freund- 
schaft zur Sowjetunion zu erziehen.’ 24
This quotation contained a sereis of positive referents which
might serve to counter West German attraction. Formerly,
no specific references to socialism and the limitation of
affect to one part of Germany had been contained in the law
on the democraticatisation of German schools, introduced in
the Soviet Zone in 1946,^ or in Article 27 of the first DDR 
26constitution. Both these documents had limited themselves
to humanistic, peace-loving aims. To take account of the
increasing stress on socialism, the DDR education system was
27completely reorganised in 1965.
2k. Programm der SED, p. 128ff.
25« See the section: Ziel und Aufgaben der deutschen Schule 
in the Gesetz zur Demokratisierung der deutschen Schulen 
vom. 31»5.1946, Berlin (East), 1946.
26. Verfassung der DDR vom 7* Oktober 1949, Berlin (East), 1949*
27* Gesetz iiber das einheitliche sozialistische Bildungs-
system der DDR, Berlin (East), 1965. Note that socialist 
aims were’also stressed in the law of December 2nd, 1959*
iii. Ideological demarcation in the sphere of economics
Initially, most DDR citizens did not perceive the relat­
ions between the two German states in terms of a cleavage 
between socialism and imperialism; the main ideological 
threat to the stability of the East German regime was in­
direct,. and resulted from the attraction of the Federal 
Republic for the East German population. This attraction 
was national, rather than ideological, and expressed it 
self in the desire for national unity which neither German 
state could ignore. In their orientation-towards the 
Federal Republic, East Germans were able to draw compar­
isons unfavourable to all aspects'of life in the DDR, since 
the Federal Republic had manifestly provided its citizens 
with a widening freedom of choice, as could be; 'seen by-any 
DDR citizens who watched West German television. West 
German citizens had also been provided with a rapidly / 
rising standard of living. Such successful consumerism, 
which reflected positively on the West German political 
system, could not be matched in the DDR, particularly 
before the Berlin Wall was built. The following quo­
tation from the period following the West German currency 
reform showed the concern of the DDR leadership for the 
effects of the higher West German standard of living 
upon the East German population, and the attempt to com­
pensate for this through political education:
’Die ungemigende Rolls, welche die antifaschistisch- 
demokratische Ostzone bisher no.ch im BewuBtsein des 
deutschen Volkes in den vom auslandischen Imperialismus 
beherrschten Zonen spielt, hat ihre Ursache nicht nur in 
der dort betriebenen Verleumdungskampagne und reaktionaren 
Unterdruckungspolitik, nicht nur darin, daB die Schau- 
Fenster in Westdeutschland und Westberlin zur Zeit einen 
gepumpten Wohlstand vorzaubern, nicht nur•in ten tatsach- 
lichen materiellen Schwierigkeiten, die es in unserer 
Zone noch zu iiberwinden gilt, sondern in dem zuruckge- 
bliebenen ideologischen Zustand groBer^ Teile der Bevol- 
kerung unserer Zone, in dem noch ungemigend entwickelten . 
XlassenbewuBtsein des Proletariats.’ 28
The economic difficulties in the Eastern Zone were made
worse not only by the lack of American assistance, but
also by the relative severity with -which the dismantling
policy was carried out, and Soviet exploitation of the
29East German economy.
The need for economic growth to permit the raising of 
living standards in the DDR was a further long--term factor 
which was required to support the legitimation of the 
regime. Economic demands of the population of a given 
state upon its government are of considerable importance,, 
and the legitimacy of the government may be called into 
question if it is widely believed that it is failing to 
satisfy the population’s material expectations. Under 
certain conditions, economic dissatisfaction may lead to 
demands for political -change. The DDR leadership had had 
experience of this problem, as a result of the disorders
28. Ernst Hoffmann: Die Bedeutung der ideologischen Offen­
sive in der Sowjetunion fur Deutschland. Einheit, 
1949/9, P. 797.
29* For the.early economic situation in the Soviet Zone
see Die Deutsche Frage, p. Il6ff. Note also the suicide 
of Erich Apel, chairman of the State Planning Commission 
of the DDR, in December 1965? allegedly because of unfav 
ourable terms of trade forced on the DDR by the USSR.
which began in East Berlin in June 1953* Again, the serious 
economic difficulties of the time had been one of the rea­
sons why the Berlin Wall was built, to stop the losses of
30skilled personnel. The economic difficulties did not 
begin to lessen until after 1963* when the reforms of the 
Hew Economic System were introduced.
In a liberal democratic state, there generally exist in­
stitutionalised arrangements for the accommodation of econ­
omic discontent, by offering the possibility of replacing 
one administration by another in a general election. Here 
there is usually no threat to the polity, since a distinc­
tion is made between the legitimacy of the government 
(which must continually face opposition from alternative 
contenders for power) and the legitimacy of the existing 
constitutional arrangements. Conversely, in a Marxist- 
Leninist state where the ruling party is identified with 
the state system, an attack on the one is seen as an attack 
on the other, and represents a demand for structural change.
For the DDR leadership, this potential danger was in­
creased by the orientation, of•East Germans, not towards 
past performance in the DDR or the living standards in 
the other Eastern European people’s democracies, but to­
wards the Federal Republic. Walter Ulbricht showed that
30. For the economic difficulties caused by. the failure of
the'Seven Year Plan introduced in 1959 see DDR-Wirtschaft 
eine Bestandsaufnahme, Frankfurt/M, 1971? P* 56ff.
he v/as aware of a link between ideology and the satisfac­
tion, with his reference to the ’principle of material 
self-interest' (materielle Interessiertheit). On the 
occasion of the VI SED congress of 1963 he declared:
'Man soli nicht glauben, daB es angangig ware, die aus 
einer falschen Behandlung der materiellen Interessiert­
heit der Menschen bestehenden Mangel durch Appelle an 
die Moral und das ideologische BewuBtsein zu iiberbrucken. 
In der sozialistischen Gesellschaft bilden die materiellen 
Interessen und die ideelen Faktoren eine untrennbare Ein­
heit, aus der eben die groBe Kraft des bewuBten Handelns 
fur das materielle Wohl unserer Menschen entspringt. Feh- 
ler auf dem Gebiet der materiellen Interessiertheit unter- 
graben daher auch die Rolle des moralisch-ideelen Faktors.'
Rudiger Thomas also claimed that East Germans tended to
compare their living standards with the Federal Republic
32rather than with the socialist states. The V  SED congress 
of 1958 had attempted to counter this by engaging in econ­
omic competion with the Federal Republic:
'Die okonomische Hauptaufgabe. besteht darin, die Volks- 
v/irtschaft innerhalb weniger Jahren so zu entwickeln, 
daB die ftberlegenheit der sozialistischen Gesellschafts- 
ordnung gegeniiber der kapitalistischen Herrschaft um- 
fassend bewiesen wird. Deshalb muB erreicht werden, das 
der Pro-Kopf-Verbrauch der werktatigen Bevolkerung in 
alien v/ichtigen Lebensmitteln und Konsumgutern hoher liegt 
als der Pro-Kopf-Verbrauch der Gesamtbevolkerung in 7/est- 
deutschland.' 33
31* Das Programm des Sozialismus und .die geschichtliche '
Aufgabe der SED, Berlin (East), 1963? p« 38. See also 
Klaus Dyhrenfurth/Gerhard Jannermann: Die Verwirk-
lichung des Prinzips der materiellen Interessiertheit 
in unseren landwir.tschaftlichen Produktionsgenossen- 
schaften, Einheit, 19ol/2.
3 2. Modell DDR, Munich, 1977? P* 60ff.
33• Protokoll des V. Parteitages der SED, Berlin (East), 
1958, p. 1357.
These promises were followed b.y the serious economic
difficulties connected with the failure of the 1959 Seven
Year Plan. However, by the end of the 1960s the standard
of living of DDR citizens, although well below that of the
West Germans, had dramatically improved, as a result of the
5Lleconomic reforms introduced from 1963* With a manifest 
rise in living standards measured by the DDR’s own past 
performance, the DDR leadership now felt confident enough 
to- compare the living standards of the two German states 
from a position of moderate.success. The alleged social 
and economic difficulties of the Federal Republic were seen 
as interrelated. It was claimed that West Germany was an 
insecure society with no future, which suffered from econ­
omic inequality, crime and unemployment.^ This tendency 
of attacking the Federal Republic in socio-economic rather 
than in ideological terms became more pronounced after 
Honecker became party secretary in 1971- Internally, he 
expanded Ulbricht’s achievement oriented policy of payment 
by results;' both men had interpreted socialism, in the
terms of the 1963 party rules, as ’^eder nach seinen Fahig-
36keiten, jedem nach seiner Leistung’.
3^«’" DDR living standards are further examined in Chapter 8.
35* See a standard East German work, Imperialismus heute, 
Berlin (East), first published in 196.5* In 1971 it 
was retitled more specifically ’Der Imperialismus der BRDf
3 6. Statut der SED, Berlin (East), 1963* p. 10.
iv. East German reactions to the new Ostpolitik of the 
Federal Republic
In the period of the Gold War, faced with the negative 
policies of Adenauer and John Foster Dulles, the DDR had 
developed the mentality of a state under siege. The DDR 
leadership had been able to gain at least one benefit from 
its relative weakness; ideological demarcation had devel­
oped in a black-and-white situation where- the issues which 
divided the two German states appeared to be clearly de­
fined, with, no possibility of compromise, which fitted in 
well with.the official DDR claim that there was an irrecon­
cilable cleavage- between socialism and imperialism. More­
over, the leadership had been able to suggest proposals 
for unification in the knowledge that they would be ig­
nored by Adenauer. The advantage of this was that the 
leadership could claim before East German public opinion 
that it was actively pursuing the goal of unification, 
and that this v/as being blocked by the Federal government.
In support of this it was constantly argued that the Federal 
Republic, together with its Western allies, had been res­
ponsible for engineering and continuing the division of 
Germany, by violating the Potsdam agreement on the dem- 
ocratisation of Germany, destroying monetary unity through 
the currency reform, by being the first to establish a 
separate German state, to rearm and Join the common defence 
organisation of its allies. This argument might be countered
by the suggestion that the behaviour of the Federal Republic 
and its allies was the result of Soviet and East German 
intransigence.
Nevertheless, Ulbricht’s scheme for a confederation,
37contained in the 1963 SED programme, whether sincere or 
not, was realistic in taking account of the differences 
between the two states; this scheme recognised that uni­
fication could not be achieved in one stage - it would at 
least have provided institutional arrangements for the 
regular exchange of opinions between the two states. But 
the Western policy of non-recognition had a further con­
sequence; it relieved the DDR of the necessity of recon­
sidering its own German policy. If negotiations with the 
Federal Republic had taken place, it is possible that the 
DDR leadership would have been exposed to internal pres­
sures to compromise, and modify its position. Negotiations 
might have raised hopes on unification-which had been lowered 
by the building of the Berlin Wall.
In the early 1960s the international- situation was changed 
by the moves towards super-power detente. This would affect 
the DDR because the settlement of the German question wc-uld 
be at the centre of detente in Europe. There was a further 
change at this time, of more direct relevance to the DDR.
37• Programm. der SED, p. 58ff.
There was a change in West German attitudes towards East­
ern Europe, including the DDR. Within the Federal govern­
ment, Adenauer’s Ostpolitk had been declared a failure by 
the then secretary of state Garstens and foreign minister 
Schroder in 1963-4* On the part of the SPD, Egon Bahr,
at that time press-secretary of the Y/est Berlin senate, 
who was closely associated with 7/illy Brandt, suggested a 
policy towards the DDR aimed at producing change through 
rapprochement (Wandel durch Annaherung). Although at 
the time Bahr’s proposals were considered controversial, 
they became important after the SPD-FDP coalition came to 
power in 1969* On the same occasion Brandt declared that 
the time had come to settle the status quo militarily, in 
order to overcome it militarily, and that this was the only 
way to achieve reunification. He continued:
’Gerade weil das Deutschlandpolitik so sehr in das Ter- 
haltnis zwischen Ost und West eingebettet ist, gibt es 
fur uns keine Hoffnung, wenn es keinen Wandel gibt.’ I4.O
The formation of the West German Grand Coalition in 
1966 marked a further stage in the revision of the Federal 
government's Eastern and German policies. In his first 
policy speech as Federal chancellor, Kiesinger repeated the
38. Der Spiegel, I966/I44, pp. 27-28.
39* Dettmar Cramer: Deutschland nach dem Grundvertrag.
Stuttgart, 1973> P* 12.
l±0. Ibid, p. 16.
desire for improved relations with Eastern Europe expressed
in Dr Erhard’s peace note of March 1966, and extended it to
the DDR. While rejecting recognition of a second German
state, Kiesinger declared:
!Wir wollen entkrampfen und nicht verharten, Graben iiber- 
winden und nicht vertiefen. Deshalb wollen wir die mensch- 
lichen, wirtschaftlichen und geistigen Beziehungen mit 
unseren Landsleuten im anaeren Teil Deutschlands mit alien 
Kraften fordern.’ 41
In the following month, in January 1967* the then foreign
minister Willy Brandt suggested that the East-West split
could only be overcome with the aid of the super-powders.
He-claimed that the DDR leadership had opposed'detente,
either by making excuses, or by presenting unacceptable
demands
A reaction to these statements came in February 1967
from the DDR state secretary for West German questions,
Joachim Herrmann, . who replied that peaceful coexistence and
cooperation (friedliches Neben- und Miteinander) between
the two states was possible without the prior recognition
of the DDR. He continued:
*Seit dem Amtsantritt dieser Regierung hat die eingefahrene 
Bonner Politik der Sabotage Jeder Verstandigung, der Blockade 
gleichberechtigter Verhandlungen eine>tauBerordentliche Zu- 
spitzung erfahren. Diese Regierung halt nicht nur an der
41. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 1, p. 2Lff.
42. Ibid, Vol. 1, pp. 28-36.
im hochsten Grade abenteuerlichen und frieaensgefahrdenden 
AlleinvertretungsanmaBung fest, sie weigert sich nicht nur, 
die Existenz von zwei deutschen Staaten anzuerkennen. Sie 
konzentriert vielmehr in volliger Verkennung der realen 
Lage ihre gesamte Politik darauf, mit Hilfe neuer raffi- 
nierteren Methoden der Tauschung, Spaltung und Srpressung 
urn Jeden Preis doch noch ihr wichtigstes Etappenziel zur 
Revision der Ergebnisse des - zweiten Weltkrieges und zur 
Erringung der Vorherrschaft in Europa zu erreichen: die 
Annexion der DDR.’ 43
The statement claimed that the West German government had . 
rejected DDR proposals for understanding and detente be­
tween the two states. The establishment of diplomatic 
relations with Romania was interpreted as a new form of 
’annexionistischer Alleinvertretungsanspruch’ directed 
against, the Eastern bloc, and above all against the DDR.
It was further declared that the true nature of the new 
Ostpolitik could be evaluated from the utterances of 
Franz-Josef StrauB, who had proposed a ’free Europe’ 
extending from the Atlantic to the Bug and the Black Sea, 
and from the ’Grauer Plan’ of the then Federal Ministry 
for All-German Affairs, which had allegedly planned down 
to the last detail ’die Beseitigung der sozialistischen 
Gesellschaftsordnung und die Ausplunderung der Bevolkerung 
der DDR’, and, thirdly, from a quotation from the CDU pol­
itician Rainer Barzel that ’unsere.:.Positionen bleiben un- 
verandert, nur unsere Methoden konnen wechseln’. It was 
significantly stated that, as a result of the behaviour of 
the West German government, including its social democrat 
ministers, the term ’gesamtdeutsch’ had become meaningless,
43* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 1. pp. 37-44*
and, accordingly, the East German Staatssekretariat fur 
gesamtdeutsche Fragen had been renamed ’Staatssekretariat, 
fiir west dent sche Fragen’ .
These manoeuvres continued with an exchange of corres­
pondence between Kiesinger and the president of the DDR 
Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph, which appeared to take 
the declamatory form of a direct appeal by each side to 
the citizens of the other state. Concrete -but irreconr 
cilable proposals were put forward by Kiesinger and Stoph, 
the former suggesting practical measures for lessening the
M,
division of Germany, and the latter suggesting a treaty to 
establish ’normal relations’ between the two states, which
) I R
would require the diplomatic recognition of the DDR.
The negative reaction of the DDR leadership to the new 
Ostpolitik of the Federal government-was hardly surprising. 
The latter had claimed a desire for closer relations with 
the citizens of the DDR, while at the same time continuing 
to refuse to recognise their government. The DDR leader­
ship’s suspicions that the Federal government’s' goal re­
mained destabilisation and annexation would have been 
heightened by KiesingerTs statement that the Federal budget
44. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 1, pp. 69-70.
45* Ibid, Vol. 1, pp. 65-68.
U6was to be used as an instrument of. German policy, and by 
his statement that ’... wir alle wissen, daB die Spaltung 
unseres Volkes •... in der Tat nur durch ein Arrangement mit 
Moskau moglich sein wird...’, ^  seemed to justify Stoph’s 
claim that the Grand Coalition’s policies had the aim 
’... die DDR zunachst international zu isolieren, ihre 
Beziehungen zu den sozialistischen Bruderlandern und zu 
anderen Befreundeten Staaten zu untergraben und durch eine 
massive politische und ideologische Einwirkung auf die 
Bevolkerung der DDR Unruhe und Unsicherheit zu stiften.’^
The East German claim that the term ’gesamtdeutsch’ had 
lost all meaning, quoted above from Herrmann’s statement of
February 1967, was considered by Schweigler to be the start
t H9of the DDR leadership s demarcation policy. I would
argue that the statement represented a further stage in
a process which had begun before the establishment of the 
DDR, that the fact that the two German states were diver­
ging had led to an objective ideological differentiation 
between them. Such factors as the dropping of ’gesamt­
deutsch, the abandoning of'the proposals for confederation
14.6 . Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 1, p. 13*
14.7 . Ibid, Vol. 1, p. 71*
1+8. Ibid, Vol. 1, p. 139*
1+9- NationalbewuBtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 76.
by Ulbricht in his New Year’s Message at the beginning of 
501967? the law of February 19&7 which claimed a specific 
East German citizenship (Staatsburgerschaft), and the new 
constitution of April 1968, which declared the DDR to be 
a ’sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation’, would suggest 
an intensified ideological demarcation in the area of the 
national question, as a reaction to West German attempts 
at rapprochement. Ideological demarcation was now increas­
ingly stressing the differences between the DDR and the 
Federal Republic as a whole, and not just its leaders. 
Unification remained in the constitution as a long-term 
goal, but was out of the question in the existing cir­
cumstances.
50. On this occasion Ulbricht declared: ’Eine Vereinigung
zv/ischen einem imperialistischen und militaristischen 
Westdeutschland und dem sozialistischen deutschen 
Friedensstaat ... ist undenkbar.’ Nevertheless, the 
1963 SED programme containing proposals for a confed­
eration remained formally valid until the new programme 
of. 1976.
1+. East German ideological demarcation after the coming to 
power of the SPD-FDP coalition
i. The implications of rapprochement with the Federal Republic
In 1969 the movement towards European detente, which had 
been interrupted by the Czechoslovak crisis of the previous
year, was resumed. In the Federal Republic the Grand Coalition
was replaced by an SPD-FDP administration in the autumn of 
1969. -Both these events resulted in proposals which seemed 
likely to affect the interests of the DDR. Firstly, the 
Western desire for a satisfactory resolution of the Berlin 
question, which was stressed by President Nixon in West Berlin 
in February, and in the April communique of the North Atlantic
Council, was met before the end of the year by Soviet willing­
ness to begin discussions.^ Secondly, in October of the same 
year, the new Federal Chancellor, Willy Brandt, laid down the
policies of the SPD-FDP coalition for Germany as a whole, and
2
for Eastern Europe. In his speech Brandt announced that the 
Federal government would conduct discussions with Poland, in 
response to the invitation to consider the question of the 
Oder-Neisse line, which the Polish party leader, Wladyslaw
•Z
Gomulka, had extended to the Federal Republic in May 1969*
1* Die Berlln-Regelung. Das Viermachte-Abkommen uber Berlin
und die erganzenden Vereinbarungen. Bonn, 1971, pp. 25i+-256.
2# Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol 2+, PP- 9-^0.
3* Karl E. Birnbaum. East and West Germany: A  Modus, Vivendi.
Lexington, Mass., 1973> P* 6.
On the same occasion Brandt replied to a Soviet aide-memoire 
on renouncing the use of force by agreeing to propose a date 
for talks with the USSR to be held in Moscow.
However, the offer of negotiations between the two German
states contained in the policy speech was of most direct
concern to the DDR. Here Brandt had declared:
*Die Bundesregierung setzt die im Dezember 1966 durch Bundes- 
kanzler Kiesinger und seine Regierung eingeleitete Politik 
fort und bietet dem Ministerrat der DDR erneut Verhandlungen 
beiderseits ohne Diskriminierung auf der Ebene der Regierungen 
an, die zu vertraglich vereinbarter Zusammenarbeit fiihren 
sollen.1
This; offer was qualified by the refusal to consider full dipl­
omatic recognition, because of the special relationships 
between the two states. Brandt continued:
’Eine volkerrechtliche Anerkennung der DDR durch die Bundes­
regierung kann nicht in Betracht kommen. Auch wenn zwei 
Staaten in Deutschland existieren, sind sie doch fureinander 
nicht Ausland; ihre Beziehungen zueinander konnen nur von 
besonderer Art sein.f
Although admitting for the first time the existence of two
German states, Brandt declared that his aim was to avoid a
further growing-apart (Auseinanderleben) of the German nation,
to move by way of a regulated working alongside the DDR
(geregeltes Nebeneinander) to cooperation with the DDR
(Miteinander).
It has been argued that affect for the concept of a united 
Germany among DDR citizens was the main hindrance to the 
legitimation of the SED-led regime, and that legitimation
required the creation of a separate East German national 
consciousness and the transforming of the Federal Republic 
into a negative referent. Under conditions of relative iso­
lation after 1961, some progress towards the former goal had 
been claimed by Gebhard Schweigler.^ However, if isolation 
had facilitated differentiation, rapprochement might hinder 
or reverse this process. The West German policy of reversing 
the growing-apart of the two German states, of achieving 
'menschliche Erleichterungen* for East German citizens, seemed 
likely to run counter to the goal of differentiation; the 
DDR leadership argued in turn that this policy was directed 
towards the destruction of its rule by means of 1ideologische 
Aufweichung1 and 1Wandel durch Annaherung*.
Nevertheless, there were good reasons why relations- with 
the Federal Republic should be normalised, if normalisation 
were to include the recognition of the DDR. The latter had 
long desired to end its diplomatic isolation from the non­
communist world, and here the negative effect of non-recogni­
tion upon domestic legitimation had been an important consid­
eration, and the arguments presented by the Federal Republic 
to justify non-recognition were freely accessible to DDR 
citizens through West German radio and television. Like its 
eastern allies, the DDR leadership hoped to check any infil­
tration of dysfunctional ideological pressures which normal­
isation of relations with the West might bring, in accord
I4.. Gebhard Schweigler. NationalbewuBtsein in der BRD und der 
DDR. Diisseldorf, 1973 > P* 10i+. Peter Bender quoted an 
undated survey among DDR schoolchildren, between 124. and 16, 
where less than 5% boys and 2 .5% girls thought^ reunification 
important. 6X  Sicherheit, Cologne-Berlin, 1971* p. 89.
with its interpretation of peaceful coexistence. However, 
the main difficulty for the DDR leadership was raised by the 
possibility of rapprochement with the Federal Republic. Yet 
the normalisation of relations with the Federal Republic was 
a prerequisite for wider international recognition, since the 
Federal Republic had gained the support of its allies for the 
policy of non-recognition, and had sought to achieve the same 
goal among uncommitted states through the application of the 
BTallstein Doctrine. The DDR, from a weaker position, had 
tried to persuade its own allies that Western, and particularly 
West German recognition of the East German state should be 
linked with any further moves b y  the Warsaw Treaty member 
states towards rapprochement with the Federal Republic.
This policy had been generally successful up to 1969, since, 
apart from the USSR, only Romania had established diplomatic 
relations with the Federal Republic, in 1967»
A  further reason why the DDR leadership should consider 
normalising relations with the Federal Republic was that 
failure; to do so might cause its policy to diverge from 
that of its allies. The DDR needed the Soviet Union to 
guard its interests in the proposed discussions on the 
future of Berlin; in the event a Berlin agreement was 
concluded in 1971, and some of the provisions of the agree­
ment required a level of cooperation between the two German 
states; which would have been difficult to achieve, if the
5* The policies of the two German states on recognition were 
examined by Philip Windsor in Germany and the Management of 
Detente. London, 1971, PP» 36-38.
DDR had maintained its policy of isolation from the Federal 
Republic. Moreover, both the USSR and Poland were to begin 
discussions with the Federal Republic. In the latter case 
Gomulka’s initiative of May 1969 was not accompanied by a 
demand for West German recognition of the DDR, which may 
have revived apprehensions among the DDR leadership to 
justify the earlier claim that the Federal Republic’s new 
Ostpolitik was aimed at the isolation of the DDR from its
g
allies. With the improvement in Bast-West relations, 
isolation from the Federal Republic now held for the DDR 
the danger of isolation from its own allies.
Closer links with the Federal Republic might hinder 
ideological demarcation and consequently the stability of
t
the regime. Here, in Birnbaum s words, the DDR leadership 
was faced by a choice between isolation or infiltration.^
For years the leadership had claimed a desire for normal­
isation (as .defined by itself), but in practise, whenever 
contacts: had seemed likely, as in the case of the proposed 
Redneraustausch of 1966, it had drawn back, thus casting
Q
doubt on the sincerity of its intentions. There was now 
less room for the DDR leadership to make apparent concessions
6. In 1967 Ulbricht had claimed that West German policy was 
aimed at the ’flexible Isolierung’ of the DDR, Neues 
Deutschland, 18 th October, 1967. (Texte zur Deutschland­
politik, Vol. 2, p. 5U)*
7* Birnbaum, p. 55*
8. In January 1967 Brandt had declared that the DDR was. evading 
detente, either with excuses, or with demands which could 
not be fulfilled. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol 1, p.33*
for internal consumption, to give the impression that the
leadership was actively attempting to promote unification.
On: the other hand the 1968 constitution had made it clear
that only a socialist Germany could be united, and Ulbricht
had declared at the VII SED congress that under the existing
q
conditions unification was impossible.
In theory, peaceful coexistence appeared to show how 
relations might be normalised while avoiding ideological 
contamination, but in practice it was not possible to draw a 
clear line between permissible and impermissible contacts, 
and DDR sources have argued that most contacts were potentially 
dangerous.1^ Again, the officially promoted Feindbild of the 
Federal Republic might lose its usefulness if normalisation 
were to come about. However, if it could be demonstrated that 
the development of a separate East German national conscious­
ness had not been stopped or reversed by rapprochement with 
the Federal Republic, then this might in turn increase the 
stability of the regime. It could not be assumed that those 
East German citizens who wanted closer links with the Federal 
Republic were also hostile to the East German state, not that 
those hostile to the state also wished to destroy it through 
fusion with the Federal Republic, rather than to reform it,
9« W. Ulbricht. Vorschlage fur ein friedliches Febeneinander
der beiden deutschen Staaten. Protokoll des VII Parteitages
der SED, Vol 1, Berlin, 1967, pp. 66-72.
10. Imperialism ’versucht verstarkt, mit den Mitteln der Kultur
in die sozialistischen Lander einzudringen und Kulturaua- 
tausch, Tourismus usw. im Sinne der ideologischen Diversion 
zu miBbrauchen.’ Kleines Politisches Worterbuch, Berlin, 
1973, P. 3k6.
but still within a Marxist-Leninist framework. By facing
openly the question of national identity, by showing greater
trust in the population it controlled, a highly-politicised
population which had been incessantly lectured on the dangers
of ideological subversion, the leadership, might gain more
support, and also lose'some of its sense of insecurity in 
11this area..
ii. The initial effects, of rapprochement upon DDR citizens
The DDR leadership accepted Brandt’s invitation* and dis­
cussions were held between Brandt and the chairman of the 
DDR council of ministers, Willi Stoph, at Erfurt in March 
1970, and at Kassel in May of the same year. These were 
the first high-level discussions between the two states, 
and at least served the purpose of clarifying the negotiat­
ing positions of the two sides. In & case study which attem­
pted a reconstruction of East German decision-making between 
Brandt’s speech of October 1969 and the Erfurt meeting be­
tween Brandt and Stoph, Anita Dasbach-Mallincrodt has sug­
gested that the reactions to Brandt’s intitiative vdiich ap­
peared in the DDR media were slow and hesitant, and that.
they were accompanied by a display of increased hostility
12towards the Federal Republic.
11. Schweigler claimed that if the DDR frontiers were 
opened, the NationalstaatsbewuBtsein of its citizens 
could be strengthened if they became aware that they 
were different from West German citizens. 
NationalbewuBsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. lOlf..
12. Wer macht die AulSenpolitik der DDR? Dusseldorf, 1972, 
pp. 227-228.
Increased hostility towards the Federal Republic was also
noted by the federal minister for intra-German affairs, Egon
Franke. In May 1970 he had suggested that the possibility of
rapprochement between the two states was causing the DDR
leadership to devote greater attention to the ideological
security of the regime. He declared:
’Wir mussen ganz nuchtern^sehen, daJB die Fortsetzung des in 
Erfurt begonnenen WOges fur die Ostberliner Fuhrung mit 
einem gewissen Risiko, mit bestimmten Unwagbarkeiten verbunden 
ist. Es ware toricht zu verkennen, dai3 die FTage, wie die 
Bevolkerung in der DDR auf eine zunehmende^Normalisierung 
der- innerdeutschen Beziehungen reagieren wurde, nicht nur 
fur Ostberlin von grundsatzlicher B'edeutung ist. Wir haben 
deshalb alien AnlaB, diese Propagandawelle als eine aus der 
Slcht Ostberlins verstandlichen Versuch zu werten, die 
weitere Ehtwicklung der innerdeutschen Beziehungen ••• 
ideologisch a b z u s i c h e r n . 13
Franke saw a paradox, in the behaviour of the DDR leadership,
claiming that the greater the level of hostility towards the
Federal Republic, the more determined was the leadership to
continue the Erfurt and Kassel talks.
The need for greater ideological demarcation would appear 
to have been justified by the events connected with B r a n d t ’s 
visit to Erfurt. West German observers have described the 
enthusiastic reception he received in Erfurt, and the placards 
with a large letter *Y’ displayed along the railway line 
between Erfurt and the border with West Germany, which made 
it clear that support was being given to Willy Brandt rather 
than to Willi S t o p h . ^
13* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol 5, P- 2U2.
i;[. U s e  Spittmann. Deutscher Gipfel in Erfurt. Deutschland 
Archiv 1970/U, pp. 43^-5•
The data assembled by Schweigler appeared to indicate in 
1970 a temporary reversal in the trend for domestic support 
for the DDR leadership to increase. On two occasions in 1970 
West Germans who had visited the DDR were questioned on the 
opinions of DDR citizens they had met. The following ques­
tion was asked:
’1st Person X der Ansicht, daB die Bundesregierung die DDR 
auf jeden Fall anerkennen sollte oder nur dann, wenn damit 
Erleichterungen fiir die Menschen hiiben und driiben ver­
bunden sind oder ist X der Ansicht* daB die Bundesrepublik 
die DDR auf gar keinen Fall anerkennen soil?’ 15
There was a slight decline from 28% in Survey I to 26% in 
Survey II of those for unconditional recognition (auf jeden 
Fall anerkennen), and an increase in those wanting condit­
ional recognition (anerkennen nur mit Erleichterungen) from 
kl% to 50%. If this indirect data were to approximate to 
reality, then half the DDR citizens were for improvements 
in their situation, and if these improvements were to be 
equated with ’menschliche Erleichterungen - and it is pos- 
ible that this v/ould have come to mind to the politically 
sensitive East Germans, then this seemed to be a demand for 
closer contacts with the Federal Republic. It would be
even worse if conditional recognition were to mean support
16for special intra-German relations.
15- NationalbewuBtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 99.
The claim that Brandt ’s Os.tpolitik'had led to a slight 
decline in domestic support for the DDR leadership 
might also, be'supported by Table 13 on page 9 8 .
l6 • U s e  Spittmann saw a link between ’menschliche Erleich­
terungen’ and ’innerdeutsche Beziehungen’ in a quota­
tion reproduced on the following page.
The DDR leadership could be encouraged by the fact that 
apparently three quarters of DDR citizens supported recog­
nition, the difficulty lay with the half of those inter­
viewed who wanted conditional recognition, since it was not 
known how far these conditions would agree with official 
policy towards the Federal Republic. The subsequent use 
of Brandt's formula of moving to Miteinander through Neben- 
qinander by Honecker - although differently interpreted - 
suggested that at least lip service was paid to these 
aspirations
iii. Ideological demarcation and the national question
It is argued that the overt Abgrenzung campaign which 
began in September 1970 resulted from the German policy of 
the SPD-FDP coalition. This led the DDR leadership to 
take measures to make it clear that high level negotiations 
with the Federal Republic would not mean Wandel durch An- 
naherung. In this connection U s e  Spittmann commented as 
follows:
’Urn die unerwunschte Stimmung der Bevolkerung aufzufangen 
und klarzumachen, dai3 Verhandlungen zyischen Bonn und Ost- 
Berlin weder ideologische noch machtpolitische Veran- 
derungen zur Folge haben wurden, konzentrierte die..SED 
ihre Agitation auf drei Punkte: die Sozialaemokratie
und ihre neue Ostpolitik, die Brandtsche Formel von den 
innerdeutschen oder zwischendeutschen Beziehungen, die 
menschliche Erleichterungen zum Ziel haben sollten, sowie 
die These von den zwei deutschen Staaten im Rahmen einer 
einheitlichen deutschen Nation.’ 18
17• These words were used by Honecker in April 1972 in Sofia.
Ifeue.s- Deut'schland, 19th April, 1972.
18. Deutschland Archiv, 1970/10, p. 1103«
The repeated declarations in the DDR' media from the spring of 
1970 that social democracy was a form of imperialist (or 
bourgeois) ideology represented an intensification of existing 
policy, which had earlier been found, for example, in the SED 
programme of 19&3* The intensification may be explained as a 
reaction to the fear that social democracy might come to be 
considered as a democratic alternative to Marxism-Leninism; 
it was an exercise in popularisation aimed at suggesting 
that a social democratic chancellor would follow basically 
the same policies as his CDU predecessors, that, while the 
form might have changed, the content of his policy was the 
same.^
However, the greatest threat to the DDR leadership’s demar­
cation was the renewed stress placed by Brandt on the unity 
of the nation. In his report on the state of the nation of 
January 1970, he declared:
’25 Jahre nach der bedingungslosen Kapitulation des Hitler- 
Reiches bildet der Begriff der Nation das; Band urn das ge- 
spaltene Deutschland. Im Begriff der Nation sind geschicht- 
liche Wirklichkeit und politischer Wille vereint. Nation 
umfaBt und bedeutet mehr als gemeinsame Sprache und Kultur, 
als Staat und Gesellschaftsordnung. Die Nation griindet sich 
auf das fortdauernde Znsammengehorigkeitsgefuhl der Menschen 
eines Volkes.’ 20
Brandt continued that no one could deny that in this sense
a German nation existed and would continue to exist, as far
as could been seen, and added that the DDR declared itself
part of this German nation in its constitution.
19* This was the view of Norden on June 9th, and of Ulbricht: 
on June 10th. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 5, 
p. 287ff ,and p. 333-334*
20. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 4, p. 203.
He repeated that since the two German states were not 
foreign countries (Ausland) for each other, there was no 
question of the international recognition of the DDR by the 
Federal Republic. This did not mean, he argued, that the 
Federal Republic wanted the DDR as a West German colony.
The two stales were not foreign countries for each other 
for the realistic and practical reason that there were 
closer family ties between the inhabitants of Leipzig and 
Hamburg, than between the inhabitants of Leipzig and Milan 
or Warsaw. Similarly, East Berliners were closer to West 
Berliners than to Parisians.
Convergence theory was wrong in suggesting that the two 
German states would automatically grow closer, but correct 
in claiming that the necessities of the modern industrial 
society in East and West would force measures, developments 
and reforms, independant of the political and social condit­
ions. Here Brandt himself declared a demarcation between the 
two states:
’In den beiden staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen, 
die es nun schon seit mehr^als zwei Jahrzehnten auf deutschem 
Boden gibt, drucken sich vollig^verschiedene und nicht zu 
vereinbarende Vorstellungen daruber aus, wie die Einheit 
Deutschlands, wie eine gemeinsame Zukunft aussehen soli und 
wie sie zu erreichen sein konnte. Niemand darf sich der 
trugerischen Hoffnung hingeben, den Auseinandersetzungen ent- 
gehen zu konnen, die unausweichlich sind, weil Deutschland 
eben nicht nur staatlich gespalten ist, sondern weil sich 
auf seinem Boden vollig unterschiedliche Gesellschaftssysteme 
gegenuberstehen. In diesem Punkt sind wir uns mit Ulbricht 
einig: zwischen unserem System und dem, was druben Ordnung
geworden ist, kann es keine Mischung, keinen faulen Kompro- 
mii3 geben.V 21
21. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 4> P* 205*
In his demand that DDR citizens should be allowed to decide 
their own future, and that contacts should be encouraged 
between East and West Germans, Brandt appeared to be appeal­
ing to the former over the heads of the DDR leadership.
The question might be asked whether a single German nation 
would continue to exist, if the social, political and ec­
onomic systems of the two states continued to diverge. 
Schweigler argued that the consciousness that the DDR was 
a separate nation state (NationalstaatsbewuBtsein) would 
increase among DDR citizens, and that this would increasing­
ly call into question the unity of the German nation as
a concept within the consciousness of DDR citizens (Be-
22wuBtseinsnation). The reaction of the DDR leadership was 
the overt rejection of the unity of the German nation. It 
opend the way for the policy of total demarcation, since it 
was an attempt to resolve the national question by destroy­
ing the Zusammengehorigkeitsgefuhl which was so important 
for Brandt, and which was the main surviving point of 
common interest to the citizens of the two states.
The DDR leadership’s changing attitude to the national 
question may be seen may be seen in a comparison with ear­
lier policy statements. It had long been argued ideologically 
that the DDR formed the nucleus of a future all-German state, 
;,rhi-ch would be socialist. However, since the Federal Republic 
was a capitalist state, unification was, at least in the short
22. NationalbewuBtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 100.
term, not possible, as could be seen from the conditions
laid down in Article 8 of the DDR constitution. The SED
programme of 1963 bad stated that the DDR was the German
state which embodied the national future of Germany:
’Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist auf alien Gebieten 
der Politik und des gesellschaftlichen Lebens die nationale 
und soziale Alternative gegenuber dem in Westdeutschland 
herrschenden Imperialismus. Ihre historische Mission besteht 
darin, durch die umfassende Verwirklichung des Sozialismus 
in dem ersten^deutschen Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Staat die feste 
Grundlage dafiir zu schaffen, dai3 in ganz Deutschland die 
Arbeiterklasse die Fuhrung ubernimmt, die Monopolbourgeoisie 
auch in Westdeutschland entmachtet und die nationale Frage 
im Sinne des Friedens gelost v/ird. ’ 23
It would seem useful to compare Ulbricht’s view of the 
nation expressed at the 10th plenum in May 1969? which was 
still close to that of the 1963 programme, with his changed 
policy statements after Brandt had become Federal Chancel­
lor. At the 10th plenum he had declared:
’Unsere Partei, die nationale Front, unser werktatiges 
Volk arbeitenjiicht nur an der Losung der Probleme der DDR. 
Wir haben daruber hinaus auch die geschichtliche Aufgabe, 
die Probleme der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung und des 
Lebens des Volkes im Namen der Lebensinteressen der ganzen 
deutschen Nation zu losen. Die Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik ist - ihrer yerfassung gemaiB - ein sozialistischer 
Staat deutscher Nation. Daraus ergibt sich der Verfass- 
ungsauftrag, ,#dal3 unsere Werktatigen beweisen, daiB es moglich 
ist, unter Fuhrung der Arbeiterklasse im Biindnis mit den 
Bauern, der Intelligenz und anderen werktatigen Schichten 
die Grundprobleme der Entwicklung des sozialistischen 
Staaies, der Entwicklung des okonomischen Systems des Soz­
ialismus und der sozialistischen Nationalkultur als Bei- 
spiel fiir die ganze deutsche Nation zu losen.’ 24
23. Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. 
Berlin (East), 1963? p« 64*
24* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 3? P* 242.
Here the SED was still claiming leadership of the German people 
and of the German nation in an all-German context. However, 
on that occasion .Ulbricht also declared that the West German 
workers, in view of the different historical circumstances 
and level of development, would have to work out their own 
path to socialism, and could not simply follow the East German 
model*
Ulbricht maintained that the DDR was a sovereign state, and 
possessed the right to negotiate on the German question. The 
Federal Republic was also a sovereign state. He argued that 
the relations between sovereign states could only be conducted 
on the basis of international law, and gave the example of the 
international relations between Arab states-which had differing 
social orders, but which were all part of the Arab nation. He 
continued:
fBer Begriff,der Anerkennung eines Staates ist volkerrecht- 
licher^Natur und beinhaltet die Bereitschaft, auf der Grundlage 
souveraner Gleichheit mit diesem Staat eine bestimmte Art von 
zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen. Das gilt auch, wenn es sich 
um verschiedene Staaten ein und derselben Nation handelt...
Das heiflt, mit der Anerkennung nimmt ein Staat lediglich offi- 
ziell von der Existenz des anderen Staates Kenntnis und bekun- 
det seine Bereitschaft zur gleichberechtigten Gestaltung der 
volkerrechtlichen Beziehungen. Eine staatsrechtliche Anerken­
nung gibt es gar nicht. Der vom Gegner haufig gebrauchte 
Begriff ist eine reine Zweckkonstruktion, die darauf hinaus- 
lauft, die DDR: zu einer Art westdeutschen Bundeslandes zu 
degradieren. Das heiHt, die geplante Annexion der DDR soli 
juristisch vorbereitet werden...* 25
The process of rejecting the concept of a single German nation, 
which was the reason given by Brandt for blocking the recognition
25* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik* Vol. 3* pp. 251-252
of the DDR in international law, was begun by Ulbricht in a
speech delivered at the 12th SED plenum on' December 12th, 1969•
This was the considered reaction to Brandt’s speech of October 
28th. Dettmar Cramer noted that since the coming to power of 
the SPD-FDP coalition the terms ’ganze deutsche N a t i o n ’ and 
*sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation’ (which Ulbricht had 
used in his speech at the 10th plenum) had been d r o p p e d . ^  
Cramer further viewed the draft treaty between the two states, 
which was published by the DDR on December 17th, as the start 
of the policy of total demarcation. EOwever, I would suggest 
that the first signs of total demarcation, in the sense of an 
attempt to attack the unity of the nation as the embodiment 
of the remaining points of common interest between the citizens
of the two states, were to be found in Ulbricht*s 12th plenum
speech which predated the draft treaty, and that the draft 
treaty had only conformed passively to the new policy by 
ignoring completely the national question.
At the 12th plenum Ulbricht claimed that the CDU/CSU had been 
responsible for splitting and betraying the interests of the 
German nation. The schism began with the establishment of the 
Federal Republic, he argued, and was confirmed in 1952 when 
Adenauer rejected the Soviet proposals for an all-German peace
26. Neues Deutschland, 14th December, 1969.
27. Deutschland Archiv, 1971/2, p. 114*
28. Neues Deutschland, 21st December, 1969*
treaty. Whereas at the 10th plenum Ulhricht had accepted the
formula of two states within a single nation, he now appeared
to argue that if there were two states, it followed that the
nation was split:
’Herr .Willy Brandt hat selbst von der Existenz zweier deutscher 
Staaten gesprochen und muB schlieBlich auch in seiner AuBen- 
politik von dieser Tatsache ausgehen. Das heiBt, auch Herr 
Brandt weiB genau, daB die deutsche Nation gespalten ist.f 29
Ulhricht then examined the term ’Germany* which, he argued, 
was a variable political and geographical concept. ’Germany1 
was often used as if a unified state organisation stilX existed. 
But two sovereign, fully independant and internationally 
(volkerrechtlich) recognised states had been in existence for 
twenty years. In view of their progressive differentiation 
(Auseinanderentwicklung), it was an illusion to wish to construct 
an artificial common roof over the two states. Ulhricht claimed 
that the solution of the German question meant only ’die Her- 
stellung eines geregelten friedlichen Nebeneinander zwischen 
der DDR und der BRD auf der Grundlage ihrer volligen Gleich- 
berechtigung und gegenseitigen volkerrechtlichen Anerkennung...* 
Although he repeated Brandt’s term ’geregeltes Nebeneinander1, 
there was no mention of ’Miteinander*. Ulhricht claimed that 
the unification of the socialist German state with the West 
German state, which was still, dominated by monopoly capitalism, 
was impossible. Nevertheless he declared that the aspirations 
of unification contained in Article 8 of the DDR constitution 
of 1968 remained valid.
29* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik,. Vol. !+> pv 129
Ulbricht returned to the theme of relations between the two
German states at an international press conference held on
30
January 19th, 1970* The occasion was used to reply to
Brandt!s report on the state of the nation of January li+th.
Once again Ulbricht claimed that the existence of two German
states meant that there could be no united German nation,
which had been split ais a result of a coup d ’etat (Staats-
streich) carried o.ut by Adenauer in agreement with the USA.
Since Adenauer had become Federal Chancellor as a result of
the elections of August 13k9 in which the West German KPD
had participated with little success, perhaps Ulbricht’s
reasoning might be compared with that of the Bolsheviks in 1918
who dissolved the elected Russian Constituent Assembly, in
view of its ’counter-revolutionary majority’, despite the
31fact that they had participated in these elections
On the national question Ulbricht declared at the press 
conference:
’Die Deklamation des westdeutschen Bundeskanzlers uber die 
Einheit der Nation wurde ubrigens von ihm selbst widerlegt, 
indem er feststellte, da£ es zwei deutsche Staaten gibt, mit 
gegensatzlicher Gesellschaftsordnung, und indem er das Be- 
kerintnis zur Integration in das westliche imperialistische 
Bundnissystem begriindete und einen deutschen Nationalstaat 
ausdriicklich ablehnte. Das ist die historische Realitat:
Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist ein sozialistischer 
deutscher Nationalstaat, die westdeutsche Bundesrepublik ist 
ein kapitalistischer NATO-Staat, dessen ehemalige Adenauer- 
Regierung sogar solche Grundrechte wie die Regelung der Bezie- 
hungen zur DDR den imperialistischen Westmachten ubertragen 
hat. Es ist ein Staat mit beschrankter nationaler Souveranitat.
30. Neues Deutschland, 20th January, 1970.
31* E. H. Carr. The Bolshevik Revolution. Vol. 1. London, 1950, 
p. 129* The term ’counter-revolutionary majority’ was 
repeated in the- 1970 official history of the CPSU.
(is'toria Kommunisticheskoi Partii ‘ Sovietskovo SOyuza.
Moscow, 1970, p . ^239•) ■
The argument that the DDR was free to decide its relations 
with the Federal Republic, in accord with Article 1 of the 
Soviet-DDR treaty of 1955, whereas the Federal Republic enjoyed 
limited sovereignty, having surrendered its rights of decision­
making in the area of relations between the two states, was 
somewhat dubious. It .wasjtrue :that the sovereignty,of the 
Federal Republic was limited by the four powers, but so was the 
sovereignty of the DDR, and this was confirmed in 1972 in 
Article 9 of the Basic Treaty between the two German states.
On the same day the Federal Government contented itself with
referring to Ulbrichtfs remarks as a ’merkwurdiger historisch-
32
politischer Exkurs’.
The purpose of Ulbricht’s’arguments would seem to be to
suggest that the Federal Republic was controlled by the
Western powers. For the first time the DDR was described
as a ’socialist German nation state’. In failing here to
describe the Federal Republic as either ’deutsch’ or ’national*,
Ulbricht appeared to be arguing that the DDR was the sole
German nation state, in claiming that Brandt had ’expressly
rejected’ a German nation state. He continued:
’Wenn gegenwartig Herr Brandt in mystischer Weise von einer 
Einheit der Nation spricht, so braucht er diese unrealistische 
Behauptung, urn die Herstellung normaler gleichberechtiger 
volkerrechtlicher Beziehungen mit der DDR aus dem Wege zu gehen. 
Herr Brandt sollte sich ubrigens daruber klar werden, daB auch 
in der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik von der Einheit der Nation 
nicht die Rede sein kann. Zwischen den Krugps und den Krauses, 
zwischen den Milliardaren und Multimilliardaren und dem werk- 
tatigen Volk gibt es keine nationale Einheit.’
32* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. IV. Bonn, 1970, p. 275
This might be understood as a reply to Brandtfs claim that 
special intra-German relationships were justified by the close 
family links between the citizens if the two states. Ulbricht 
argued, from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, that there could 
be no national unity between capitalists and members of the 
working class. However, it was not clear whether there could 
be national unity between the West German Krauses and the 
citizens of the DDR.
The 13 th plenum of June 1970 w a n  characterised by inten- - 
sified hostility towards the Federal Republic. On this 
occasion Albert Norden argued that the SPD-FDP coalition 
was^continuing the militaristic and revenge-seeking policies 
of the CDU/CSU, that, despite the change of government, polit­
ical and economic power still remained in the hands of the 
capitalists. ^ Norden argued that the West German insistence 
on intra-German relationships was a variation of the Hallstein 
Doctrine, an ’arrogant interference in the affairs of third 
states’, which contradicted the West German declaration that 
relations with the DDR should be conducted on the basis of 
equality. He further condemned the Federal Republic’s refusal 
to recognise the DDR in international law, and concluded that 
this meant that the Federal Republic was allowing itself a 
free hand for ’aggressive Absichten’ against the DDR.
33* Neues Deutschland, 15th June, 1970
Ini M s  speech at. the 13 th plenum Forden developed the
theme that the German nation was split.. A  link was seen
between Brandt’s affirmation of the unity of the nation and
of special intra-German relationships:
’Typisch fur das Auftreten auch der gegenwartigen Bonner 
Regierung unter Bundeskanzler Brandt ist die standige 
Wiederholung der nationalist!schen B.emagogie von der angeb- 
lichen „Einheit der Nation1’. Mit dieser der politischen und 
gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit widersprechenden These wird 
versucht, die revanchistische Formel von ffinnerdeutschen 
Beziehungen” zu begrunden.’
Norden continued that the ’reactionary forces* in West Germany, 
in alliance with American imperialism, had consciously destroy­
ed the unity of Germany after 19U5> and made the split perman­
ent through the Paris Treaties of 195U*'^+ The Federal Republic 
was calling for the unity of the nation, Norden argued, despite 
having been responsible for splitting Germany. When West Ger­
man sources had noted that the DDR constitution supported 
unification, they had not added that this was qualified unifi­
cation, on the basis of democracy and socialism.
Norden had carefully declared that the unity of Germany, 
rather than the unity of the nation had been destroyed. He 
argued that the Germans had been divided by the irreconcilable 
class opposition between proletariat and bourgeoisie, even 
when they had lived within a single area; there had never 
been unity between the ruling class and the workers, whose 
brothers were not the German capitalists, but their class
3^« The Paris Treaties guaranteed the Federal Republic equal 
rights within NATO and the West European Union. See 
Die Deutsche Frage, Wurzburg, 196U, PP* 6I4.-76, for West 
German defence policy between 19U9 and 1963.
comrades throughout the world. This irreconcilable class 
opposition had assumed state form (staatliche Gestalt) in the 
socialist DDR and the monopoly capitalist Federal Republic.
It was claimed that imperialism was the negation of all nat­
ional interests, which today could only be represented by 
socialism, the revolutionary working class and the national 
liberation movement. Norden defined the DDR as ’der soziali- 
stische deutsche Nationalstaat*, and the Federal Republic as 
’ein monopolkapitalistischer NATO-Staat’, repeating Ulbricht*s
terminology of January 19th; 1970.
<
On. the following day at the 13th SED .plenum, Ulbricht 
countered the Federal Government’s German policy point by point:
1. It was argued that recognition of the DDR would seal the 
schism between the two states - but this had come about 20 
years ago, and had been caused by the Federal Republic.
2. Recognition of the DDR by third states was claimed to be 
an unfriendly act, and to hinder the growth of intra-German 
relationships - but these did not exist.
3« Membership of the United Nations Organisation by the two 
states would be a ’juristische Verewigung’ of the split - 
but the split had become legally permanent through the setting 
up of the Federal Republic and its adherence to the Paris Treaties. 
k* Why could there not be relations between the two German 
states similar to those between the Federal Republic and Austria?
Ulbricht*s reply was that the Federal Republic was an imperial­
ist state which exploited Austria, and that a similar arrange­
ment was unacceptable to the DDR. He also stressed the cultural 
and linguistic differences between the two German states. The 
DDR, it was argued, was encouraging the development of a 
fhumanistische sozialistische Nationalkultur*, which had in­
herited the classical German language, whereas there existed 
in the Federal Republic a language which was contaminated by 
imperialism and manipulated by the capitalist monopoly pub­
lishing houses.
5* The constant West German demand for self-determination 
could only refer to self-determination within the Federal 
Republic, and the attempt to apply this principle to the East 
German population represented the camouflaged aim of annexing 
the DDR. East German citizens had the inalienable right of 
self-determination, and had made use of this right in a pleb­
iscite on the constitution of the socialist DDR.
Ulbricht then considered the question of all-German Zusammen-
gehorigkeitsgefuhl. It may be noted that here he did not
stress the differences between monopoly capital and the working
class, between the Krupps and the Krauses, but between the
citizens of the Federal Republic and the ’Staatsvolk des
sozialistischen deutschen Nationalstaates1:
’Sprechen wir also iiber einige Gefuhle. Klar, es gibt zwischen 
Verwandten gute Oder schlechte Gefiihle und manchmal auch 
gewisse Gemeinsamkeiten. Aber die Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik und die westdeutsche Bundesrepublik und ihre Gesell- 
schaftsordnungen sind nicht miteinander verwandt. Die Burger
der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik stellen in ihrer Gesamtheit 
das Volk eines monopolkapitalistischen Staates dar und sind 
mit den Fariser Vertragen an die imperialistischen Westmachte 
verbunden. In der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik hat sich 
das Staatsvolk des sozialistischen Nationalstaates sein sozia- 
listisches Vaterland geschaffen. Von entscheidender Bedeu- 
tung sind also nicht Gefuhle zwischen Verwandten.<# Entschei- 
dende Bedeutung haben vielmehr andere Gefuhle - namlich Ge­
fuhle des Hasses des Volkes der DDR gegenuber den imperia­
listischen, militaristischen und neonazistischen Krafte, die 
fur den Hitlerkrieg mitverantwortlich sind und die heute in 
Westdeutschland die entscheidenden Positionen in Armee und 
Verwaltung innehaben.* 35
When taken with Ulbricht*s remark at the 10th plenum that the 
West German working class would have to find its own way to 
socialism, the differentiation between East German citizens 
and the whole population of West Germany' represented a further 
move towards total, or at least maximum demarcation from the 
Federal Republic. It had been declared that ideology was 
thicker than blood. Not only Nation but also Volk had become 
a concept subject to demarcation. The statement at the 10th 
plemum that *der Weg der sozialistischen Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik nicht schematisch auf Westdeutschland ubertragen werden 
kann* implied that West German communists would follow a diff­
erent policy from the SED. Accordingly, besides demarcation 
between the populations of the two states, it might be argued 
that Ulbricht was sacrificing the unity of the German working 
class in the cause of total demarcation. Aspirational total 
demarcation, balanced by affect for the USSR, was perhaps best 
presented by Gunter Mittag at the 13th plenum:
.’Alles. verbindet uns jnit der DDR, unserem sozialistischen 
Vaterland, mit der machtigen Sowjetunion und den anderen 
sozialistischen Staaten. Nichts verbindet uns mit dem 
imperialistischen System in Westdeutschland und seinem 
Hauptverbundeten, dem aggressiven USA-Imperialismus,* 36
35* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 5, p. 330. 
36. Neues Deutschland, 12th June, 1970.
iv. The Moscow Treaty
Ulbricht fs draft treaty of December 1969 and the Erfurt and
Kassel meetings had made it clear that the DDR saw the normal­
isation of relations between the two German states not as an 
opportunity for rapprochement, but as a means of consolidating 
and extending its demarcation from the Federal Republic. At 
the 13th SED plenum Ulbricht had claimed that the Kassel meet­
ing had clearly demonstrated to the world_the irreconcilability
37
of the social systems of the two states• However, the claim
that normalisation would confirm differentiation remained an 
aspiration; it could not become an effective claim unless it 
was supported by the rank and file SED membership, by the 
general population of the DDR, and by the allies of the DDR 
leadership. It has been argued above that the first effects
of the Brandt-Stoph meetings upon DDR' citizens had tended to
hinder rather than promote demarcation: the Soviet-West German
treaty concluded on August 12th, 1970, (the Moscow Treaty) was 
to show the level of Soviet support for the German policy of 
the DDR leadership.
In the treaty the Federal Government accepted that the fron­
tiers of the DDR were inviolable. At the end of Article 3 of 
the treaty it was declared that the USSR and the Federal Republic
37• Neues Deutschland, 16th June, 1970.
’.*• betrachten heute und kunftig die Grenzen aller S'taaten
in Europa als unverletzlich . • • einschlieBlich der Oder—
FeiBe-Linie, die die Westgrenze- der Vo Ik are pub lik. Polen
bildet, und der Grenze ‘zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
38
land und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*.’ However,
the Moscow Treaty did not include any reference to Western
or West German recognition of the DDR. It was ironic that
Ulbricht’s earlier claim that the Federal Republic had not
been permitted by the three Western powers to negotiate on
the German question was used by Bahr as an argument to
39Justify the non-recognition of the DDR.  ^ The sovereignty 
of the DDR was shown to be similarly limited by the all- 
German interests of the Soviet Union, when the DDR news 
agency referred to Soviet, forces in the DDR, which was 
immediately corrected to Soviet forces, in Germany.^0
It was in the interests of neither the USSR nor the DDR to 
publicise their differences, but Blrnbaum noted that the at­
tempt by the DDR Mini stem rat to argue that die Im Ver-
trag zwischen der UdSSR und deir BRD eingegangenen Ver- 
pflichtungen machen es folgerichtig erforderlich, nunmehr
38* Texts zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6 , p. 9^ -•
39. Ibid, Vol. 6, p. 112.
iiO* - Dettmar Cramer-: Deutschland nach dem Grundvertrag.
Stuttgart, 1973> P* 53* Cramer gave other examples 
of confusion in the DDR media on how to refer to 
Soviet troops.
diplomatische Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD herzu-
stellen... 1^  was omitted from the translation of this declaf-
U2
at ion which appeared in PravcLa. It was also significant that 
the West German affirmation of the unity of the nation, ..which., 
was expressed in; t h e ;Brief zur Deutschen E i n h e i t ^  presented 
to.the Soviet Union on the same day that the treaty was signed, 
wa*s not rejected by the latter.
The DDR's interests in the Berlin q u e s t i o n -  and this applied
to Fast as well as to West Berlin - had been put at risk by the
USSR's restatement of four-power responsibilities f o ^  the city'
during the negotiations with the Federal R e p u b l i c , ^  which
had: been highlighted by West German insistence on a political
link (Junktim) between the ratification of the Moscow Treaty
and a& satisfactory Berlin agreement. ^ Certainly, W6st German
demands for securing a close relationship between the Federal
Republic and West Berlin, and for unhindered access to West 
2x6
Berlin, raised potential problems for the DDR, particularly
/
1+1. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 108.
2f.2v Karl E. Birnbaum: East and West. Germany: A Modus
vivendi•
U3* Texte zur. Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6 , p. 96.
2+2+. Gromyko had declared that the rights of the four powers ' 
with regard to Germany as a whole and to Berlin would 
not be affected by the Moscow Treaty. Texte zur 
Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 8I4..
2+5. This was stated by the Federal government on June 6th, 
1970. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 120.
J
2+6. See, for example, Brandt 's remarks on December 1st, 1970. 
Texte zun Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 222.
in the latter case, if this were to mean that not only Western 
military traffic hut also civilian West German traffic between 
the Federal Republic and West Berlin could cross DDR territory 
without being subject to DDR control. This would represent an 
loss of formal sovereignty to the DDR, and the loss of the 
opportunity to interfere with civilian transit traffic a s  a 
reprisal against any alleged 'provocations' by the Federal 
Government or by West German political parties in West Berlin*
The reiteration by the Federal Republic in the Moscow Treaty 
that'it had renounced the use of force worked against the 
Feindbild promoted by the DDR* It was admitted in the declara­
tion of the DDR Council of Ministers of August 12+th that the 
Federal Republic's 'friedensbedrohende Revanchepolitik* was 
now at an end, if the Federal Republic kept strictly to the 
letter and spirit of the treaty. This might be contrasted 
with Norden's statement at the 13th plenum two; months earlier 
that non-recognition meant that the Federal Republic was; 
harbouring 'aggressive Absichten' towards the DDR. In this 
respect a comment in Pravda, which, in the view of one West 
German observer, was addressed to the D D R , ^  stated that 
'...those who were accustomed for decades to regard the Federal 
Republic as the tool of aggressive blocs find it difficult to 
accept the fact that west Germany, like any other sovereign 
state, has its own state interests, and wishes to pursue a
2+7. Jurgen Kellermeier: Der Vertrag mit; Moskau oder*: Die
neue Lage fur Ost-Berlin. Deutschland Archiv, 1970/9, 
p. 1005.
policy which takes into account the real situation and the real 
possibilities..
However, whatever the outcome of the Moscow Treaty, the DDR 
had decided to resume contacts, with the Federal Republic. In 
his closing remarks at Kassel Stoph had declared that the 
Federal Republic required a pause for thought (Denkpause), to 
rethink its position,,to realise that the DDR proposals offered 
the best way of achieving peaceful coexistence between the two 
s t a t e s . ^  In July 1970 Ulbricht had added that 'die Dauer der 
Denkpause hangt aber nur von der Frist ab, die die Bundes- 
republik fur die Unterzeichnung des Gewaltverzichtsabkommens 
mit der Sowjetunion braucht.1^0 Clearly, the only concession 
made by the Federal Republic in the treaty had been to guaran­
tee the inviolability of the frontiers of the DDR, and, after 
the treaty had been signed, Brandt had claimed that the 20 
point prograinm he had proposed at, Kassel remained the constr­
uctive basis for a treaty (vertragliche Regelung) between the
51
two German states.
It was possible that this willingness to resume contacts 
with the Federal Republic resulted from a desire not to appear
2+8., Pravda., 18th August, 1970
2 + 9 Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 5, p. 153.
50. Ibid, Vol. 6, p. 2+8.
51. Ibid, Vol. 6, p. 102.
inflexible in the face of domestic and international public
opinion; the experience of the statements in the DDR media
at the time of the Erfurt and Kassel meetings suggested however
that further discussions with the Federal Government would be
used to stress the ideological differences between the two
states. A  similar view had been taken by Egon Franke, who
declared, in a West German declaration of ideological demarcation:
'Bei der Fortfuhrung der Gesprache bleiben die ideologischen 
Gegensatze unberuhrt. Wir sind auch nicht bereit, unsere 
Vorstellungen von Demokratie, sozialem Rechtsstaat und frei- 
heitlicher Gesellschaftsordnung aufzugeben. Daruber gibt es 
keine Diskussion.' 52
This raised the question whether it was possible to conceive of
a united nation between two states with differing dominant
ideologies, or whether, as the DDR leadership claimed, unity
could only be achieved by the elimination of one of the two
states, which implied the elimination of the dominant ideology
of that state. A  unified nation further implied a unified
national culture. The DDR had long attempted to develop a
separate socialist national culture. The rejection of the
unity of the nation was an extension of this process.
The policy of the DDR leadership suffered a setback in the 
Moscow Treaty, not only through the absence of Soviet support, 
but also because the DDR population, through its access to both 
Eastern and Western information, became aware of this failure.
52. Texte zur- Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 119
5* Overt demarcation - from Ulbricht to Honecker
i . The beginnings of the Abgrenzung campaign
The relative decline in anti-West German statements in the
Bast German media before the signing of the Moscow Treaty,
which had been noted by U s e  Spittmann,^ continued for a month.
This quiescence may possibly be explained by the need of the
DDR leadership to reconsider its German policy in the light
of the lack of Soviet support for this policy associated with
the Moscow Treaty. The DDR media continued to stand by the
interpretation of the treaty contained in the declaration of
the Council of Ministers of August li+th, and presented the view
that the German and European policies of the DDR were fully
supported by and completely in line with those of the USSR and
2
of the other Warsaw Treaty member states. However', signs of
irritation might be noted in reference to a Chinese allegation
that the Moscow Treaty was a betrayal of the sovereignty of
the DDR; this was condemned as an attempt to drive a wedge
■3
between the DDR and the Soviet Union.
A  return to the slogans of ideological warfare was signalled 
by a speech delivered by Hermann Axen, a member of the secre­
tariat of the Central Committee of the SED, on September 13th,
1. Deutschland Archiv, 1970/10, p. 1103•
2. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, pp. 105-108.
3* Zum internationalen Echo auf den Vertrag UdSSR-BRD.
Neues Deutschland, September 22na, 1970
1970. While stressing the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist 
nature of the DDR, Axen argued that unpunished Nazis were to 
be found in the Federal Republic, which was the home of neo­
nazism, revenge-seeking and militarism. He continued:
fDer antifaschistische Grundzug der Heutschen Demokratischen 
Republik hat uns verpflichtet, die faschistische Vergangenheit 
erfolgreich zu bewaltigen. Doch sind wir eingedenk der Lehre, 
dag der Faschismus die Ausgeburt imperialistischer Unter- 
druckungs- und Kriegspolitik ist. Der antifaschistische 
Grundzug der DDR verpflichtet uns daher, in Gegenwart und 
Zukunft erst recht, unseren sozialistischen Arbeiter-und- 
B&uern-Staat weiterhin auf alien Gebieten von der imperialis­
tischen Bundesrepublik abzugrenzen. Die DDR tritt grund- 
satzlich fur die Herstellung von volkerrechtlichen Beziehungen 
von Beziehungen der friedlichen Koexistenz zur BRD ein, damit 
vom westdeutschen NATO-Staat kein Konflikt, kein Krieg ange- 
stiftet werde. Aber keine nationalistische Demagogie von 
sogenannten „innerdeutschen” Beziehungen oder von der angeb- 
lichen tfEinheit der Nation"' kann die Grundwahrheit verdunkeln, 
daB ganze Welten und Epochen den sozialistischen deutschen 
Staat vom monopolkapitalistischen Regime Westdeutschlands 
trennen. ’
Here hostility towards the Federal Republic was more pronounced 
than in Ulbricht*s speech in Rostock on July 16th, delivered 
before the Moscow Treaty was signed, where at least a distinc­
tion had been made between the Brandt-Scheel coalition and 
*progressive democratic forces* on the one hand, and the 
’extreme right wing forces* gathered around Franz-Josef StrauB 
on the other.^ Despite the clear rejection of the use of force 
by the USSR and the Federal Republic in Article 2 of the Moscow 
Treaty, the old claims of militarism and revenge-seeking had 
been applied in undifferentiated form to the Federal Republic,
i+. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 129*
5. Ibid, pp. kh-67*
from which now total demarcation, * Abgrenzung auf alien Ge 
bieten*, was overtly advocated.
Subsequent speeches by a number of East German leaders
suggested that 'Abgrenzung* was the key word in a renewed
anti-West German campaign. On October 6th Willi Stoph again
attacked the concept of the unity of the nation, and repeated
the standard ideological distinction between the two states:
'Angesichts der Gegensatzlichkeit der Staats- und Gesell- 
schaftssysteme vollzog und vollzieht sich unvermeidlich ein 
objektiver ProzeB der Abgrenzung und nicht der Annaherung. 
Worum es zwischen der BRD und der- DDR geht - das ist die Her- 
atellung von volkerrechtlichen Beziehungen, wie es zwischen 
Staaten mit unterschiedlicher Gesellschaftsordnung im Intere- 
sse der Erhaltung des Friedens notwendig ist.1’ 6
The detailed coverage of this speech in the Soviet press
noted by.Spittmamt,^ suggested that its anti-West German
content was acceptable to the USSR. A. similar opposition of
demarcation and rapprochement, the former making the latter
impossible, was argued by Kurt Hager in the following month:
'Angesichts der Gegensatzlichkeit der zwei Staats und Gesell- 
schaftssysteme - des Sozialismus und des Imperialismus - 
vollzog^und vollzieht sich gesetzmaBig ein ProzeB der politi- 
schen, okonomischen und ideologischen Abgrenzung zwischen der 
DDR und der BRD. Eine Annaherung oder ^ gar ein ,finneres" Ver- 
haltnis ist objektiv uberhaupt nicht moglich.* 8
In a speech reported in Neues Deutschland on October 2hth 
Honecker declared that the logic of the Moscow Treaty was
6. Neues Deutschland, 7th October, 1970.
7- Deutschland Archiv, 1970/10, p. 1115.
8. Neues Deutschland, 28th November, 1970.
that the Federal Republic should establish diplomatic relations
with the DDR. The division of Germany had been made permanent
by the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO. There could
never be finnere Beziehungen between socialism and imperialism.
Honecker continued:
'Der Antagonismus zwischen den beiden Systemen ist objektiv. 
Uhd so vollzieht sich auch zwischen der sozialistischen DDR, 
die fest und unverriickbar zur sozialistischen Staatengemein- 
schaft gehort, und der imperialistischen Bundesrepublik, die 
mit den USA verbiindet und fest in die NATO integriert ist, 
ein objektiver ProzeB der Abgrenzung.' 9
Honecker stated that West German politicians, who did not deny
the irreconcilability of the two systems, should draw the
necessary conclusions. Relations with the Federal Republic
had to be based on peaceful coexistence, which 'beruht auf
dem unerschiitter lichen Bundnis mit der Sowjetunion, auf der
Macht und der Solidaritat aller sozialistischen Staaten.'
But peaceful relations had to be accompanied by ideological
watchfulness, he argued, since the socialist states were to
be strengthened not only by economic development, but also
by the ideological struggle against imperialism. Echoing
Mittag at the 13th plenum, he concluded:
'Nichts verbindet uns mit dem imperialistischen System - 
alles verbindet uns mit unserem sozialistischen Vaterland, 
der DDR, mit unseren Freunden und Verbiindeten in der 
sozialistischen Gemeinschaft...'
Although Honecker had identified economic development and 
ideological security as two means of strengthening the social-
9* Neues Deutschland, October 2i+th, 1970.
ist states, including the DDR, there was a third factor, which 
was peculiar to the DDR, the need for Western recognition to 
support legitimation. The realisation of diplomatic recognition 
did not lie directly within the power of the DDR leadership; 
as has been argued above, this depended ultimately on the 
Federal government. But the latter was not prepared to rec­
ognise the DDR in international law, which explains the attacks 
on the unity of the nation and intra-German relationships, 
since these concepts were used by the Federal Government to 
justify non-recognition. It would perhaps have seemed a log­
ical step for the DDR leadership to have incorporated the 
denial of national unity into the Abgrenzung theory; this was 
done indirectly with the slogan of demarcation in all areas, 
yet there was, no mention of 'nationale Abgrenzung', possibly 
because any attempt to formulate such a concept would have been 
counter-productive, in view of the level of affect for Brandt
- and by implication, for the German policy of his administration
- which had been demonstrated at Erfurt.
There was a further difficulty of a constitutional nature. 
Despite the declaration that the DDR: was the socialist German 
nation state, the term 'Nationalstaat' had carefully not been 
applied to the Federal Republic. It was claimed that the leaders 
of the Federal Republic had destroyed the unity of the German 
nation. But in denying the unity of the German nation the DDR 
leadership did not go as far as saying that there were now two
nations, which nationale Abgrenzung would have implied. The 
furthest that Ulbricht went was to declare a *staatliche 
Abgrenzung* between the two s t a t e s . ^
In a speech reported on November- 6th Albert Norden linked
Abgrenzung with peaceful coexistence:
*Da<s grofie his tori sche Ringen zwischen Sozialismis und Im- 
perialismus beflugelt den Kampf der Volker urn ihre Befreiung.. 
Zwischen den Systemen findet vielmehr ein objektiver ProzeB 
der immer deutlicheren politischen, ideologischen und okono- 
mischen Abgrenzung^statt. Mit jedem Erfolg des Sozialismus 
tritt der reaktionare Gharakter des Imperialismus und seine 
historische tJberlebtheit immer scharfer hervor. Staaten, die 
diese entgegengesetzte Systeme reprasentieren, heben sich 
daher in ihrem Wesen mehr und mehr voneinander ab. Genauso 
verhalt es sich mit der Stellung der sozialistischen DDR zur 
imperialistischen BRD. Das schlieBt Beziehungen der fried- 
lichen Koexistenz zwischen solchen Staaten nicht nur nicht aus 
sondern macht sie geradezu notwendig, eben weil es urn Staaten 
mit unterschiedlicher, ja gegensatzlicher Ordnung geht. Darum 
bilden die klare Erkenntnis der Unversohnlichkeit von Sozia­
lismus und Imperialismus und unsere Politik der aktiven 
friedlichen Koexistenz eine untrennbare Einheit.* 11
The argument that peaceful coexistence was essential under
conditions of demarcation was repeated two days later. Here
peaceful coexistence was defined as-follows:
*Sie zielt gerade darauf'ab, daB Beziehungen des Volkerrechts 
zwischen alien Staaten und die Zuruckdrangung der aggressiven 
Krafte des Imperialismus heute den Prieden zusichern, ohne 
daB damit der grundlegende gesellschaftliche Antagonismus 
und der Gegensatz von biirgerlicher und sozialistischer Ideo­
logic aufgehoben werden konnte. 12
Once again the refusal by the Federal Republic to establish 
relations with the DDR based on international law was the point
10. Neues Deutschland, January ll+th, 1971 •
11. Ibid, November 6th, 1970.
12. Ibid, November 8th, 1970.
at issue, since apart from this it could be argued that the
Federal Republic had already complied with the main tenets of
peaceful coexistence. It had long been prepared to exchange
declarations of non-aggression with the Eastern bloc, and to
include the unsolved problems of the division of Germany in
15
these declarations.  ^ Furthermore Brandt, who had directly 
offered the DDR an agreement on the mutual renouncing of the 
use of force in October 1969**^ hac* combined this with his 
declaration in January 1970 that there could be no ideological
1*5
compromise between the two states. ^ The difference between 
the official viewpoints of the two states was that the DDR 
claimed that demarcation and rapprochement were opposites; 
on the other hand, Brandt wanted both ideological demarcation 
and rapprochement.
Some light may be thrown on this apparent inconsistency by
Picaper’s statement that Western culture is decentralised,
16
but is seen by the East as a coordinated conspiracy. Brandt 
appeared to limit his conception of ideological demarcation 
to a rejection of the belief system of the DDR leadership. 
Conversely, in accord with the Marxist-Leninist base/super- 
structure theory, the DDR leadership viewed all activity as
13. See Kiesingerfs policy declaration of December 13th, 1966. 
Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 1, p. 20.
14* Ibid, Vol. Uf p. "38.
15* Ibid, Vol. 1+, p. 205•
16. Jean-Paul Picaper. Kommunikation und Propaganda, in der 
DDR. Stuttgart, 1976, pp. 66-67-
ultimately related to ideology.1^ Thus the East German concept 
of total, demarcation was ideological in this wider sense. It 
followed from this that rapprochement was the negation of de­
marcation, since rapprochement was understood by the Federal 
Republic in terms of menschliche Erleichterungen, which would 
have the effect of facilitating increased contacts between the 
citizens of the two states, contacts which would expose DDR 
citizens to Western ideology. It was not possible to describe 
the desire for increased contacts with the DDR as a coordinated 
conspiracy, because the Federal Republic, as a liberal dem­
ocratic state, did not aspire to exercise ideological control 
over all sectors of West German life, but the effect was the 
same, since the ballot box had shown that the majority of West 
German citizens shared the liberal democratic ideology of the 
politicians in the Bundestag.
17* On the question of basis and superstructure a modern 
East German source has declared:
fDie Gesellschaft stellt auf jeder##Entwicklungsstufe eine 
Gesamtheit gesellschaftlicher Verhaltnisse zwischen den 
Menschen dar, die in materielle und ideologische einge- 
teilt werden konnen. Die ersteren bilden die Grundlage, 
die reale Basis einer Gesellschaft; die letzteren stellen 
den ttberbau iiber dieser Basis dar.'
Kleines Politisches Worterbuch. Berlin, 1973, p. 97*
ii The strengthening of the leadership’s control
The Abgrenzung campaign was accompanied by intensified .
measures to promote greater effectiveness within three
key areas of East German society, the education system,
the rank and file SED membership and the armed forces.
In January 1.970 an agreement was signed to develop the
cooperation between the DDR and the USSR in the field of 
"1ft
education. In May 1970 the VII pedagogic congress of the
D D R  took place, on which occasion the minister- of education,.
Margot Honecker, called for higher research standards, the
revision of curricula, and for higher levels of achievement
19
by schoolchildren. On* September 15th, 1970, an academy of
pedagogic sciences; of the DDR was founded, and simultaneously
a plan for scientific cooperation with the Soviet academy
20
of pedagogic sciences was announced. Fifteen institutes
and sections were established for specialised tasks in the
21
field of education. Their work, particularly through the 
rewriting of textbooks, became important for the social-
22
isation of schoolchildren into the concept of demarcation.
18. Deutschland Archiv, 1970/2, p. 223.
19. VII Padagogischer Kongrefi der DDR 1970, Berlin (East), 
1970, pp. 35-95.
20. Padagogik, 1970/12, p. 1099.
21. Ibid, 1971/1, p. 79.
22. Gerhard Wettig argued that Abgrenzung became a school 
subject. Dilemmas,,der SED-Abgrenzungspolitik. Eerichte 
des Bundesinstituts fur ostwissenschaftliche und inter­
national e Studien, Cologne, 1975/22, p. 2.
The following example of how demarcation was to be taught 
in the schools, balanced the negative: referent of West German 
imperialism by positive reference to the USSR and the other 
socialist states. At this time-, Uuly 1970, the central 
conviction of the friend-foe relationship was still declared 
to be that the West German working class would one day 
achieve socialism.
Anforderungen an das ideologische Freund-Feind-Blld * 
Entscheidende Oberzeugungen zum Freund-Feind-BiId
1. Politisch-ideologisches Engagement fur 
die Partei der Arbeiterklasse und alle 
Werktatigen in der sozialistischen 
M enschengeme inschaft•
. 2. Die marxistisch-leninistische Analyse 
des Charakters unserer Epoche ist die 
-> objektive Grundlage unseres Freund- 
Feind-Bildes. •
3. Zentrale Oberzeugung zum Freund-Felnd 
Bild: So wie die Arbeiterklasse ihre
—  historische Mission erfullt hat, wird --
—  es auch eines Tages die Arbeiterklasse 
Westdeutschlands tun.
h- Liebe und Verbundenheit zum soziali­
stischen Staat, zum sozialistischen
Vaterland. Unser Hauptfeind ist der ---
westdeutsche Imperialismus. Ihm 
gilt unser ganzer Ha£.
5» Unser engster Freund und Kampfgefahrte 
ist die SU. Unsere Freunde sind die 
Lander der sozialistischen Staaten- 
gemeinschaft. Unser gemeinsamer Feind —  
ist der Imperialismus.
6. Unser Beitrag zur Starkungder politi- 
schen Macht der Arbeiterklasse starkt 
unser sozialistisches Vaterland und 
die sozialistische Staatengemeinschaft.
7. Obereinstimmung der personlichen In- 
teressen mit den Interessen des soziali-«- 
stischen Vaterlandes sowie mit alien urn <- 
Frieden, Demokratie und Sozialismus <- 
kampfenden Menschen und Staaten.
23- Horst Adam: Philosophisch-padagogische Probleme des
Freund—Feind—Blldes in der ideologischen Srziehung. 
Padagogik, 1970/7, p. 621.
In October 1970 joint manoeuvres of the Warsaw Treaty armed 
forces, codenamed Waffenbruderschaft, took place within the 
DDR. The manoeuvres were given massive coverage in Neues 
Deutschland, with fulsome expressions of the unbreakable 
bonds of friendship between the DDR, the USSR and other Warsaw 
Treaty member states, and the standard condemnations of all­
eged Western aggression. In the same month Walter Ulbricht 
called for increased political-ideological work among the
armed forces in a speech before newly commissioned officers
2k
of the Nationale Volksarmee He returned to the language 
of the cold war. The old bogey of the Hitler generals of 
the Bundeswehr, who were allegedly planning to use chemical 
and nuclear weapons against the socialist states, was re­
vived. It was claimed that Waffenbrudershaft had demon­
strated the invincibility of the socialist community of .....
states, and had strengthened the international reputation 
of the DDR. Here the DDR statement of August li+th, which 
had suggested that West German revenge seeking was at an 
end after the Moscow Treaty had been signed, seemed to have 
been forgotten.
Ulbricht then turned to ideological questions. He declared 
that the newly qualified officers .were starting their car­
eers at a time when the DDR was building the developed soc­
ialist society, which was indivisibly connected with the
2U« Einheit, 1970/11. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6,
pp. 167-182.
mastering of the scientific-technical revolution in all
areas of society, including defence# He continued:
’Entscheidende Voraussetzung fur die effective Losung 
aller Hauptaufgaben ist die ideologische Geschlossenheit 
der Bevolkerung, die Stabilitat des BewuBtseins jedes 
einzelnen Burgers und demzufolge auch ;jedes Armeeangehorigen. 
Lenin lehrt uns: lf...;je tiefer die Umgestaltung, die wir 
vollbringen wollen, desto mehr muB man Interesse und be- 
wuBte Einstellung zu ihr wecken, muB man •• • von dieser 
Nbtwendigkeit uberzeugen.” *
The world struggle between socialism and imperialism was 
intensifying, he argued. The economic struggle was accom­
panied by a struggle for the consciousness of all peace- 
loving people, where ideology was the decisive area of con­
flict between the two systems# Lenin's statement that there 
was no middle way between bourgeois and socialist ideology 
remained true. This made the political-ideological work 
in the NVA increasingly important.
'Vor jedem militarischen Kampfkollektiv, vor jeder Partei- 
organisation steht die unabdingbare Porderung, zu erreichen, 
daB sich jeder Armeeangehorige vorbehaltlos mit den Zielen 
und Aufgaben des Sozialismus identifiziert. Elicht zuletzt 
wachst die Bedeutung der politisch-ideologischen Arbeit, 
weil das sozialistische Denken und Handeln aller Bevolkerungs- 
schichten^unserer Republik nur durch die Auseinandersetzung 
mit der burgerlichen Ideologie entwickelt werden k a n n . V
It was argued that ideological work should be linked more
closely with military duties, that the greatest military
successes were achieved where communist consciousness was
most highly developed. Ulbricht declared that the young
officers occupied a key position in political-ideological
work, as the immediate superiors of the ordinary soldiers,
and advised the newly qualified officers on the methods of
political education; they should make use of the experience
of their superiors, study the contemporary Marxist-Leninist 
social sciences and set a good example through their per­
sonal behaviour.
This speech suggested that a widespread tightening-up of 
ideological discipline was in progress ' in‘ the-NVA. What 
was interesting was the assertion that socialist thought and 
behaviour could be developed only through conflict with 
bourgeois ideology. However, Ulbricht die not relate id­
eological controversy specifically to the Federal Republic, 
and there was no mention of Abgrenzung. Jorg Lolland claimed 
that Ulbricht had taken measures to try to raise the polit­
ical consciousness of the NVA, because its morale had been 
shattered. Lolland argued that this had been caused firstly 
by the defeat of the Egyptians in the 1967 six day war in 
the Middle East. The fact that the Egyptians had been trained 
by Soviet instructors had lessened the NVA's trust in Soviet 
military science. The second reason suggested by Lolland 
was the unpopularity of the intervention of the DDR armed 
forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968, where in the first days 
DDR military reporters had thoughtlessly described the NVA 
as an army which was full of elan and intoxicated with 
victory.^
25. Jorg Lolland: Zu Befehl Genosse Unterleutnant.
Authentische Berichte aus dem Alltag der Nationalen
Volksarmee. Stuttgart, 1971 > pp. 33-35*
Between September 1st and October 31st, 1970, all full 
and candidate members of the SED had their membership doc­
uments renewed. This subject was mentioned in November in 
a television interview between Ulbricht and two party secre­
taries. It was clear from the interview that an attempt
had been made to explain the DDR leadership1s German policy
26
to the ordinary party members. The significance of the 
exchange of party documents was discussed In Neuer Weg, the 
periodical for SED officials. Horst Dohlus, the central 
committee member in charge of party organs had declared in 
July 1970:
'Der Dokumentenumtausch 1st so gesehen keine^rein inner- 
innerparteiliche Angelegenheit, seine Durchfiihrung hat 
groBe gesellschaftliche Bedeutung und. steht in Zusammen- 
hang mit der Losung aller anderen Aufgaben. Der Umtausch 
der Mitgliedsbucher und Kandidatenkarten ist ein Bestand- 
teil der Anstrengungen^unserer^Partei,Mden Flick der Ge- 
nossen und aller Werktatigen fur die nachste Zukunft zu 
weiten und alle Krafte unserer sozialistischen Gesellschaft 
noch bewuBter und grundlicher auf die Losung der gegenwar- 
tigen Hauptaufgaben zu orientieren, sie zu mobilisieren 
und zu fuhren.' 27
However, while alerting the party, Dohlus die not elaborate
on the tasks which had to be tackled. A  further article in
September declared that some comrades had expressed the view
that too much fuss had been made about the exchange of doc-
ments. But it was necessary to raise the level of'activity
of every member, and to prepare the party for the coming
tasks.^
26. Neues Deutschland, 9th November, 1970.
27* Neuer Weg,- 1970/13, P* 603.
28. Ibid, 1970/17, p. 818.
iii. West German interpretations of demarcation
At the beginning of December 1970, on the eve of the li+th
plenum, a meeting of the Political-Consultative Committee
of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was held in East Berlin.
The concluding declaration, quoted by Ulbricht at the li+tb
plenum, appeared to give considerable support to the DDRfs
Western policy. It was stated that the establishment of
relations based on international law between the DDR and
other states, including the Federal Republic, and the entry
of the DDR into the United Nations Organisation and other
international organisations were important contemporary 
29demands •
However, this support could not disguise the fact that the 
DDR had suffered a further setback with the conclusion of 
the treaty on the normalisation of relations between the 
Federal Republic and Poland (the Warsaw Treaty), on December 
7th, 1970.^° The DDR had failed to stop Poland normalising 
relations with the Federal Republic, without the latter 
having recognised the DDR. It was again shown that the 
DDR's allies were not prepared to insist *on Y/est German 
recognition of the DDR. Despite this failure Ulbricht
29. It was stated#in the declaration: 'Die Teilnehmer der
Beratung erklarten sich einmutig mit der Friedenspolitik 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik solidarisch.'
Texte. zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, pp. 221+-227.
30. Vertrag zwischen der^Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Volksrepublik Polen iiber die Grundlagen der Normalisierung 
ihrer gegenseitingen Beziehungen. Texte zur Deutschland­
politik, Vol. 6, pp. 258-260.
commented at the li+th plenum:
'Die Regierung Brandt wird also zur Kenntnis nehmen mussen,. 
daB es keinen sozialistischen Staat gibt, bei dem sie Ver­
st andnis fur die nebulose Forderung nach „innerdeutschen 
Bezlehungen" finden konnte.' 31
The uncertainties, connected with the Berlin and Warsaw 
treaties for the DDR leadership may be viewed as one explan­
ation for the Abgrenzung campaign and the associated measures; 
for intensified political education in the NVA and SED. A  
further source of anxiety might be found in the continuing 
quadripartite negotiations on the future of Berlin. In 
November 1970 Neues Deutschland had attacked the West German 
government's insistence that its ratification of the Moscow
Treaty would be made dependent on a satisfactory outcome of
32the Berlin negotiations. .Here, if the demands of the
33Federal government were realised, ^ they would represent a
serious limitation of East German claims to sovereignty in
this area. A contemporary West German observer claimed
that the DDR was using the Berlin negotiations for a
'deutschlandpolitische Gegenoffensive', by attempting to
make concessions on Berlin dependent on the Federal Republic
3kaccepting the DDR-'s German policy. But the realisation 
of the DDR leadership's policy depended on Soviet support,
31. Neues Deutschland, 10th December, 1970
32. Ibid, 5th November, 1970
33 • West German demands were explained by .Egon Frahke on 
August 11th. Texte- zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6,
pp. 87-88.
3k• Deutschland Archiv, 1970/12, pp. 1259-1260.
and the USSR had shown in the Moscow and Warsaw treaties 
that it was prepared to sacrifice DDR interests when they 
conflicted with Soviet policies in the field of European 
security.
It is argued that one immediate factor behind the DDR
leadership's decision to introduce the Abrenzung campaign
was; connected with its agreement with the Federal Republic
on October 29th, 1970, to resume discussions with- Bonn on
3*5matters of common interest• ^ This was the view of the 
parliamentary state secretary in the Federal ministry for 
intra-German relations, Karl Herold, which he expressed 
during question time in the Bundestag on May 12th, 1971- 
At that time he was asked how the Federal government judged 
one of the SED May Day slogans - 'Vollstandige Abgrenzung 
von der imperialistischen BRD - fur die Herstellung normaler 
diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD ent- 
sprechend den Regeln des Volkerrechts!' - with respect to 
the Erfurt and Kassel meetings and the discussions between 
the two states which began in November 1970* Herold re­
plied by sketching the course of the campaign which began, 
he claimed, with Stoph's speech of October 7th, 1970, and 
was developed by Honecker at the lkth plenum. He noted 
the relationship between demarcation and peaceful coex­
istence and continued:
35* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 166
'Was folgt aus diesen AuBerungen? Im Sinne der Terminologie 
der SED bedeutet die Einfuhrung und der standige Gebrauch 
des Begriffs „Abgrenzung" nichts anderes als das dringende 
Bestreben, dasideologische Gebaude ihrer Politik. in einer 
Zeit zu sichern, in: der die DDR-Regierung; Gesprachskontakte 
mit der Bundesregierung unterhalt. Die Formel von der Ab­
grenzung ist daher von der DDR her gesehen verstandlich.
Sie widerlegt aber nicht die Richtigkeit der B'emuhungen der 
Bundesregierung, zu einer Besserung der Beziehungen zwischen 
den beiden Siaaten in Deutschland zu kommen.' 36
This reaction resembled Egon Franke's comment of May 1970, 
that increased hostility towards the Federal Republic after 
the Erfurt meeting was evidence of the leadershipfs desire 
for ideological security within the DDR, to counteract any 
euphoric hopes for closer contacts with the Federal Republic 
among DDR: citizens. Herold added that the Federal adurinis- . 
tration could not remain indifferent to the 'ideologische 
Aggressivitat' of the SED. He reinforced his assertion that 
a settlement with the DDR in no way implied approval of the 
political-ideological or social relationships in the DDR, 
and quoted Brandt's similar views in the latter's state of 
the nation speech of January 1971r that there could be no 
amalgamation of the opposed ideological and political con­
ditions within the two states*
The federal government could afford to take a more relaxed 
view of the ideological controversy between the two German 
states, because the dominant ideology of the Federal Republic, 
liberal democracy, was shared by both the government and the 
overwhelming majority of the population of West Germany.
36* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 8, p. 19k*
Thus the Federal government, unlike the DDR leadership,
did not suffer from a lack of legitimacy. A few days
after Heroldfs statement, Willy Brandt was asked in an
interview whether total demarcation had worsened the
chances for Nebeneinander with the DDR. He replied:
'Dieser seit einiger Zeit vermehrt gebrauchte Begriff 
der lfAbgrenzung,f spricht nicht von SelbstbewuBtsein, auch 
nicht von der Bereitschaft zur aktiven Koexistienz. Die 
Begrundung fur die angebliche Notwendigkeit einer „Ab- 
, grenzung" ist sehr theoretisch und wird von den Menschen 
in beiden Teilen^dea Landes - darin tausche ich mich be- 
stimmt nicht - fur kiinstlich und weltfremd erhalten#
Diese Theorie widerspricht sogar der- Verfassung der DDR 
und wird von der Wirklichkeit uberhoit 'werden.’ 37
This view was subsequently supported by Gerhard Wettig,
who claimed that a survey conducted in the DDR in early
1972 had concluded that, four fifths'of ..the Easf German
38population disapproved of the official demarcation policy.
37- Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 8, p. 202. See 
also a more considered official.West German . 
interpretation of demarcation in DDR Handbuch,
Bonn, 1975, pp. 1-2.
38 Gerhard Wettig2 Dilemmas der^SED-Abgrenzungspolitik. 
Berichte des Bundesinstitus fur ostwissenschaftliche 
uns Internationale Studien, Cologne, 1975/22, p. k*
iv. The 14th SED plenum
The li+th plenum, which was held between December 9th and 
11th, 1970, formalised the Abgrenzung campaign. Its signif­
icance may be judged by the frequent references back in the 
following months to the statements on Abgrenzung which were
developed during the plenum. In the report of the Politburo
39
to the 14th plenum, delivered by Paul Verner, stress was laid 
on the role of demarcation in the field of ideology. It was 
argued the aggressive nature of imperialism had increased, 
that accordingly greater watchfulness was required against 
the new forms of counter-revolutionary struggle against soc­
ialism. Peaceful coexistence could never mean ideological 
coexistence, in this area there was neither room for neutral­
ity nor compromise. Verner claimed that the differences 
between the West German social democratic leaders and the 
GDU/CSU were tactical rather than fundamental, the former 
finding the conservatism of the latter unsuitable in the 
fight against socialism. Brandt*s formula of intra-German 
special relationships was viewed not as a nationalistic 
propaganda slogan, but as the contemporary principal 
strategic line of nationalism against the DDR. This was 
an expression of revenge-seeking, which had the purpose of 
preparing the way for the annexation of the DDR.
39 • Neues Deutschland, 10th December, 1970.
Verner continued that the intra-German concept was derived 
from the allegedly continuing unity of the German nation.
This unity had been destroyed, he argued, as a result of the 
second world war, and especially by the subsequent split for 
which the American and West German imperialists were respon­
sible •
'■In der Geschichte war stets der Charakter der Gesellschafts- 
ordnung das Ausschlaggebende. Urn wieviel mehr ist das heute 
der- Fall, da mit dem Sozialismus eine Gesellschaftsordnung 
existiert, die sich grundsatzlich von alien fruheren Ausbeuter 
gesellschaften unterscheidet und in nichts mit ihnen verbunden 
ist. Deshalb kann es zwischen den beiden gegensatzlichen 
Gesellschaftsordnungen Sozialismus-und Imperialismus keine 
Annaherung geben, sondern es, vollzieht sich ein objektiver 
ProzeS der Abgrenzung. Eine Annaherung gibt es nur zwischen 
sozialistischen Staaten, wle wir es in der sozialistischen 
Staatengemeinschaft erleben. Die Abgrenzung zwischen der 
sozialistischen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der 
imperialistischen Bundesrepublik ist Ausdruck dieser objek- 
tiven Entwicklung. Daraus ergeben sich wichtige SchluG- 
folgerungen gerade fur den ideologischen Kampf. Die Abgren­
zung zwischen den Systemen findet ihren Ausdruck in dem sich 
verscharfenden Kampf zwischen der sozialistischen und der 
imperialistischen Ideologie, insbesondere auch mit dem Sozial- 
demokratismus, einer Variante dieser Ideologie, die gegen den 
siegreichen Vormarsch des Marxismus-Leninismus und gegen die 
sozialistischen Lander gerichtet ist.1
Honecker also repeated at the 14th p l e n u m ^  that there 
could be no rapprochement between socialism and imperialism, 
and declared that the fact that an objective process of 
demarcation, and not of rapprochement, was taking place 
between the two German states, was of great importance for 
the ideological work of the SED. He claimed that the ex­
change of party documents had been more than a purely
40. Neues Deutschland, 14th December, 1970.
organisational matter. Its aim had been to increase the
leading role of the party in all areas of social life, and
to intensify the development of socialist consciousness
among the workers, in order to fulfill the great task of
building a socialist society on the DDR. For this purpose
the exchange of documents had been the opportunity to
conduct a personal, comradely discussion with each party
member and candidate. In this connection he declared:
'..•unsere Genossen - und dies haben die Versammlungen 
und Aussprachen bewiesen - durchdenken die Frage der Ab*- 
grenzung zwischen der sozialistischen DDR und der imperia- 
listischen BRD bis zu Ende...'
Further reference to Abgrenzung at the 14th plenum was made
by Friedrich Ebert, whose attack was directed particularly
against social democracy as a form of bourgeois ideology.
He declared that objective demarcation represented permanent
conflict with the policy and ideology of social democracy.
The all-round strengthening of the DDR and the unshakeable
links with the USSR and other socialist states were decisive
in this conflict
The hostility towards the Federal Republic seen at the 
14th plenum was reflected in the columns of Neues Deutsch­
land, taking the form of constant references to past Nazi 
atrocities, and the alleged claims that West Germans =
were assisting the Portuguese colonialists in Guinea,
Ll2
and operating as mercenaries in the.Sudan* This running;
41. Neues Deutschland, 13th December, 197Q
42. This was especially noticeable around the new; year*.
criticism m a y  be explained as a deliberate policy decision 
to provide material to justify the Abgrenzung campaign. A  
change was noted in Neues Deutschland after Honecker's 
accession to power, when criticism of the Federal Republic 
tended to be- aimed: at the latter*s alleged social and 
economic deficiencies.
At the end of December an article appeared in Neues 
Deutschland, entitled: Abgrenzung.der Kultur: Bin
aktuelles Problem des ideologischen Xlassenkampfes. ^ The 
article repeated that an objective process of demarcation, 
and not of rapprochement, was taking place, and continued 
that party members were interested in the role of demar­
cation against imperialism in the field of culture. Stoph's 
remarks at the 14th plenum that art and culture were play­
ing an outstanding part in the conscious creative activity 
of the workers were recalled. It was declared:
'Diese Vorgange sind dialektisch unauflosbar verknupft 
mit der Abgrenzung und Wegwendung von den kulturellen 
Verfallsmerkmalen, welch den uberholten: Ausbeuterordnungen 
anhaften. Jeder Schritt auf dem Weg zur sozialistischen 
Kultur ist zugleich ein Schritt weg von der imperialistischen 
Uhkultur•'
It was claimed that in the socialist countries a revolution 
had been completed in the field of ideology and culture, that 
the demarcation against imperialism was not a superficial 
phenomenon, as Western propagandists had maintained, in 
their efforts to make rapprochement palatable and to propagate
43• Neues Deutschland, December 29th, 1970
the notion of cultural disarmament. Abgrenzung against 
imperialism was an essential part of all socialist progress, 
and accordingly of cultural progress. A n  example of this 
was the democratic school reform which had ended privilege 
in education. This was indubitably a distinct and permanent 
form of demarcation, it was argued. There could-be no rap­
prochement between humanists and barbarians.
'Die Kultur der Arbeiterklasse und der sozialistischen 
Gesellschaft wie uberhaupt jegliche humanistische Kultur 
vertragt- weder „versohnliches Nebeneinander" mit der impe­
rialistischen Kulturzerstorung und Unkultur noch gar eine 
„Annaherung" an die Unkultur. Zu ihrem besseren Gedeihen 
bedarf die Menschheit nicht der Abrustung tfder" Kultur.
Was die Menschheit dringend notig hat, ist die grundsatz- 
liche und fortschrittliche Abgrenzung der Kultur von ihrem 
Gegenteil.*
v. Ulbricht's final months of control
In his 1971 new year m e s s a g e ^  Ulbricht had argued that the 
Federal Republic, by concluding the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, 
had bound itself to promote relations with the DDR on the 
basis of full equality, and the entry of the two states into 
the United Nations* Ulbricht claimed he was surprised that - 
the Federal Republic had declared that it could not conclude 
an agreement with the DDR on the transit;traffic between 
West Berlin* and West Germany, because this lay within the
J r Cy
competence of the four powers. He: appeared to have forgotten 
his earlier position of one year before, when he had argued 
that the sovereignty of the Federal Republic was limited 
in this area by the three Western powers, whilst conversely 
the sovereignty of the DDR was not limited by the U S S R .^5 
He made no reference to Abgrenzung in his comparison of the 
two German states*
Ulbricht had indeed referred to demarcation on December
17th, 1970, several weeks after other prominent DDR leaders,
46but his speech was not published until four weeks later.
On the national question he had declared:
1|1+ • Neues Deutschland, 1st January, 1971* Texte zur Deutsch- 
landpolitik, Vol. 6, pp. 314-325*
45* Neues Deutschland, 20th January, 1970.
46 . Ibid, 14th January, 1971*
'Die Integration der BRD in die NATO und die imperialistische 
Globalstrategie der USA einerseits und die Entwicklung der 
souveranen sozialistischen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
andererseits hat eine immer scharfere staatliche Abgrenzung 
zwischen den beiden Staaten und Gesellschaftssystemen be- 
wirkt. Im ProzeB der Entwicklung der Arbeiter-und-Bauern- 
Macht und des sozialistischen Aufbaus hat sich die DDR als 
sozialistischer deutscher Nationalstaat herausbebildet.1
Ulbricht continued that the old bourgeois German nation had
ceased to exist after 1945* The DDR was the socialist German
nation state, within which a socialist nation was developing*
These were irrevocable facts. The Federal Republic was an
imperialist NATO state, which embodied the remaining part of
the old bourgeois German nation.
'Wahrend der Gegner Beziehungen zur DDR nutzen will, urn im 
Zeichen einer fiktiven „nationalen Gemeinsamkeit" die DDR 
der BRD anzunahern und mit der sozialdemokratischen Gesell­
schaf tstheorie in der DDR FuB zu fassen, ist unsere Politik 
darauf gerichtet, solche Beziehungen zur BRD herzustellen, 
die uneingeschrankt dem Volkerrecht entsprechen, der objek- 
tiven und unvermeidlichen Abgrenzung zwischen den Systemen 
Rechnung tragen und damit alle Plane fur irgendwie geartete 
„innerdeutsche Beziehungen1' durchkreuzen. Wenn die Politik 
des Gegners auf Verklammerung mit der DDR hinauslauft, kann 
es uns nur urn entschiedene Abgrenzung gehen. Das,ist die 
Voraussetzung fur eine offensive Politik der friedlichen 
Koexistenz gegeniiber der BRD.'
Ulbricht repeated his assertion that the Moscow Treaty repre­
sented the obligation to establish 'normale staatliche B e ­
ziehungen' between the two German states, and that both should 
join the United Nations* The anti-West German tone of the 
speech was notably sharper than was found in his new year 
message.
Ulbricht then examined the development of the DDR during 
the 25 years' existence of the SED* Since a socialist
programme had been introduced at the VI SED congress of 1963> 
the principal characteristics of the national structure of 
the DDR had been formed. This process had continued after the 
VII congress, with the establishment of the guidelines for 
'die allseitige Gestaltung des entwickelten gesellschaftlichen 
Systems des Sozialismus und die Durchfuhrung der wissenschaft- 
lich-technischen Revolution.' Imperialism had been eradicated, 
an end had been put to the exploitation of man by man, and 
the socialist national culture had further developed.
What was decisive in these sucesses, he argued, was that the 
historic achievement of the SED could be seen, that the SED 
had been able to convince people, to win them over for the 
solution of these great historical tasks. • The matter was as 
Engels had said; there could be no social progress without 
it first passing through the heads of people. The SED had 
to mobilise the whole population. All DDR citizens had to 
be filled with socialist consciousness, all workers had to 
become good specialists, for without this the scientific- 
technical revolution could not be realised. This would also 
contribute to the further development of the socialist 
community (Menschengemeinschaft)•
Here Ulbricht's aspirations could be clearly seen. He 
wished- to build socialism through an achievement-oriented 
society. However, he did not refer in this passage to the 
neccessity of following Soviet experience.
The 15th SED plenum took place at the end of January. On 
that occasion It was, announced that the VIII party congress 
was to be held in June, and the congress agenda was published. 
At the plenum Ulbricht declared that the VTII conge as would 
raise the important tasks for the party, the working class 
and people of the DDR. These tasks, arose ’aus der Entwicklung 
der DDR. zum sozialistischen deutschen Nationalstaat, der 
untrennbar mit der Sowjetuniom und der sozialistischen Staaten 
gemeinschaft verbunden ist, und seiner prinzipiellen Abgren­
zung vom imperialistischen NATO-Staat BRD.'^ The phrase 
underlined in the original was repeated twice in Ulbricht rs. 
speech. He: then appealed to the citizens of the DDR in 
emotional, non-material terms:
'Die Burger der DDR bauen unter. Fiihrung der revolutionaren 
Partei der Arbeiterklasse ihr sozialistisches Gesellschafts- 
system ausund entwickeln sich dabei selbst zu sozialisti­
schen Personlichkeiten mit sozialistischem BewuBtsein. Das 
heiBt, sie sind erfullt von dem Gefuhl hoher Verantwortung, 
sie erwerben hohe Bildung und Moral, sie entwickeln Inter- 
nationalismus und besonders feste Preundschaft mit der Sow- 
jetunion, sozialistisches NationalbewuBtsein und soziali- 
schen Patriotismus fur ihren sozialistischen deutschen 
Nationalstaat. Moge so die Weltanschauung unseres Volkes 
entwickeln und festigen.••'
Adressing himself to Deutschlandpolitik, Ulbricht declared 
that the only rational path for the Federal Republic was the 
path of peaceful coexistence. More favourable conditions 
now existed for the establishment of relations regulated by 
treaties based on international law (vertragliche volker- 
rechtliche Beziehungen) between the two German states.
47* Neues Deutschland, 30th January, 1971*
'Die Deutsche Demokratische Reoublik und die BRD sind - 
nun bereits im dritten Jahrzehnt - voneinander unabhan- 
ige, international und volkerrechtlich anerkannte Sta­
ten. Beide Staaten sind^Subjekte des Volkerrechts. Sie 
haben gegensatzliche Gesellschaftsordnungen. Und deir- 
objektive ProzeB der Abgrenzung dieser beiden Staaten 
voneinander hat einen Stand erreicht, von dem aus es 
ein Zurxick nicht gibt.f
Ulbricht stressed the importance of literature and art 
in the development of socialist national culture. Lit­
erature and art were to develop as an essential part of 
socialism; they were important for the development of 
socialist consciousness., if writers, and artists created 
truly socialist works and deepened their relationships, 
with the working class, and if the artistic presentation 
of social relationships, of the socialist community and 
the socialist personality was associated with the struggle 
against anti-communism and imperialist ideologies in this 
field. He continued:
fY/ir sind uns bewuBt, daB die Stabilitat der DDR als 
sozialistischer deutscher Nationalstaat von der richtigen 
ideologischen Erziehung der Mitglieder der SED und aller 
Werktatigen und von der s.tandigen s.ystematischen Aufklar- 
ungsarbeit unter alien Burgern der Republik abhangig ist.
The theme of stability had also appeared in Neues Deutsch­
land one month earlier in an article which evaluated .the 
work of the 14th plenum.
48. Neues Deutschland, 13th December, 1970.
At the 15th plenum H'onecker stressed the importance of
ideological work, of 'parteiliche t t b e r z e u g u n g '
'ftberzeugte Menschen handeln mit groBem Verstandnis bei 
der Losung der Aufgaben, gehen schopferisch an die Ver- 
wirkLichung, entfalten eine groiSe personliche Initiative 
zur weiteren Entwicklung der sozialistischen Gesellschaft. 
Dabei haben wir stets vor Augen, dai3 wir die neue Gesell­
schaf t des Sozialismus unter den Bedingungen unverson- 
licher Klassenauseinandersetzung mit dem Imperialismus 
in der BRD und seiner verscharften geistigen Diversions- 
versuche aufbrauen. So ist es auch weiterhin notwendig, 
alle Spielarten der burger lichen Ideologie, vor allem<# 
Nationalismus und Sozialdemokratismus^ konsequent- zuriick- 
zuv/eisen. • +*
Hbnecker claimed that the exchange of party documents in 
the previous year had been concerned with the goal of in­
creasing the fighting strength of the SED, and of deepen­
ing; the relations based on trust with the workers, collec­
tive farm workers and intelligentsia. The principal aim 
was the all-round strengthening of the DDR and its firm 
and irrevocable integration into the socialist community 
of states. The latter offered the sole guarantee for a 
successful policy of peaceful coexistence with states of 
differing social order, including the Federal Republic.
He continued:
'Die weitere Abgrenzung der sozialistischen DDR von der 
imperialistischen BRD ist die wirksamste Antwort auf die 
reaktionare- nationalistische, antikommunistische Politik 
der herrschenden Kreise der BRD.'
With reference to the decisions of the 14th plenum, Hon-
ecker declared that they had evoked great agreement and
i+9. Neues Deutschland, 31st December, 1971.
satisfaction .among the whole population of the DDR. This 
proved the party's links with the people.
The question arises why Ulbricht himself did not refer 
to Abgrenzung until December 17th, 1970 - and this speech 
was not published until January 14th of the following 
year, some four months after Axen had proclaimed 'Abgren­
zung auf alien Gebieten'. This would seem all the more 
remarkable, since Ulbricht had tended to lead the way in 
stressing the differences between the two states, par-
ticluarly with his claim that the DDR was as 'sozial-
istischer deutscher Nationalstaat'. There v/ere occasions 
after Axen's speech which would have given him the oppor­
tunity to join the Abgrenzung campaign, but, even at the 
14th plenum of December 9th-llth, where Abgrenzung appeared 
to become accepted as general party policy, he remained
silent on this point.
This might be explained as evidence of disagreement on 
German policy not only with the Soviet Union (which was 
suggested by the failure of the Soviet ambassador to the 
DDR, P. A. Abrassimov, to make any reference to Ulbricht 
when congratulating Honecker on becoming party secretary)*^ 
- but also with his colleagues in the party leadership.
50. See U s e  Spittmann: Warum Ulbricht sturzte.
Deutschland Archiv, 1971/6, p. 568.
It is argued that Ulbricht was opposed .to any but the 
minimum necessary contacts with the Federal Republic, 
yet improved contacts would have to come about, since 
this was part of the price the USSR had to pay, in order 
to further its European policy. I would suggest that 
Ulbricht's .colleages accepted that closer contacts bete- 
een the two German states were inevitable, and they, 
rather than Ulbricht had introduced the Abgrenzung cam­
paign, in order to maintain control under conditions 
where static relations with the Federal Republic were to be 
replaced by developing relationships. Such a view might 
be supported by the link between demarcation and peaceful 
coexistence made by Nor den.. (November 6th) and Stoph" 
(November 8th), which appeared to make demarcation part 
of the process of the normalisation of relations between 
the two German states. Such a link was subsequently 
elaborated by Honecker after he had become party secr­
etary. Again, early signs of similar thinking by the'USSR 
and Ulbricht’s colleagues may be inferred from the prin­
ting in Pravda of Stoph’s claim in his speech of October 
6th that demarcation was the opposite of rapprochement, 
a claim repeated by Verner and Honecker at the 14th plenum. 
Thus Ulbrichtfs belated acceptance of the demarcation pol­
icy is viewed as a defeat for his views within the DDR 
leadership.
6. Ideological demarcation under Honecker
i. Closer alignment with the Soviet Union
At the VIII SED congress of 15th-19th June, 1971> the 
demarcation policy against the Federal Republic, formul­
ated under Ulbricht, was restated:
fDer Parteitag erklart: Zwischen der DDR und der BRD,
zwei voneinander unabhangigen Staaten mit entgegengesetz- 
ter Gesellschaftsordnung, vollzieht sich gesetzmaGig ein 
ProzeB der Abgrenzung. Zwischen ihnen kann es daher nur 
Beziehungen der friedlichen Koexistenz auf der Grundlage 
des Volkerrechts geben.’ 1
However, some changes in emphasis became apparent after the 
replacement of Ulbricht, the most notable being a closer 
identification of the DDR with the Soviet Union. This 
view was supported by an increased number of references to 
the USSR in the East German media, and, in particular, by 
HoneckerTs speech at the 16th plenum of May 1971> the 
first plenum which he addressed as party leader. Here 
there were constant uncritical references to the Soviet 
example, as a model for the development of the DDR. Hon­
ecker Ts speech was largely a detailed description of the 
recently held XXIV congress of the CPSU, whose decisions 
were declared to be 'von grundlegender Bedeutung fur alle 
kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien...' The leading role 
of the CPSU was stressed with an even greater intensity 
than had been found for years in SED declarationss
1. EntschlieBUng des VIII. Parteitag.* Quoted from
Deutschland Archiv, 1971/8, P* 880.
'Mit aller Klarheit verdeutlichte der XXIV Parteitag die 
welthistorische Rolle der Kommunistischen Partei der Sow- 
jetunion als des kampfgestahlen Vortrupps der Erbauer des 
Kommunismus in der UdSSR, als der fuhrenden Kraft im inter 
nationalen revolutionaren ProzeG unserer Epoche, als der 
Avan-tgarde des Fortschritts der gesamten. Menschheit • * 2
Deutschlandpolitik was now more explicitly claimed to be 
backed up by Soviet support. Whereas Ulbricht had also de­
clared that DDR policy was in line with that of its allies, 
as, for example, after the meeting of the political-consul­
tative committee held in East Berlin in early December 
1970, the impression was now given not only that DDR policy 
enjoyed Soviet approval, but that the DDR was faithfully 
carrying out policy which had been initiated by the USSR.
On this point Honecker declared:
'In Obereinstimmung mit der KPdSU und den andereri Bruder- 
parteien - das zeigte der XXIV Parteitag erneut - gehen 
wir in unserer Politik davon aus, da!3 sich am reaktionaren 
aggressiven Gharakter des Imperialismus der BRD nichts 
geandert h a t 3
The claim that the Deutschlandpolitik of the DDR was being
initiated by the Soviet Union at this time was later to
be supported by the tone of the Soviet declarations in Annex
I and Annex III of the Quadripartite Agreement.
There was an apparent contradiction here, since Soviet 
and DDR interests were not identical, as was shown in the 
outcome of the Moscow Treaty, where the wider concerns of 
the USSR caused the DDR's claim for West German recognition
2. Deutschland Archiv, 1971/6, p. 642.
3* Ibid, p. 649*
to be frustrated, and by the signs of disagreement between 
Ulbricht and the USSR in the four power negotiations on 
Berlin.^- I would argue that Honecker found advisable to 
appear to support Soviet policy totally at this time, in 
order to secure his position during the leadership change in 
the SED. Perhaps realistically, if unwillingly, he had to 
accept that Soviet policy would run counter to some DDR 
interests in the German question. But if Soviet policy 
were to permit the realisation of some of the aims of the 
Federal government's German policy, the desired fmenschiiche 
Erleichterungen', then this would put the demarcation policy 
to the test. It was also possible that a closer Soviet 
orientation was not unwelcome to Honecker, since the Soviet 
Union was required as a positive referent to balance the 
official Peindbild of the Federal Republic.
At the 16th plenum Honecker also referred to the Soviet 
example in the field of political socialisation; he spoke 
of the new face (Antlitz:) of Soviet man, of the role of 
Soviet writers in supporting the ideological position of the 
CPSU, and reported with approval the demand made at the XXIV 
CPSU congress for more effective ideological work, for a 
contribution from each individual communist to the raising 
of the moral reputation of the party through exemplary 
personal conduct. It is likely that the SED membership
I4.. The tensions between Ulbricht and the Soviet leadership 
were examined by U s e  Spittmann in Deutschland Archiv, 
1971/6, pp. 568-569.
5. See Harald Ludwig: Die SED vor dem VIII. Parteitag.
Deutschland Archiv, 1971/6, p. 589*
clearly understood that these demands also applied to them­
selves. After the 16th plenum the adulation of the Soviet 
example began to abate, but in one respect closer ideolog­
ical cooperation with the Soviet Union appeared to be 
permanent. Evidence of such change was to be found in the 
following year, with the establishment in East Berlin of 
two joint DDR-U3SR commissions, on April i+th and 6th,- 1972, re­
spectively, the one for research in the field of philos­
ophy, and the other for research on the history and theory
6 ■of the international labour movement.-
ii. The national question-
At the VIII congress the SED’s view of the national ques­
tion was developed by Honecker. He repeated that there was 
no unity of the German nation, and that relations between 
the two states could only be based on peaceful coexistence:
'Die prinzipielle Linie unserer Partei geht davon aus, 
daB der gesamte Verlauf der Entwicklung und die Festigung 
unseres sozialistischen Staates objektiv dahin fuhrt und 
fiihren muB, daB die Gegensatzlichkeit zwischen unsound der 
BRD, die den kapitalistischen Weg geht, sich verstarkt 
und daB darum der ProzeB der Abgrenzung zwischen beiden 
Staaten in alien Bereichen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens 
immer tiefgehender wird.'7'"
Such was the situation, Honecker argued, as long as the 
Federal Republic remained an imperialist state. He re­
minded those in the West who allegedly wished to swallow
6. Deutschland Archiv, 1972/5, P* 558.
7. Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag der 
SED, Berlin (East), 1971, p. 23.
up the DDR that it was a stable socialist state, behind which 
stood the whole power of the Soviet Union and the united 
socialist countries, and in this claim he was supported by 
Brezhnev’s speech at the congress.
The DDR’s contribution to European security was enumer­
ated under five headings. It was declared that the SED and 
the government of the DDR would react positively to meas­
ures taken by the Bonn government which took into account 
the true state of affairs. The five points were:
1. Support for a European security conference, at which
the DDR would be an equal participant.
2. DDR membership of UNO would assist European detente.
3* The DDR was ready to establish diplomatic relations
with all states, with full mutual respect of sover­
eignty.
If. The West German formula of special intra-German re­
lations was torpedoing the normalisation of relations 
between the two states, and also European security.
5. Normalisation of relations between the DDR and West
Berlin would contribute to detente in the centre of 
Europe. Thus the DDR wished for a successful outcome
to the four power discussions on Berlin. Here it had
to be recognised that West Berlin had a special polit­
ical status, did not belong and never would belong to 
the Federal Republic.
So far Honecker’s position did not differ greatly from 
that of his predecessor. However, Honecker declared not 
only that there was no unity of the German nation, but 
also that the national question had been answered:
’Was die nationale Frage betrifft, so hat hieriiber die 
Geschichte langst entschieden.’ 8
Honecker sketched the development of the German nation from 
1871* It was claimed that at that time German GroBkapital 
in alliance with the Junker class had welded together a 
unitary German nation state by blood and iron through the 
suppression of the German people themselves and the sub­
jugation of foreign peoples. From the beginning the bour­
geoisie was the worst enemy of the nation, having plunged 
the German people into national catastrophes through two 
world wars, for which the bourgeoisie was to blame. With 
the end of the Third Reich the bourgeoisie had lost the 
right to lead the nation. Only the working class, Honecker 
argued, could renew the nation on a democratic basis and 
guarantee its unity within an anti-fascist and democratic 
state. German monopoly capital had completed its national 
treachery by splitting Germany and the German people in 
the interests of preserving its class rule..
Honecker continued:
rMan muB bei der Einschatzung der nationalen Frage von 
ihrem Klasseninhalt ausgehen. Die sozialistische Re­
volution, die zur Erneuerung aller Existenzformen der 
menschlichen Gesellschaft fuhrt, erneuert auch von Grund 
auf die Nation. Indem das Proletariat - wie Marx und 
Engels im »Kommunistischen Manifest« begrundeten - die 
politische Macht erobert, erhebt es sich zur nationalen 
Klasse, konstituiert es sich selbst als Nation. Mit der 
Errichtung der Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Macht und dem Aufbau 
und dem Aufbau er sozialistischen Gesellschaft entwickelt 
sich ein neuer Typus der Nation, die sozialistische Nation.
8. Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag 
der SED, p. 30.
im Gegensatz zur BRD, wo die burgerliche Nation farthe­
st eht und wo die nationale Frage durch den unversohnlichen 
Klassenv/iderspruch zwischen der Bourgeoisie und den^werk- 
tatigen Massen bestimmt wird, der - davon sind wir uber- 
zeugt - im Verlauf des welthistorischen ProzeBes des ttber- 
gangs vom Kapitalismus zum Sozialismus seine Losung finden 
wird, entwickelt sich bei uns in der Deutschen Demokrati- 
schen Republik, im sozialistischen deutschen Btaat, die 
sozialistische Nation.f 9
Honecker then explained how the socialist nation was.
developing:
’Das findet seinen Ausdruck darin, daB die Macht der 
, Arbeiter und Bauern errichtet wurde und souveran iiber ihr 
eigenes Territor-ium herrscht, dessen Grenzen zuverlassig 
geschutzt sind. Durch die Vergesellschaftlichung der ent- 
entscheidenden Produktionsmittel, durch den Sieg der sozia­
listischen Produktionsverhaltnisse ist eine vollig neue, 
die sozialistische okonomische Basis der Gesellschaft ent- 
standen. An die Stelle der kapitalistischen Anarchie und 
Konkurrenz ist die sozialistische Planv/irtschaft getreten. 
Die sozialistische Gesellschaft in der Deutschen Demokra- 
tischen Republik besitzt eine grundlegend neue Klassen- 
struktur. Hier existieren unter Fuhrung der Arbeiter- 
klasse freundschaftlich miteinander verbundene Klassen 
und Schichten der Bevolkerung, die von sozialistischen 
Characterziigen gepragt werden. Im Verlauf der sozialis­
tischen Entwicklung in unserer Republik sind die sozia­
listische Ideologie und die neue sozialistische National- 
kultur, die alle humanistischen Traditionen der deutschen 
Vergangenheit in sich aufgenommen hat, vorherrschend ge- 
v;orden. Fur alle Zeiten ist die Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik fest im sozialistischen Weltsystem verankert und 
ihre Integration in die sozialistische Staatengemeinschaft 
vertieft sich gesetzmaBig.’ 10
This statement was significant, because it was delivered 
by the party leader at the party congress, and had the 
effect of laying down official policy on the national 
question for the next five years. However, in the following
9« Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag 
der RED, p. 31-
10. Ibid, p. 32.
months there was a decline in references both to the nat­
ional question and to demarcation, although Honecker de­
clared at the 2nd plenum of September 1971 that a ’vollige
und entgiiltige Abgrenzung’ was being achieved between the
11two states, on the basis of peaceful coexistence. The
further development in the DDR leadership’s German policy,
the proposals made by Honecker in his speech in Sofia on
18th April, 1972, repeated at the 5th plenum in the same
month, that the two states ..should discuss the normalisation
12of their relations, ignored the national question, 'as had 
Ulbricht’s draft treaty of December 1969*
.In a contemporary review of the SED policy on the national 
13question, Ludz noted that Ulbricht and Honecker had intro­
duced revised concepts of the nation in an imprecise manner, 
the former by including both the did .Isozialistischer Staat 
deutscher Nation’ and the new ’sozialistischer deutscher 
Nationalstaat’ in his statement of January 19th, 1970, and 
the latter by not specifying whether the socialist nation 
had been achieved, or whether it was still developing.
The continuation of older definitions was seen in the DDR 
constitution, which was not changed until 191h-i and the 
party programme and rules,’which were replaced at the IX
11. Neues Deutschland, 18th September, 1971.
12. Ibid, 19th April, 1972.
13* Zum Begriff der »Nation« in der Sicht der SED - Wand- 
lungen und politische Bedeutung. Deutschland Archiv, 
1972/1, pp. 17-27.
SED congress of 1976. Connected with'these developments 
was the apparent tendency from 1970/1971 to limit the use 
of the word 1 deutsch* Ludz explained the coexistence of
old and new definitions as a sign of ’Unsicherheit- im 
Selbstverstandnis der SED-Fxihrung bezuglich der Nation’ .
I would suggest that the DDR leadership was likely to 
experience uncertainty for the following reason: by deny­
ing the unity of the German nation it was putting the 
legitimation of:the regime at risk. The concept of a single 
German nation, which had been employed by Ulbricht as late 
as 1969? had been the main obstacle to legitimation. It 
was of symbolic significance, because it implied the unific­
ation of the two German states, and the principle of uni­
fication, although more and-mare heavily qualified, remained 
in the DDR constitution until 1974* Consequently, uni­
fication hindered the legitimation of the DDR leadership, 
by implying that the East German state was provisional, 
until unification had been achieved.
Since 1945 the two parts of the former Reich had increas­
ingly diverged, and Schweigler had suggested that all-German 
national consciousness, although widespread, was tending 
to decline. At the same time the DDR leadership was slowly
14- See, for example, Werner Ragusa: Das verflixte Deutsch.
Deutschland Archiv, 1972/4> PP* 349-350.
undermining beliefs of all-German significance, finally 
rejecting the unity of the nation in 1970. The question 
was how far the rates of change in (a) the decline in 
affect for a united Germany and (b) the leadership’s moves 
towards a rejection of a nation common to both German 
states were in step. A decline in the leadership’s support 
would ensue if the SED’s.. policy on the national question 
were to develop faster than the decline in all-rGerman nat­
ional consciousness among the general population.
Ludz declared on the leadership’s national policy:
’...da£ die... politische Konsolidierung der DDR - bei 
weitreichender sozio-okonomischer Stabilitat - einer 
tieferen Begrundung, einer Legitimation dringend bedarf. 
Vor allem die Betonung der sozialistischen Nation nach 
auBen (gegenuber der Bundesrepublik) ist deshalb als 
Funktion der Innenpolitik der SED anzusehen.’ 15
The East German view of the relationship^between domestic
and foreign policy was presented in the May-June edition
l6of Deutsche AuBenpolitik. The international factor, 
in the form of the Soviet Army, it was argued, had con­
tributed to the establishment of the DDR, and had guaran­
teed its protection from imperialist attacks. However, 
the international factor was especially important through 
the fact that the DDR was in direct confrontation with 
West German imperialism. This caused a particular respon­
sibility for the peace and security of all European peoples
15* Deutschland Archiv, 1972/1, p. 19.
16. Werner Hanisch/Joachim Kruger: Zur Dialektik von
Innen- und AuBenpolitik in der Strategie und Taktik 
der SED. Deutsche AuBenpolitik, 1971/3*
to develop in the DDR. The article continued:
fAls wesentliche Aufgabe der standigen Auseinandersetzung 
mit dem westdeutschen Imperialismus entstand fur die Stra­
tegic und Taktik der DDR die Notwendigkeit, einen hart- 
nackigen Kampf urn die voile Gleichberechtigung und die 
volkerrechtliche Anerkennung der DDR als souveraner Staat 
im System der internationalen Beziehungen zu fuhren. Die 
Ergebnisse dieses Kampfes festigten die Sicherheit der DDR 
weiter. Sie sind zugleich von zentraler Bedeutung fur den 
Frieden und die Sicherheit aller europaischen Volker.’ 17
It was argued that the building of socialism within the DDR 
and a successful foreign policy for the DDR were inter­
dependent. However, the article did not go as far as advoc­
ating the international recognition of the DDR as an inde­
pendant sovereign nation. The two-nation theory was aimed 
principally at the populations of the two German states.
It has been ignored, not only in the West, but also among 
the DDR’s allies. Brezhnev stressed the growing internat­
ional authority of the DDR in his speech at the VTII SED 
congress, but made no reference to the socialist nation
1 Q
in the DDR. The attempt has however been made to pro­
ject the claim to a specific DDR national culture inter­
nationally, as Lindemann and Mfciller have suggested. ^
The proclamation of the DDR as a socialist nation was 
determined by domestic considerations, and was used, as 
Ludz wrote, to support the attempts'to legitimise the
17* Hanisch and Kruger, p.442,
18. Deutschland Archiv, 1971/7> PP- 772-778.
19. Auswartige Kulturpolitik der DDR, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, • 
1974.
20regime. Hartmut Zimmermann argued that two possible 
strategies on the German question existed for the leader­
ship mitivated by a desire for self-preservation. Both 
proceeded from the historical fact of national division, 
but had drewn contrasting donclusions from this. Zimmer­
mann postulated an ’offensive* attitude aimed at over­
coming this division, and a ’defensive* attitude, where 
the unified German nation was rejected. He saw Ulbricht’s 
speech of January 19th, 1970, as a-, switch from an offensive 
to a defensive strategy on the national question.
, I would argue that the strategy change was completed by 
Honecker at the VTXI congress, that Honecker’s opposition 
of the West German ’burgerliche Nation’ to the East German 
’sozialistische Nation’ was a logical consequence of ’Ab- 
grenzung auf alien Gebieten’, and, although this was. hot 
stated in the DDR media, it represented a call for nat­
ional demarcation. This view was supported by a West 
German source of 197U:
’Der VTII Parteitag- der SED .... wurde von dem neuen 1. 
Sekretar des Z'entralkomitees der SED, Erich Honecker, 
dazu benutzt, urn die Politik der nationalen Abgrenzung 
verbindlich zu formulieren, nachdem die entsprechenden 
Vorarbeiten bereits vom 12. und 13• Plenum des ZK der SED 
der VTI Legislaturperiode und von Ulbricht in seiner 
letzten Rede ... geleistet worden waren. 21
20. The GDR in the 1970s. Problems of Communism, March- 
April 1978*
21. Die deutsche Nation - von der Geschichte iiberholt Oder 
geschichtlicher Auftrag? Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 197kf
p. 32.
iii. Ideological demarcation within the education system 
after the VIII congress
The demands for more effective teaching at the VII Pedagog­
ic Congress of May 1970 continued in the following year. 
Pressure upon the teaching staff to raise, their politicial 
consciousness was to be noted. The claimed antagonism be­
tween socialism and imperialism, with particular condem­
nation of West German social democracy as a disguised form
of anti-socialist nationalism and revenge-seeking, was
22stressed in the educational press. More specifically, in
connection with research into the development of teaching
methods in the socialist' schools, an article was published
attacking the West German educational system:
-.In der Didaktik der sozialistischen Schule wurde es stets 
als eine prinzipielle Aufgabe betrachtet, Auseinanderset- 
zungen mit .der imperialistischen Didaktik zu fiihren und 
eindeutigen Abgrenzungen zu den gesellschaftlichen Grund- 
lagen,^den Zielen und Positionen aus vorzunehmen. Die 
Verscharfung des ideologischen Klassenkampfes zwischen 
Sozialismus und Imperialisms, die Notwendigkeit, einen 
kompromiBlosen Kampf gegen die imperialistischen Ideologie 
zu fiihren, erfordert jedoch, die offensive Auseinander- 
setzung noch im weitaus starkerem UaBe zu einem Prinzip 
unserer gesamten Arbeit werden zu lassen.’ 23
It was argued that West German didactic theories had to 
be subjected to thorough analysis and criticism, in order
22. Y/erner Paff: Wesen und Funktion des Sozialdemokratismus
in der Klassenauseinanersetzung zwischen Sozialismus und 
Imperialismus, Padagogik, 1971/5• See also Gunter Mei- 
ster: Gegen Antikommunismus der rechten SPD-Fiihrung in
alien Erscheinungsformen, Padagogik, 1971/9-
23. Ursula Drews: Didaktik und Manipulierung in der BRD,
Padagogik, 1971/8, p. 762.
to strengthen the positions of DDR educationalists in the 
controversy between the two ideologies, and in order to 
carry out resolutely the demarcation process in the field of 
education. It was argued that it was necessary to uncover 
the social bases of the approach towards didactics under 
state monopoly capitalism, as well as its anti-communist 
nature. It was also necessary to fight against the philo­
sophical roots of West German didactics, and to show its 
position and function within the whole framework of West 
German educational theory.
Policy changes introduced at the VIII. congress were re­
flected in the school curricula. These changes were pre­
sented in the form of detailed directives to the teaching 
force, effective from the beginning of the 1971-2 academic
2ii
year. ^ The emphasis was to be increased on the links be­
tween the DDR and the socialist community, especially the 
USSR, and on the demarcation of the DDR from the Federal 
Republic, as part of the world-wide opposition between 
socialism and imperialism. For instance, the 10th class 
of the polytechnic secondary school was required to study 
the v/hole of the SED central committee report to the VIII 
congress.
2U • Direktive zur Behandlung der Materialien des VIII. 
Parteitages der SED im Unterricht und in der auBer- 
unterrichtlichen Arbeit der allgemeinbildenden Schulen. 
Deutsche Lehrerzeitung, 1971/32.
The greatest number of changes introduced by the directives
concerned civics (Staatsburgerkunde), and the' time devoted
25to that subject was increased. Of all subjects taught in 
DDR schools, civics is perhaps the one most closely related 
to ideological demarcation. The key role of civics v/as 
presented in the teachers’ guide to the 7th class civics 
course:
’Die Koordinierung mit anderen Fachern, ein vielfach be- 
grundetes objektives Erfordernis sozialistischer Bildung 
und Erziehung, gewlnnt im Staatsbiirgerkundeunterricht der 
Klasse 7 besonaere Bedeutung...’ 26
Civics is introduced in the.seventh class of the polytechnic
secondary school, when the pupils are aged 12. East German
educationalists have claimed that at this age the pupils
have developed positive attitudes to socialism and to the
DDR, that their interests in politics is growing and that
27they have an open mind towards the new subject. T M s  
might be the reason why the directives specifially called 
for changes of emphasis in the 7th class civics course.
Since for this age-group the material has to be presented 
in a relatively simple form, it most clearly shows the 
function of ideology in relation to everyday life. The 
directives stated that section four of the 7th class course, 
which examined the question ’why are there today two Ger­
man states?’ should be taught with reference to Part 1 of
25. Direktive, pp. 3-5•
26. Staatsburgerkunde 7 Klasse. Unterrichtshilfen,
Berlin (East), 197^> P* 12.
27* Ibid, p. 11.
the central committee report to the VIII congress. Part I 
was entitled ’the main tendencies of international devel­
opment and the foreign policy line of the SED’, and included
both relations with the Federal Republic and with the states
28of the socialist community. Section four of the 7th class 
civics course, together with section three ’the DDR - our 
socialist fatherland’, presented the friend - foe relation­
ship which was the basis of ideological demarcation.
The principal aims of sections three and four of the "7th
class course were as follows: The 1972 teachers’ syllabus
for section three declared that the main purpose of the
section was to teach the pupils to be proud' of" the DDR and
29to love their socialist fatherland.  ^ The notes to section
four recommended that the conflict between the two great
contemporary class forces (Klassenkrafte) should be stressed
in the relations between the two German states:
rDer Uhterricht soli den Schulern helfen, die Klassen- 
fronten auf deutschen Boden zu erkennen, Freund und Feind 
zu unterscheiden und so einen klaren politischen Stand- 
punkt zu gewinnen. Sie sollen die Einsicht gewinnen, daB 
die Abgrenzung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik von 
der imperialistischen BRD ein objektiver ProzeB ist und 
unsere Republik als untrennbare Bestandteil der sozialist­
ischen Staaatengemeinschaft eine feste Bastion des Friedens 
und des Sozialismus in Europa ist. 30
28. Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII Parteitag der 
SED, pp. 11-32.
29• Lehrplan fur Staatsburgerkunde Klasse 1, Berlin (East),. 
1972, p. 17. '
30. Ibid, p. 21
In: 1972 the 7th class civics syllabus was basically the
31same as when it had been introduced in 1968. However, in 
1974 it was completely revised, in accord with the proposals 
made at the VII Pedagogic Congress. The greater effective­
ness of the new course, especially the skill with which the 
material was presented, showed evidence of the work of the 
Academy of Pedagogic Sciences. The title of section four,
’why are there today two German states?’ now became ’the 
socialist DDR and the imperialist BHD - two staites with 
opposed social 'orders’ . There was a tendency to replace 
the expressions ’deutsch’, ’Deutschland1 and ’Westdeutschland’ 
noted in the 1968 edition with a clear (socialist) DDR - 
(imperialist) BRD demarcation. Even in the 1968 edition
there had been no mention of nation or unification in the
32pupils’ textbook. This was perhaps understandable, since 
the national question would have less relevance.for.those 
who had lived all their lives in the DDR.
The.1974 teachers’ guide to section four repeated the
simplified emotional demarcation to be internalised by
the schoolchildren - love for socialism, the DDR and the
USSR, and ’Gefuhle des Hasses •«.» gegenuber den imperial-
33istischen Kraften in der BRD..*’ ^
31. The 1968 syllabus is taken from Lehrplan fur Staats­
burgerkunde Klasse 7 (1972 edition), the 1974 syllabus
from Staatsburgerkunde 7* Klasse Unterrichtshilfen, 1974 •
32. Staatsburgerkunde Klasse 7> Berlin (East), 1968.
33* Staatsburgerkunde 7* Klasse Unterrichtshilfen, 1974* P* 139*
The desired aim of unit four was described as follows:
fDie Konfrontation der sozialistischen DDR mit der 
imperialistischen BRD in der Stoffeinheit Zj. verdeut- 
licht den‘ Schiilern den weltv/eiten ProzeB der Abgrenzung 
zwischen den beiden gegensatzlichen gesellschaftlichen 
Systemen und festigt ihre sozialistische G-rundposition 
zur DDR als ihrem sozialistischen Vaterland.’ 3k
Section four was to be concluded by a simplified diagram, ^
which presented demarcation as an accomplished fact.
Macht der M onopo- 
listen und Junker 
(gegen die Werkratigen 
gerichtet)
(2) Macht der Arbeiter 
und Bauem
Imperialistischer
NATO-Pakt
(3) Sozialistische
Staatengemeinschaft
-  Aggressive, gegen 
Sozialismus 
gerichtete Politik
— Anpassung an verandertes 
Krafteverhaltnis
— abgestimmte 
sozialistische 
Friedenspolitik
— revolutionare 
Wachsamkeit
— zur Erhaltung 
des Imperialismus
— Hetze und Verleumdung 
des Sozialismus
(4) zur Starkung
des Sozialismus 
der Solidaritat 
— Entlarvung menschen- 
feindlicher Auffassungen
Machtver-
haltnisse
DDR
Sozialistischer Staat
BRD
Imperialistischer Staat
gesell-
schaftliche
Ziele
gesell-
schaftliche
Ideen
Ergebnisse der gegensatzlichen Entwicklung der sozialistischen DDR und der imperia­
listischen BRD
Ausdruck der Unvereinbarkeit und Abgrenzung zwischen Sozialismus und Im­
perialismus
Einzige Moglichkeit zum friedlichen Nebeneinanderbestehen 
volkerrechtliche Beziehungen zwischen beiden gegensatzlichen deutschen 
Staaten
3k. Staatsburgerkunde 7- Klasse Unterrichtshilfen, p. 9 
35* Ibid, p. 168.
The attempt to make the East German teaching force more
aware of a demarcation from the Federal Republic in the
field of education continued with the holding of a joint
conference of the Academies of Pedagogic Sciences of the
USSR and DDR, which took place in East Berlin on November
l6th-l8th, 1971• The theme of the conference was 1 the
struggle against anti-communism in the schools policy and
pedagogics of imperialism,' - a fundamental task of Marxist-
Leninist pedagogicsf. The conference was opened by the DDR
minister of education, Margot Honecker, who claimed that
anti-communism was trying to destroy Marxist-Leninist
theory and socialist education, and to educate young
people in the spirit of imperialism. She continued:
fEs; entspricht zutiefst dem humanistischen Anliegen der 
sozialistischen Padagogik, alles zu^tun, urn die Uugend vor 
dem Gift des Antikommunismus zu schutzen. Die Terwirk- 
lichung der hochsten Ziele der Menschheit, den Komnrunismus 
zum Siege zu fiihren, den Frieden zu erhalten und zu sichern, 
macht den konsequenten, kompromiBlosen Kampf gegen den 
Antikommunismus, den Feind der Yolker und ihrer Jugend, 
zu einer unabdingbaren Aufgabe aller Padagogen, die es mit 
ihrem humanistischen Auftrag ernst meinen.* 37
Although Margot Honecker was condemning anti-communist 
educational theory in general, most of the East German 
participants specifically attacked the West German ed­
ucation system.
36. The proceedings of the conference were published in
Die marxistisch-leninistische Padagogik - eine streit- 
bare Waffe im Kampf gegen den Antikommunismus.
Berlin (East), 1972.
37* Ibid, p. 21.
Iv. Honeckerfs demarcation policy in practice.
After the VIII congress a series of demarcation measures 
were introduced against the Federal Republic which appeared 
to have two aims; (a) to make communications between the 
two German states more difficult and (b) to abolish all 
institutions which had an all-German dimension.
In the first respect, on July 1st, 1971> the letter postal
rates Tnach den kapitalistischen europaischen Landern, ein-
schlieBlich der Bundesrepublik, nach Westberlin und den Lan-
dern in i)berseef were raised to the same level, thus equating
the Federal Republic and West Berlin with 'Ausland*• At the
same time the foreign tariff was introduced for telegrams
and parcels to the Federal Republic, and telephone charges
were also raised, so that a telephone call from East Berlin
to West Berlin now became approximately eight times more 
38expensive. Again, the border between the two German states 
was strengthened by the DDR authorities, with new minefields, 
weapons which were automatically triggered (SelbstschuBan- 
lagen), and with new chain fences and observation towers.^
Secondly, on July 7th the East German Sekretariat fur 
westdeutsche Fragen (formerly gesamtdeutsche Fragen) was
38• Deutschland Archiv, 1971/7> P* 784 and 1971/8, p. 895*
39* The strengthening of the border was described in some
detail by Rainer Barzel. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, 
Vol. 10, p. 148.
abolished.^ Further, on August lbth the ’standiger Aus- 
schuS der deutschen Arbeiterkonferenzen zur Forderung der 
Aktionseinheit der Arbeiterklasse’, another body claiming 
to be of all-German significance, ceased to function. The 
DDR anthem, with the words ’Deutschland, einig Vaterland’, 
was no longer sung. Again, on October 1st, the ’Deutscher 
Freiheitssender 90V, broadcasting ’an alle Deutschen, urn 
sie fur Frieden und Freiheit zu gewinnen’, was replaced by 
the ’Stimme der DDR’, intended for DDR citizens.^ On 
September 28th the' leader of the KPD, which had maintained 
a shadowy existence in the Federal Republic as an allegedly 
all-German party, joined- the West German DKP, thus signal­
ling the end of the KPD, and the DDR-based ’Stimme der KPD’
42ceased broadcasting. A significant change occurred at 
the end of 1971, when the ’Rationale Front des demokratischen 
Deutschlands’ was renamed ’Rationale Front der DDR’
These measures were balanced by the introduction of visa- 
free travel between the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, 
from the beginning of 1972,^ which indirectly was to aid 
demarcation from the West by encouraging the closer i d e n ­
tification of East Germans with their Eastern neighbours.
V). Deutschland Archiv, 1971/8? p. 895*
41. Ibid, 1972/1, pp. 1-2.
42. Ibid, 1971/11, pp. 1124-1125.
43* Die Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.
6. Wahlperiode, Berlin (East), 1972.
44* Hans Lindemann: Visafreies Reisen. Deutschland
Archiv, 1972/4, P« 402ff.
v. The Quadripartite Agreement
At the same time as the DDR leadership was introducing 
these demarcation measures, it was being obliged to accept 
a further international agreement connected with the devel­
oping policies of detente of the tv/o super-powers, and with 
the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic. A new situation 
was introduced with the signing of the Quadripartite Agree­
ment on Berlin, on September 3rd, 1971* It provided for 
a series of subsiduary agreements between the Federal Re­
public, West Berlin and the DDR, which appeared to con­
tain the possibility of rapprochement, rather than 
demarcation, between the two German states.
The Quadripartite Agreement was a practical contribution 
to the normalisation of the situation in Berlin, and care­
fully attempted to avoid the extraordinary legal and sem­
antic difficulties associated with the Berlin Question, by 
agreeing that the individual and joint rights of the four 
powers would remain unchanged, and that, irrespective of 
the differences in legal views, the situation which had 
developed in the area should not be changed unilaterally.
45* Part 1 of the General Provisions of the Quadripartite 
Agreement, Articles 3 and 4* The English text is 
taken from Die Berlin-Regelung. #<Das Viermachte- 
Abkommen iiber Berlin und die erganzenden Vereinba- 
rungen, Bonn, 1971, P* 330.
For instance, the English text was entitled simply ’Quad­
ripartite Agreement’, leaving unclear whether it referred 
to Berlin as a v/hole or solely to West Berlin, and the 
Senate in West Berlin, which called itself ’Berliner Senat’, 
but which the DDR called ’Westberliner Senat’, was referred 
to simply as ’the senate’. Nevertheless, since the choice 
of terminology was considered to be of great importance by 
the two German states, a sharp disagreement broke out be­
tween them over the German translation of the text, which 
led to a temporary interruption of discussions between 
their two negotiators, Egon Bahr. and Michael Kohl.^
The DDR leadership expressed satisfaction that the agree­
ment had declared that West Berlin was not a constituent 
part of the Federal Republic, and claimed that the DDR’s 
international position had been strengthened, since its 
correct title had been used in the agreement. However1, 
the Quadripartite Agreement had limited the freedom of 
action of the DDR, since it was required to negotiate with 
the Federal Republic and West Berlin on a range of matters, 
where the outcome of the negotiations had already been 
agreed in outline by the four powers, and where the outcome 
seemed likely to contradict the aims of the DDR’s demarca­
tion policy. This'could be understood from Annex I and .
46* Deutschland Archiv, 1971/10, p. 1117.
Annex III of the agreement, where it was declared:
’The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub­
lics... has the honour to inform the Governments of the 
French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States 
of America that: -
...transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the 
territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian 
persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin 
and the Federal Republic will be facilitated and unimpeded.
...communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin 
and areas, bordering on these Sectors and those areas of 
the German Democratic Republic which do not border on 
these sectors will be improved...
. . .permanent residents of the 'Western Sectors of Berlin 
will be able to travel to and visit such areas for com­
passionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial 
reasons, or as tourists...
...arrangements implementing and supplementing the pro­
visions..., will be agreed by the competent German author­
ities.’ 47
Here it was the DDR’s main ally which was laying down the 
terms on which the negotiations to be entered on by the DDR 
were to be concluded.
The first result of the provisions of Annex I and Annex 
III came quickly on September 30th, 1971, when a post and 
telecommunications agreement (Protokoll uber den Post- und 
Fernmeldeverkehr) was signedJ^ This was followed on 
. December 17th, 1971, by an agreement between the two German 
states on transit traffic between West Berlin and the Fed­
eral Republic (Transitabkommen) and on December 20th,
47* Die Berlin-Regelung, pp. 333-337•
48. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, p. 158ff. 
49- Ibid, Vol. 9, p. 434ff•
1971, arrangements for visits by West Berliners to the DDR
50
were agreed by the DDR and the Senate. The latter two 
agreements officially came into force together with the 
Quadripartite Agreement on June 3rd, 1972. The delay was 
caused by the link with the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties 
(Ostvertrage), which were not ratified by the Bundestag 
until May 17th, 1972.
The protocol on post and telecommunications traffic seemed 
likely to run counter to the demarcation policy and to hin­
der officially promoted political socialisation by facil­
itating the exchange of information between individuals in 
the two German states. The relevant points of the agreement 
were a shortening of delivery times for letters and parcels, 
and an improvement in telephone, telegraph and telex links. 
In the case of telephones, the number of lines was to be 
doubled. A colour television link was to be set up between 
the two states, which was available for the exchange of 
programmes, not only between the two states, but also be­
tween the Eurovision and Interv.ision networks. Point 6.5 
of the protocol declared:
’Der Pernsprechverkehr wird vollautomatisiert. Die dafiir 
notwendigen Leitungen und Kabelverbindungen werden bis 
zum 31* Dezember 1974 bereitgestellt’ .
This meant that, gradually over the next two years, the DDR
50. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, p. 458ff.
leadership would lose the capability to stop the immediate 
exchange of information by telephone between individuals 
of the two German states. This in turn seemed likely to 
cause some insecurity among the leadership, and possible 
justification for their often publicly expressed concern 
for the dangers of subversion and espionage from the Fed­
eral Republic.
.*
It was suggested above that the provisions in the Quad­
ripartite Agreement for civilian transit traffic between 
West Berlin and the Federal Republic, and for visits by 
West Berliners to the DDR, would tend to limit the free­
dom of'action.of the DDR leadership. This meant that the 
leadership would lose the capability of interfering with 
these traffics (except under limited and clearly defined 
conditions). The DDR had formerly used such interference 
as a means of exerting political pressure upon the Fed­
eral Republic and the three Western powers, subject to 
Soviet constraintsi An official West German view of the 
provisions for transit traffic claimed that formerly West 
Berliners had suffered a sense of insecurity, since they 
did not know whether their links with the West would be 
maintained. Especially after June 1968, with the demand for 
passports and special endorsements (Sichtvermerke), it was 
declared that the DDR had attempted to hinder the transit 
traffic ’durch verzorgerte Abfertigung, schikanose Kon- 
trollen, Rotschalten der Ampeln u. a.’.
It v/as claimed that:
’Diese Vereinbarung uber den Berlinverkehr ist der groBte 
Fortschritt, den die Vier Machte seit der Beendigung der 
Blockade hinsichtlich des Berlin-Zugangs erzielt haben... 
Die Westmachte haben dadurch zugunsten Berlins etwas er- 
reicht, worum sie seit den ersten Schwierigkeiten auf den 
Zugangswegen vergeblich bemiiht hatten: eine prinzipielle
sowjetische Verpflichtung, einen unbehinderten Verkehr zu 
gewahrleisten.’ 51
Secondly, the improved travel arrangements into and across 
the territory of the DDR posed a potential security problem 
for the DDR leadership. If the numbers of West Germans and 
West Berliners travelling were to increase (as was subse­
quently the case), then it was.likely that East Germans 
would increasingly come into contact with them. This would 
run counter to the demarcation policy, since increased face- 
to-face contacts might contradict the official Feindbild of 
the Federal Republic. There might also be an increased 
demand from DDR citizens for the corresponding right to 
visit West Berlin or the Federal Republic. Restricted 
permission was later granted, to DDR citizens below re­
tirement age for pressing family reasons, in a regulation
52published on October 17th, 1972, on the same day that 
the Verkehrsvertrag between the two German states came into 
force.
51* Die Berlin-Regelung. Das Viermachte-Abkommen iiber 
Berlin und die erganzenden Vereinbarungen. Bonn,
1971, pp. 266-267.
52. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 246-247*
Honecker, Ulbricht and Stoph commented on the Q.uadripar-
tite Agreement in interviews published on September 5th,
7th and 8th September, respectively. As the titles which
headed the interviews given by Ulbricht and Stoph indicated
53the agreement was claimed to be a success for peace. In
his interview Honecker maintained that the agreement had
strengthened the position of the DDR in international law:
*In den Viermachte-Abkommen haben sich die drei West- 
machte*.. zum erstenmal uber die Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik als einen souveranen Staat, uber seine Grenzen 
und seine Beziehungen zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland und. 
zu Westberlin verbindlich geauBert. Diese Tatsache schat 
zen wir sehr hoch ein. Es handelt sich ja um ein inter- 
nationales Abkommen, in dem die Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik, ihr Territorium und ihre Grenzen genannt werden 
Dieses Abkommen tragt die Unterschriften der USA, GroB- 
britanniens und Prankreichs. Die AuBerung der drei West- 
machte uber die Deutsche Demokratische Republik hat also 
volkerrechtlich verbinalichen Charakter.' 5^-
Without mentioning the Federal government's demand for a 
satisfactory outcome to the Berlin negotiations before 
the ratification of the Ostvertrage, Honecker continued 
that the Quadripartite Agreement had created favourable 
conditions for the ratification of the treaties. He ex­
pressed satisfaction for the statement contained in the 
agreement that Berlin v/as not a constituent part of the 
Federal Republic, and argued that the agreement referred 
solely to West Berlin:
'In dem Abkommen der vier Machte wird klar gesagt... 
Verhandelt wurde liber den westlichen Sektoren Berlins, 
liber deren Einwohner, liber den Transit zwischen den
53* Neues Deutschland, 7th and 8th September, 1971*
5I4.. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, pp. 32-33.
westlichen Sektoren Berlins und der Bundesrepublik Deutsch­
land und iiber die Vertretung dieser Sektoren im Ausland.
Das demokratische Berlin ist seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehn- 
ten die Hauptstadt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. 
Sie ist kein Gegenstand des Viermachte-Abkommens.'
Honecker further declared that the sovereign rights and
legitimate interests of the DDR were not affected by the
Quadripartite Agreement. He later claimed that they had
been confirmed by the; agreement. ^ 5 Stoph also.welcomed
the agreement, and declared:
fDer Ministerrat hat am 2ii. August 1971 seine Bereitschaft 
unterstrichen so wie bisher durch konstruktive Vorschlage 
und Verhandlungen den Beitrag der DDR zur Inkraftsetzung 
der Vereinbarung zu leisten. Im Sinne dieser Erklarung 
wird die Deutsche Demokratische Republik alles in ihren 
Kraften Stehende tun, urn die Verhandlungen mit dem Beauf- 
tragten der Regierung der BRD ziigig zu positiven Resultaten 
zu fiihren. Das gleiche gilt fur die Verhandlungen zwischen 
Beauftragten der DDR und des Senats von Westberlin.' 56
The constant reiteration by the DDR leadership that the 
sovereign rights of the DDR had not been affected by the 
Quadripartite Agreement might be explained by reasons of 
domestic legitimation. It might be seen as an attempt to 
present a situation dictated by external circumstances as 
a success for the policies of the leadership. This was 
an example of how the DDR leadership was a prisoner of its 
own policy statements. The leadership's claims to legit­
imacy were related to its further claim to be the sole
55* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, p. 170. 
56. Neues Deutschland, 8th September, 1971*
bearers of Marxism-Leninism, the only ideology which permit­
ted the taking of correct decisions* Accordingly, to claim 
that its foreign policy was unsuccessful would go against 
the'leadership1s justification, of its own legitimacy> any 
failures had to be explained as the fault of the other side. 
Because the SED claimed that there was an interaction between 
domestic and foreign policy, the one dependent on the other, 
to suggest that foreign policy had failed would question the 
success of domestic policy.
The Quadripartite Agreement had confirmed the rights of
the four powers in Berlin, as point 3 of the general pro-
57visions of the agreement had made clear. Pour power
rights in the whole of Germany, to be confirmed in the Basic
»
Treaty of 1973 > contradicted the DDR s claim to be an in-
58dependant, sovereign state. But the. immediate limitation 
was the proposed loss of control over transit traffic. 
Honecker’s assertion which was made three times in his in­
terview of September 5th, that the international position 
of the DDR had been strengthened by the fact that for the 
first time it had been officially named in an international 
treaty, might be defended. However, in the agreement the 
DDR had not been directly named by the three Western powers; 
the'DDR had been officially mentioned in the sections which
57* Die Berlin-Regelung, p. 330.
58. The rights and responsibilities of the four powers 
were confirmed by Article 9 of the Basic Treaty.
See Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 288-289*
contained the statements of the Soviet Union, which were not 
rejected by the Western powers. Mention of the DDR was still
t
a long way from Ulbricht s goal of recognition in internat­
ional law by the non-Marxist-Leninist world.
The official DDR position that the Quadripartite Agreement 
had been a success for DDR policies was contradicted by the 
claim of the United States representative at the quadripar-L 
tite negotiations, Kenneth Rush, that the Soviet represen­
tative, P. A. Abrassimov, had initially refused to consider 
the question of access to West Berlin as part of the neg­
otiations. Rush declared in an interview on September 9th:
TZu der Zeit weigerte sich Herr Abrassimov hartnackig, 
die Frage des Zugangs. zu er or tern. Ich habe das President 
Nixon gesagt, und nach einer personlichen Intervention des 
Prasidenten bei AuBenminister Gromyko sprachen wir uber 
den Zugang. Ein weiteres Mai habe ich personlich mit 
President Nixon gesprochen, als die Sowjets am 26. Marz 
1971 ihre Vorschage auf den Tisch legten und hinsichtlich 
des Zugangs lediglich auBerten, es werde das gemacht, was 
die Ostdeutschen wollten, anstatt daB die Sowjets selber 
die Verantwortung ubernahmen, wie es am Ende war.* 59
This statement would seem to support the view that the DDR 
leadership had perceived that its sovereignty would be lim­
ited by the Quadripartite Agreement, and also the claim that 
Ulbricht1s retirement from the party leadership had been 
influenced by disagreement between the USSR and the DDR in 
the area of German policy.^0
59* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, p. 72. '
60. See U s e  Spittmann: Warum Ulbricht stiirzte, Deutschland 
Archiv, 1971/6, p-. .568.
vi• Honecker’s economic and social policies
Both Ulbricht and Honecker had been aware of the need for
material incentives as a means of gaining support for the 
* 61regime. Since DDR citizens tended to perceive their stan­
dard of living in relation to that of the Federal Republic, 
the growth of DDR incomes might assist demarcation, if this 
caused DDR' citizens to become less dissatisfied with the 
fact that they were lower than West German incomes. At the 
T i n  congress Honecker related DOER living standards with 
their level five years before. Since that time he claimed 
that a one third increase in production and a 20% increase 
in living standards had been achieved. The continuity of 
economic policy was implied by reference to the analysis of, 
economic development conducted at the 14th plenum. With 
regard to planned economic development in the period 1971- 
19759 Honecker predicted a 21-23% increase in real income, 
higher old age pensions, and improved supplies of consumer 
goods. ; The key word was stability, which had been stressed 
at the 14th plenum, in the section of the Politburo report
headed *Kontinuitat und Stabilitat des volkswirtschaftlichen
62ReproduktionsprozeB1, and in a commentary of December 13th, 
1970, that the decisions of the 14th plenum formed the basis
61. The role of planned national economic development as an 
aid to political mobilisation was discussed by J . P. 
Nettls Political Mobilisation, London, 1967> PP* 232-
244. '
62. Aus dem Bericht des Politburos an die 14* Tagung der 
SED. Neues Deutschland, 10th December, 1970.
for the further stabilisation of social development in the 
63DDR. On this question Honecker declared at the congress: .
#
fEs ist augenfallig, daB unsere Bestrebungen von den ver- 
schiedensten Seiten her darauf abzielen, eine noch groBere 
Kontinuitat und Ausgeglichenheit unserer volkswirtschaft- 
lichen Aufwartsentwicklung zu bewirken. Unsere Volks- 
wirtschaft - das diirfte wohl klar sein - wird auch weiter- 
hin leistungs- und wachsturnsorientiert sein. In diesem 
Sinnekann man die Plandirektiven fur 1971-1975 als ein 
wirtschaftliches Programm'fur hohe Stabilitat und sicheren 
Fortschritt bezeichnen. Uhser Ziel ist^Stabilitat der sehr 
betrachtlichen Wachstumsraten, Stabilitat im Rhythmus. der 
Produktion, Stabilitat der Versorgung und Stabilitat der 
Verbraucherpreise. Das ist eine Aufgabe, die den aktiven 
Einsatz aller verlangt und auch etwas Zeit, aber sie ist. 
losbar, und sie wird gelost werden.* 6l\.
in the section of his speech which dealt with the ideolog­
ical-theoretical work of the SED, and the role of agitation 
and propaganda, Honecker drew back from the impression cre­
ated by Ulbricht at the 15th plenum that the DDR had been 
following a unique path of socialist development. Honecker 
recognised the existence of ’allgemeingultige GesetzmaBig- 
keiten der sozialistischen Revolution und des sozialistischen 
Aufbaus’, which had been confirmed by the experiences of 
the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. In 
contradistinction to Ulbricht, he argued that there was 
no fixed boundary between socialism and communism; the 
former was gradually growing into the latter. Although 
stressing continuity in economic policy, a note of caution 
and realism was to be found. Honecker declared:
63* Neues Deutschland, 13th December, 1970
6k . Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII Parteitag 
der SED, p. 56.
’Manche haben in dieser Zeit die Frage nach dem okonom- 
ischen System des Sozialismus gestellt. Genossen, das 
okonomische System des Sozialismus entwickelt sich gut, 
nur allzuviele ,fauBerplanmai3ige Wunder” kann es nicht 
verkraften. Es braucht den bilanzierten Plan als sicheres 
Fundament.’ 65
t
In a comment on Honecker s more realistic and sober approach.
to economic policy, Hartmut Zimmermann concluded that the
SED could no longer legitimise its policy by reference to
future benefits, but only by demonstrating here and now
66what it could offer DDR citizens. Instead of promising,
the new leadership acted, as shown by its decision to freeze
6"7consumer prices in the period 1971-1975• Honecker stressed
the ’dialectical connection’ between economics and politics:
’Okonomie und Politik voneinander zu trennen ist ebenso 
falsch, wie das okonomische System des Sozialisrosis -im 
Sinne eines blofien Steuerungs- und Regelmechanismus zu 
handhaben Oder auszulegen’ 68
In this connection Honecker argued that it was necessary to
increase the moral factor as the principle of material self-
interest (materielle Interessiertheit) was developed.
Besides'offering improved economic benefits, Honecker 
also called for greater attention to be paid to popular 
participation (under the guidance of the party) in the
65. Bericht des ZK an den VIII Parteitag der SED, p. 37•
66. The GDR in the 1970s, p. 21
67* MaBnahmen zur Stabilitat der Verbraucherpreise.
Neues Deutschland, 19th November, 1971*
68. Bericht des ZK an den VIII Parteitag der SED, p. 9k.
affairs of state at all levels. He also promised the streng­
thening of socialist legality:
’Von alien Staats- und Wirtschaftsfunktionaren muB gefor- 
dert werden, daB sie vorbehaltlos die Gesetzlichkeit 
achten und die Gewahrleistung von Ordnung, Diziplin und 
Sicherheit zum festen Bestandteil ihrer Leitungstatigkeit 
machen. Selbstverstandlich schlieBt das auch - im groBen 
wie im kleinen - die strikte Wahrung der Rechte der Burger 
ein. Die Rechtssicherheit ist ein wichtiger Faktor, der 
das Vertrauen der Burger zu ihrem sozialistischen Staat 
festigt. Angriffe gegen unsere sozialistische Ordnung, 
gegen das sozialistische Eigentum, gegen Gesundheit und 
Leben der Burger werden konsequent geahndet.’ 69
In an apparent attempt to gain the support of all citizens, 
the frequent use of the word ’Burger’ was significant. This 
had-to be seen in relation to the reaffirmation of the lead­
ing role- of the working class by Honecker:
’Die theoretisclr-ideologische Arbeit wurde besonders darauf 
konzentriert, die fiihrende Rolle der Arbeiterklasse und 
ihrer revolutionaren Parte! welter auszuarbeiten und darzu- 
legen.’ 70
Although the term ’Burger’ applied to all DDR citizens, 
whereas ’Arbeiterklasse’ applied to part of the citizens, 
the latter term included all those who in the Federal
t
Republic would be classified as Arbeiter/Angestellte/Beamte, 
excluding the collectivised peasantry, the intelligentsia 
and the remaining self-employed. In the DDR the majority of 
the population is classified as working class, including 
many, who in common British usage, would be classified as
69* Bericht des ZK an den VIII Tagung der SED, p. 67* 
70. Ibid, p. 92.
middle class. Indeed, as evidenced by the attempts to break 
down the barriers between manual and non-manual work, and 
the promotion of the skilled worker in the MMM (Messe der 
Meister von morgen), and by the stress on achievement or­
ientation (Leistungsprinzip, sozialistischer Wettbewerb), 
it could be argued that the whole ethos of DDR society was 
middle class in the sense commonly understood in Britain.^ 
However, Honecker found it necessary to declare that:
’Die objektiv begrundete Fuhrung der sozialistischen Ge- 
schaft durch die Arbeiterklasse mindert die Stellung und 
Leistung der anderen werktatigen Klassen und Schichten 
unseres Volkes in keiner Weise..-’ 72
Kurt Hager later expanded on the difference between the
working class and the intelligentsia, and stressed that
the socialist intelligensia enjoyed great respect, as the
VIII congress had very clearly declared; its position had
73not been devalued in relation to the working class.
The SEDfs goal of ideological demarcation from the Federal 
Republic could only be internalised by the majority of DDR? 
citizens after a long process of political education. The 
acceptance of (DDR) socialism implied the rejection of (Vfest
71• For a definition of working class see Kleines Politisches 
Worterbuch, Berlin (East),.1973* Philosophisches Worter- 
buch, Leipzig, 1974-» and a West German interpretation in 
DDR Handbuch, Cologne, 1975* See also Zur Sozialstruktur 
der sozialistischen G-'esellschaft, Berlin (East), 197^ 4-> 
and Soziologische Probleme der Klassenentwicklung in der 
DDR, Berlin (East), 1975*
72. Bericht des ZK an den VIII Tagung der SED, p. 60. Note 
also Honeckerh call for a relationship based on trust 
between the party and the ’parteiloser Burger’ (ibid, p. 60)
73- Sozialismus und wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution. 
Berlin (East), 1973* P* 12.
German) imperialism. At the VTII congress Honecker argued 
that a principal task of the party in the building of the 
socialist social order in the DDR was the development of the 
’allseitig entwickelte PersonlichkeitT. He declared that 
the arts had their part to play in the development of soc­
ialism, and stressed the continuing development of a spec­
ific socialist national culture in the DDR. The term 
’sozialistische Nationalkultur’ was found in the SED pro­
gramme of 1963* This expression, like so many others con­
nected with the national question, was ambiguous. In 1963 
it was primarily-interpreted as the socialist (as opposed 
to the bourgeois) culture of the single German nation. 
However, with the proclamation of the two nation theory at 
the VIII congress, it was to be*understood rather as the 
culture of the socialist German nation, in opposition to 
the culture of the bourgeois German nation. Honecker saw 
the function of the artist in the DDR as counteracting the 
influence of bourgeois ideology through the development of 
specific socialist forms of expression:
’In wachsender Verbundenheit mit den Werktatigen unserer 
Republik und4<ihrer Kollektive und mit der Aufgabe vor 
Augen, die Burger unserer Republik auch mit den Mitteln 
der Kunst fur die Auseinandersetzung mit der burgerlichen 
Ideologie, mit dem Imperialismus auszuriisten, werden die 
Kunstler dabei ihre schopferische Phantasie einsetzen kon- 
nen, urn beeindruckende, unserer sozialistischen Gesell- 
schaft eigene Ausdrucksweisen zu finden, die sich nicht 
aus dem Modernismus einer uns fremden, ja feindlichen 
Welt nahren... Die Kulturschaffenden unserer Republik 
leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag im Kampf gegen die ideo- 
logischen Diversionsversuche des Tmperialismus gerade auf 
kulturellem Gebiet. Den menschenfeiiidlichen Produkten 
des westlichen Kulturzerfalls setzen sie den lebensspen~ 
denden Atem unserer neuen sozialistischen Epoche entgegen.
Dabei erweist sich unsere sozialistische Nationalkultur 
als die Bewahrerin aller fortschrittlichen Tradltionen.’ 74
Without mentioning the Federal Republic, the same elements
of bourgeois ideology were condemned, as had been the case
under Ulbricht. These were anti-communism, anti-sovietism,
social democracy, revisionism, convergence theory and the
theory of the industrial society.
vii. Changing West German attitudes to the national question
One factor which indirectly facilitated the demarcation 
policy of the SED was the increasing awareness by most West 
Germans that the two German states were following divergent 
paths, not only economically and politically, but also 
socially. This view was supported by Schwiegler^ claim 
that growing awareness of divergence was leading to a dim­
inution of all-German national consciousness among 'West
75German citizens. ^ Again, the. notion of West German ideolog­
ical demarcation from the DDR, implicit in some West German 
publications concerned with political education, and explicit 
in the declarations of some political leaders, might be 
noted.^
One West German observer, Manfred Ackermann, writing in 
1971* shared Schweigler’s view that the concept of the all-
74. Bericht des ZK an den VIII. Parteitag der SED, p. 77.
75* NationalbewuBtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 65*
76. Note, for example, the SPD’s demarcation between social­
ism and communism. „Sozialdemokratie und Xommunisinus" . 
BeschluBvorlage des Parteirates der SPD vom 14*10.1970 
in Tatschachen und Argumente, Bonn, No. 301.
German nation was becoming increasingly difficult to defend:
’Die Deutschen haben keine gemeinsame Geschichte mehr, 
keine gemeinsame Kultur. Sie haben eine gemeinsame Sprache 
(auch mit den Osterreichern. und Bewohnern der Schweiz), sie 
leben in einem geographischen Raum (Mitteleuropa), es be- 
stehen gewisse verwandtschaftliche Beziehungen (die abneh- 
men), man weiB, daB es fruher einmal anders war, und die 
Mehr.zahl meiiit, daB es auch heute anders sein sollte, als 
es ist. Dies ist kaum ein ausreichendes Fundament fur die 
Konstituierung als- Nation.. Deshalb lautet folgerichtig die 
Devise des Tages »Abgrenzung«, mal bewuBt forciert - mal 
praktisch gelebt, in jedem Fall eine Tatsache.’ 77
The arguments employed by Ackermann to support his claim
that there was an inadequate basis for a single German
nation were remarkably similar to those of Ulbricht and
Honecker, apart from the lack of a class-based analysis.
However, his questioning of the nation was untypical of
West German opinion; the government’s view was restated
by Brandt in his state of the nation speech of.January 28th,
1971* where he repeated what he had said in his previous
report on the state of the nation that:
’Die Nation grundet sich auf das fortdauernde Zusammen- 
gehorigkeitsgefuhl der Menschen eines Volkes. Niemand kann 
leugnen, daB es in diesem Sinne eine deutsche Nation gibt 
und geben wird, soweit wir vorauszudenken vermogen.’ 78
Brandt declared that he agreed with Ulbricht when the latter 
spoke of demarcation, since the ideological and social con­
ditions of the two states were incompatible.^
77* Deutschland Archiv, 1971/9, p. 910.
78. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol..7* P* 11*
79* Ibid, Vol. 4* P* 205
Whereas Ulbricht and Honecker had derived their rejection 
of a single German nation from the opposed ideologies of the 
two states, Brandt was arguing the opposite - that ideolog­
ical demarcation was compatible with the unity of the German 
nation. Brandt maintained that ’Nation ist eine Frage von 
B'ewuBtsein und Willen’. . The existence of such a perception 
of the nation in the DDR had been perhaps confirmed by the 
continual polemic of the DDR leadership against the unity 
of the nation. Brandt was suggesting that the leadership’s 
rejection of the single nation was opposed by wide sectors 
of the DDR population. By advocating a single nation, a 
single nationality and the right of self-determination for 
all Germans, Brandt was directly challenging the legitimacy 
of the leadership, whose apparatus of political socialisation 
had the goal of convincing DDR citizens to the contrary.
The question was whether two states which were socially, 
economically and ideologically diverging could form part 
of a single nation. Ulbricht had once appeared to believe 
this, since, before he re jected ' the-unity of the nation,'-
Q r \  ~
he had proposed a confederation. In January 1972 the 
Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forestry, Josef 
Ertl, had similarly suggested a ’deutsche Foderalion’, but
1...unter Fedingungen, die alien Deutschen eine freie
80. The offer of a German confederation appeared in the
1963 programme of the SED, which remained formally in' 
existence until a new programme appeared in 1976.
7/illensbildung und ein freies Entscheidungsrecht ermog-
Q -1
lichen’, that was to say, on terms totally unacceptable 
to the DDR leadership. Ulbricht had at least realistically 
proposed, with regard to the two German states:, that his 
confederation ’erfordert keine Veranderung ihrer Gesell-
82 tschaftsordnung’. Ulbricht s and Ertl’s proposals had
been made in response to popular- demands. One difference 
between the two proposals was that they had been made at 
different times;. Ulbricht had suggested his confederation 
when Adenauer had been Federal Chancellor, and had refused 
all official contacts with the DDR, which was not recog­
nised by the Federal Republic. Here it could be argued 
that Adenauer had followed a policy aimed'at total demar­
cation from the DDR leadership, though not from East German 
citizens. Again, Ert-1 had proposed a federation when the 
situation had changed, when the DDR had rejected confeder­
ation and proposed a total demarcation from the Federal 
Republic and from West German citizens. A second difference 
was that Ulbricht had made his proposal with the suggestion 
that it was a step towards possible unification, while in 
fact his policies were promoting divergence, whereas Ertl 
was attempting to create the impression for West German 
public opinion that the goal of unification remained, while 
preparing West German citizens for concessions which
81. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, p. 519.
82. Programm der SED, 1963> P* 59*
were to be interpreted by the CDU/CSU opposition, particul­
arly during the Bundestag debate on the ratification of the 
Ostvertrage of 23rd-25th February, 1972, as a widening of 
the division of Germany. As with Ertl’s proposed German 
federation, Brandt!s definition of the German nation had no 
chance of being considered by the DDR leadership, since the 
latter had placed the national question within an ideolog- 
framework where it was subordinated to the claim that soc­
ialism and capitalism were irreconcilable.
The DDR leadership;1 s argument that the two systems were 
mutually exclusive was accompanied by all attempts at syn­
thesis, such as through convergence'theory or the ’demo­
cratic socialism * of the 3PD . These were categorised as 
expressions of ideological sabotage. The alleged mutual 
exclusiveness of the systems now appeared to be confirmed 
by Brandt and the other,West German leaders who in their 
turn were declaring that the dominant ideologies and social 
orders of the two states were irreconcilable. Both sides 
had proposed a ’friedliches Nebeneinander’, although inter­
preted differently, and, given the mutual ideological de­
marcation between the two states, this appeared to be as 
far as they could go if they wished negotiations to succeed. 
The DDR leadership had long considered the implications of 
this limited goal, by relating it to the principle of 
peaceful coexistence. Here I would argue that it was be­
coming clear to the West German side that peaceful coex­
istence was applicable to the German policy of the Brandt- 
Scheel administration, that it was only in such terms that 
the Federal government’s German policy could be expected to 
achieve results.
The rejection of ideological convergence, not only by 
Ulbricht and Honecker, but also by Brandt would make this 
fact clear to politically conscious East Germans, and would 
tend to force them to choose between Marxism-Leninism and 
liberal democracy. Given a situation where time was work­
ing for the DDR leadership, where an increasing percentage 
of East Germans consisted of those who had been socialised 
solely within the DDR, with no direct experience of the 
Federal Republic, it would seem likely that the latter 
would accept the dominant ideology of the society in which 
they lived as the norm, and that of the West German state 
as alien to their experience. As will be considered in 
Chapter 8, this did occur up to a point, since even most of 
the East German critics of the DDR leadership, such as 
Havemann and Bahro, claimed to be communists, and to reject 
West German liberal democracy. But Honecker had related 
national demarcation to ideological demarcation; the former 
would appear to be supported by the evidence of Schweigler 
and others that all-German national consciousness was de­
clining, not only in the DDR, but also in the Federal Re­
public. If two forms of national consciousness specific to 
the DDR and the Federal Republic were to arise, then the 
choice of a national consciousness related to only one
German state would- imply the decline of affect for an all- 
German nation.
As direct negotiations between the .two German states con­
tinued, increased signs of strain were to be observed with­
in the Federal Republic, as shown by the controversy over 
whether the word fdeutschr could only apply to all Germans, 
or whether it should or should not be used to mean solely
the citizens of the Federal Republic, which arose at the
83beginning of 1972. At that time Josef Ertl posed the 
question whether a separate West German consciousness 
existed:
*Vor einiger Zeit ist mir die Frage gestellt worden, ob 
es; nicht mit der Dauer der staatlichen Teilung so etwas 
wie ein bundesrepublikanisches EewuBtsein gebe und wie ich 
es definieren wurde. Ich glaube in der Tat, da-3 sich, so 
sehr man dies auch aus gesamtdeutscher Sicht bedauern mag, 
bei uns zulande so etwas wie eine Art StaatsbewuGtsein 
allmahlich aus sich selbst heraus entwickelt hat. Es 
liegt ihm die tiefer greifende Motivation zugrunde, daB.' 
unsere Burger in der Bundesrepublik den freien Teil Deutsch 
lands reprasentiert sehen, in welchem sie uber ihr politi- 
sches Schicksal und alle Fragen des gesellschaftlichen 
Zusammenlebens frei entscheiden konnen. Eine zweite ITr- 
sache ist in der nuchternen auBerlichen Tatsache zu sehen, 
daB sich auf dem Boden des Deutschen Reiches durch Teilung 
und Demarkationslinie eine Entwicklung zu zwei deutschen 
Staaten hin vollzogen hat und immer v/eiter vollzieht. Die 
Folge ist,t<daB sich der Deutsche westlich der Demarkations­
linie tagtaglich, nicht. zuletzt z. B. im Auslandsreise- 
verkehr Oder im Sport, der Bundesrepublik zugeordnet sieht. 
Wen wundert es, wenn er sich dann letztlich selbst mit 
diesem seinen Staat, der Bundesrepublik, identifiziert?T 8I4.
83. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9> PP« 537-539 
8k* Ibid, Vol. 9, P« 520.
In relating ideological demarcation to group theory, I 
have suggested that the DDR leadership had rejected the 
unity of the German nation, because it hindered the aim 
of persuading East German citizens to develop affect for 
the state system within which they lived. If, as Ertl 
suggested, West Germans were increasingly identifying with 
the familiar surroundings of the Federal Republic rather 
than with the receding abstraction of an all-German con­
sciousness, then, by choosing the Federal Republic, they 
were demarcating themselves from the population of the DDR. 
This might not be national, demarcation; whether or not 
it w.as depended on how the nation was defined. But, if 
social, economic and ideological demarcation existed be­
tween the two states, and if family links were declining, 
then there was little left in common on which to base an 
all-German national consciousness. -Ertl’s reference to 
demarcation in sport was significant, since sport is a 
powerful generator of specific affect. His suggestion that 
a West German StaatsbewuGtsein was emerging might be sup­
ported by the recorded cases of disorientation among DDR 
citizens who had fled to the Federal Republic, who had
found it difficult to integrate themselves into West Ger- 
'85man society. Such evidence also supported the claim 
that a DDR state consciousness was developing.
35* The problems faced by East Germans who have settled 
in the Federal Republic are regularly examined in 
the feature ’Barbara bittet’, in Die Zeit.
However, while doubts about national identity began to 
appear in the statements of the Federal government, the 
GDU/CSU opposition continued to condemn any moves away 
from the West German national policy which had developed 
under Adenauer. In the Bundestag debate on the state of 
the nation report in January 1971 Brandt’s national pol­
icy was bitterly attacked by the former Federal Chancellor 
Kurt iiesinger:
’Die deutsche Nation bleibe auch eine Realitat, w.enn sie 
in unterschiedliche staatliche und gesellschaftliche 
Ordnungen aufgeteilt sei. Y/elch melancholosche Fest- 
Feststellung! Es ist ein schlimmer Trost, eine Nation 
zu sein und in zwei Siaaten geteilt zu bleiben.’ 86
An example of thinking which had remained fixed in the
Adenauer era was found in a 1971 speech by the President
of the Bundestag, Kai Uwe von Hassel, where he referred
to the DDR at one point as ’die sow^etische B'esatzungszone
For electoral reasons, the unity of the nation remained 
an article of faith for West German politicians. In his
1972 state of the nation speech, which opened the debate
on the ratification of the Ostvertrage, Brandt claimed - 
despite Honecker’s remarks at the VIII congress - that 
there was no reason to expect change in the DDR’s nation­
al policy:
86. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 7, p. 635*
87* Ibid, Vol. 8, p. 242.
’Es wird zu beriicksichtigen sein... daB beide Staaten, 
bei all ihrer Unterschiedenheit und Gegensatzlichkeit, 
doch zur Nation in Beziehung stehen. Wir sind unserem 
Grundgesetz verpflichtet, und uns ist nichts davon be- 
kannt, daB die Ausrichtung der DDR-Verfassung auf die 
Nation geandert werden soil. „Deutschland” und „deutsch” 
- das sind Begriffe, zu denen wir stehen und von denen 
andere auch kaum weglaufen konnen. Es hat nichts mit 
Juristerei zu tun und steht jedenfalls iiber der Kategorie 
des Volkerrechts^ daB die Menschen in diesen beiden Staa­
ten sich im Verhaltnis zueinander nicht als Auslander 
empfinden. Uhd die Regierungen in Deutschland sind gewiG 
gut beraten, auch diese Realitat v/eder zu leugnen noch zu 
ubersehen.’ 88
Brandt had defined the nation as being independent of 
social, economic and ideological differences. He now 
appeared to go one step further by divorcing the nation 
from international law. Conversely, the DDR leadership 
had argued the ’dialectical unity of domestic and foreign 
policy’, that the international recognition of the DDR 
would strengthen the development of the socialist rev­
olution within the DDR. Honecker had argued at the VIII 
congress that the East German working class, having taken 
political power, became a national class, and themselves 
constituted a nation. Brandt’s definition would seem to 
support Ackermann’s view that there was little in common 
between the two German states on which to base the concept 
of an all-German nation.
It might be argued that the West German view of the 
nation had been influenced by history. The example of the
88. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, p. 116.
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation might he given, 
within which ideological demarcation existed in the form 
of religious cleavage, and economic demarcation through 
the customs barriers between the component states. Here • 
a form of national consciousness was kept alive by the free 
movement of intellectuals and adminstrators, but it was a. 
different national consciousness from that of the Second 
and Third Reich, which followed the rise of pan-German 
nationalism and the fkieindentsche Losung1 of the German 
question in the nineteenth century. But such conditions did 
not exist between the Federal Republic and the DDR, and the 
latter!s concept of the nation was based on different prin­
ciples. It was possible that Adenauer and others had in 
mind a Holy Roman Empire type of solution in their support, 
for the -'European Community. However4, the success - of. Aden­
auer’s policy of Western integration was an important reason 
for the failure: .of his German policy, since West German 
identification with the European Community has contributed 
more to the division of Germany than corresponding East 
German identification with the joint institutions of the 
socialist community. Perhaps unwittingly, Adenauer’s 
policies have contributed to a West German demarcation 
from the DDR by increasing the West European orientation 
of West German citizens.
The controversy within the Federal Republic on future 
German policy came to a head in February 1972 in a heated
Bundestag debate on the ratification of the Ostvertrage, 
which reflected a parallel debate within West German soc­
iety. This debate, which nearly led to the defeat of the 
coalition, was televised live and followed by millions of 
Germans.
The main speeches for and against ratification occurred
between February 23rd and 25th, and the vote was not taken
until May 17th, 1972. Ratification of the two treaties
was accompanied by a joint declaration (BntschlieGungs-
antrag) of coalition and opposition, which stressed that
ratification did not conflict with West German policy on
89the national question. Brandt declared at this time that
the idea of the German nation v/ould not and did not need to 
90be abandoned.
On introducing the treaties before the Bundestag, the
then Federal Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, argued that
the debate had both external and internal significance:
’... wenn wir in fairer Grundeinsteilung an die vor uns 
liegende Debatte herangehen, werden wir diesem Staat nach 
auBen und nach innen einen groBen, vielleicht einen ent- 
scheidenden Dienst erweisen. Nach auBen, weil die Wfe.lt 
in diesen Tagen auf den Deutschen Bundestag blickt. Sie 
will, nicht nur wissen, was fur und was gegen die Vertrage 
gesagt wird. Die Welt wird^vor allem auf die Halbtone 
horen, die ihr vielleicht Ruckschlusse auf das innere, 
das tiefere Denken unseres Volkes ermoglichen. Noch
89• Point 3 of the declaration. Texte zur Deutschlandpol-
itik, Vol. 10. p. 427>
90. Ibid, Vol. 10, p. 482.
wichtiger als die Frage, mit welcher Mehrheit die Ver- 
trage verabschiedet werden, wird sein, ob wir uns den 
Frieden nicht nur als Ziel gewahlt haben, sondern ob wir 
auch eine Sprache des Friedens##fuhren... .Die Art undM 
Weise, wie wir diese Debatte fuhren, wird aber auch fur 
die Zukunft unseres Landes von Bedeutung sein. Wollen 
wir sie so fuhren, daB der nationalenJTeilung ein innerer 
Graben in der Bundesrepublik hinzugefiigt wird? 91
It was significant that when Scheel spoke of ’die Zukunft
unseres Landes’ he meant the Federal Republic, and not the
whole of Germany. The importance of the debate for the
Federal Republic’s German policy was also noted by the
leader of the CDU/CSU Fraktion, Rainer Barzel:
’Die Entscheidung, die wir hier zu treffen haben werden, 
gehort zu den erstesten und zu den folgenschwersten, die 
je im Deutschen Bundestag zu treffen waren. Ich scheue 
mich nicht, von einer geschichtlichen Entscheidung zu 
sprechen. Zur Entscheidung steht hier eine Folitik. Es: 
geht auch, aber nicht nur urn Vertragstex.te. ’ 92
In the debate the government claimed that the unity of 
the nation would not be affected by ratification, while 
the CDU/CSU had argued that this would deepen the division 
of Germany.*^ But the CDU/CSU was mistaken: It was likely
that the division of Germany would deepen, not because of 
ratification, but because of the chain of events which the 
second world war had started. As Ulbricht might have said, 
ratification meant thp acceptance of reality. On the other 
hand, ratification offered at least the chance of slowing 
down the rate of divergence, if the promised ’menschliche
91. Ratifizieren oder#>nicht? Die groBen Reden der Debatte 
iiber die Ostvertrage im Bundestag 23.-25* Februar 1972. 
Hamburg, 1972, p. 23-
92. Ibid, p. 37.
Erleichterungen’, whose introduction depended on ratification, 
were to be implemented. Ratification meant the acceptance 
of peaceful coexistence, which had become apposite after 
Brandt had declared that there could be no ideological 
convergence with the DDR. The debate, which some East Ger­
mans would have followed on their television screens, for­
malised the failure of Adenauer’s German policy, through 
which he had hoped to force unification by destabilising 
the DDR by ignoring its existence.
Scheel had maintained that the outcome of the debate v/as
of interest to the whole world. This applied especially to
the DDR, since the Moscow Treaty guaranteed its frontier
with the Federal Republic, and supported its claim to be
a sovereign state. At the VIII congress Honecker declared:
’Das besondere Interesse der Deutschen Demokratischen Re­
publik an diesen Vertragen steht auBer Frage, weil die 
territoriale Integritat der Deutschen Demokratischen Re­
publik auf diese Weise erneut bekraftigt wurde.’ 94
He argued that ratification was opposed by ultra right wing
circles in the Federal Republic, who openly continued to
support the old goal, of revenge-seeking. The importance
of ratification for the DDR leadership was demonstrated
by the apparent apptempts to assist the coalition in its
difficult task of gaining a majority for ratification in
the Bundestag. It was significant that the DDR, as a
9 4 Bericht des ZK an den VIII. Parteitag der SED, p. 27*
fG-este des guten Willens’, introduced the agreement on
95visits by West Berliners to the DDR, on the day before
the report on the state of the nation, an action noted
96with approval by Brandt in his report.' This agreement 
had not been due to come into force until after rati­
fication.
On March 10th, 1972, Honecker claimed that the decision 
to put into effect the agreement on travel between West 
Berlin and the DDR before ratification underlined the 
positive attitude of the SED and the East German govern­
ment to all questions of peace and security. In an attack 
on the GDU/OSU opposition, Honecker declared:
fWer von Frieden redet, aber den Weg zu sicherem Frieden 
blo.ckiert,. macht sich: nicht nur unglaubwurdig,. sondern 
schadet den Volkern. Schliefilich wird es^nur die Ratifi- 
zierung der zu Erorterung stehenden Vertrage ermoglichen, 
die Abkommen zwisehen der DDR und der BRD sowie zwischen 
der DDR und Westberlin in Kraft zu setzen und eine Ent- 
wicklung einzuleiten, die zu einem friedlichen Neben- 
einander zwischen der DDR und der BRD fiihrt..,*
This was seen as an expression of peaceful coexistence.
He continued:
’Diese Politik der friedlichen^Koexistenz entspricht so 
umfassend den Interessen der Volker, ist so fest fundiert 
in unserer sozialistischen Gemei'nschaft, daB es geradezu 
lacherlich wirkt, ihre Ernsthaftigkeit mit dem Gerede in 
Frage zu stellen, sie stande im Widerspruch zu dem ob- 
jektiven ProzeB der Abgrenzung, der sich bereits iiber 
zwei Jahrzeiinte hinweg zwischen der DDR und der BRD voll- 
zieht. Von einem solchen Widerspruch kann selbstver- 
stanalich keine Rede sein. Eine aktive Politik der
95* Deutschland Archiv, 1972/3, pp* 328-331*
96. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, p. 115*
friedlichen Koexistenz setzt gerade die Respektierung der 
Tatsache voraus, daiB die Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
ein souveraner sozialistischer Staat und ein festes Glied 
der Gemeinschaft sozialistischer Staaten ist. Gerade weil 
zwischen den Gesellschaftssystemen des Sozialismus in der 
Deutschen Demokraisehen Republik und des Kapitalismus in 
der BRD eine unuberbriickbare Kluft besteht, weil es zwi­
schen ihnen nichts Gemeinsames geben kann, sind Bezie- 
hungen der friedlichen Koexistenz der einzig mogliche Weg, 
urn normale Beziehungen unter Ausschaltung von Gewaltan- 
wendung und kriegerischer Konflikte zu unterhalten. . Das 
andert nichts am objektiven ProzeB der geschichtlichen 
Auseinandersetzung zwischen Sozialismus und Kapitalismus.’
Given the apparent difficulties for the DDR leadership of 
explaining the relationship between peaceful coexistence 
to SED members, it was not surprising that West Germans 
found it difficult to accept the argument. But it seemed 
that at least the leader of the SPD Praktion in the Bundes­
tag, Herbert Wehner, who had long maintained semi-official 
contacts with the DDR leadership, understood this view of 
demarcation, when he declared during the ratification 
debate in the Bundestag:
’Wir sind - das ist zugegeben - in einer Situation, in 
der diejenigen, die in Deutschland nebeneinander zu leben 
haben, vollig unterschiedliche und miteinander nicht zu 
vereinbarende Zielvorstellungen iiber die Vereinigung 
Deutschlands haben. Die unsere paBt nicht zu der anderen, 
und deren paBt nicht zu der unseren. Keine Seite kann 
der anderen ihre Auffassung aufnotigen. - Dafiir wird es 
immer zu sorgen sein. Abgrenzung sollten wir ein wenig 
versachlicht behandeln. Denn Abgrenzung vorzunehmen und 
staatliche Zusammenarbeit gleichzeitig nicht zu verweigern 
ist durchaus denkbar.’ 98
97* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, pp. 395-397* 
98. Ibid, Vol. 10, p. 180.
On the following day of the debate a further interpret­
ation of demarcation was given by Egon Franke. He claimed 
that the Federal government had done everything possible 
to maintain the unity of the nation, as the Grundgesetz 
required. However, the German question could only be kept 
open if the West German position remained credible:
’Beide Staaten miissen gleichsam>#sich selbst finden, bevor 
sie im Rahmen des Ost-West-Verhaltnisses in Beziehung 
treten. Es geht nicht urn Vermischung und urn die Errichtung 
von falschen Fassaderi der Gemeinsamkeit in Dingen, in 
denen es keine Kompromisse geben kann. Die DDR spricht 
von Abgrenzung und versteht darunter nach ihren eigenen 
Worten die Profilierung als sozialistischer Staat. So 
iibertrieben und iiber das Ziel hinausschlieBend uns manche 
der Abgrenzungsbegriffe auch erscheinen mogen, wir sollten 
ihren tieferen Zweck nicht iibersehen. Sie dienen augen- 
scheinlich dazu, eine Politik der Beziehungen vorzube- 
reiten. Wir kennen diese Methode aus langjahriger Be- 
obachtung und Erfahrung sehr genau. Wir sollten auch 
nicht verkennen, daB die bisherigen Femuhungen der DDR 
unter dem Stichwort profilierung1’ ihre Menschen einige 
spiirbare Erleichterungen gebracht haben. Der Reise- 
verkehr nach Polen und in die Tschechoslowakei etwa.sind 
Fakten, die sich aus Fotwendigkeit ergeben, die aus der 
allgemeinen politischen Entv/icklung bedingt und erfor- 
derlich sind.’ 99
Here Franke was referring to the introduction of visa-free
travel.between the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. While
these measures could be seen as ’menschliche Erleichterungen’
their effect would appear to facilitate demarcation by turn-
the attention of DDR citizens eastwards.^00
Franke argued that the German nation continued to exist:
99* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, p. 273-C7U*
100. On December 31st, 1971, the Sachsische Zeitung, Dresden,
described these^measures as ’eine neue Etappe des Zusam-
menlebens der Burger sozialistischer Staaten’ and there
could be ’gegeniiber dem Imperialismus keine_ Politik, der
offenen Grenzen’. Quoted from Deutschland Archiv, 1972/l(. 
p. i+02.
’ ... ob es dem einen Oder anderen gefallt oder nicht ge­
fallt, und das laBt sich auch nicht mit Konstruktionen 
von burgerlicher Nation oder sozialistischer Nation, wie 
es andere sagen, nicht austreiben. G-enauso unsinnig ware 
es, zwischen sinnvollen und unsinnigen Nationen zu unter- 
scheiden. Vermutlich glauben die Urheber solcher Begriffs- 
manipulationen selbst nicht an ihre Weisheiten, es sei 
denn, sie hatten den Kontakt mit der Wirklichkeit abge- 
brochen. Ein untriigliches Kennzeichen dafur, ob eine 
Nation besteht, oder nicht besteht, ist die Auffassung 
ihrer Nachbarn, und hier besteht, glaube ich, nach alien 
Richtungen kein Zweifel. Pur die Welt sind die Menschen 
in der Bundesrepublik und in der DDR Deutsche, die man 
fur die Wirkung und die Mitwirkung Deutschlands haftbar 
macht. Davon kann sich jeder Jederzeit iiberzeugen. 
Natiirlich wirken die Auffassungen des Auslandes auch auf 
das BewuBtsein der Nation zuruck.’ 101
The viev/ that the two nation theory was not accepted outside
of Germany might be supported by Brezhnev’s speeches at the
102VIII congress and on March 20th, 1972. - Brezhnev had
spoke of the growing international authority of the DDR, 
and had supported ratification, not only for Soviet rea­
sons of state, but to confirm the DDR as an independent 
sovereign socialist state, but on neither occasion had he 
referred to the DDR as a socialist nation. Later, Honecker ■ 
admitted that most DDR citizens were of German nationality,
but an attempt was made to distinguish between nationality,
lO^citizenship, and nation. ^
Honecker untertook a further initiative before the Bundes­
tag voted on ratification, in a speech delivered in Sofia
101. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, p. 272.
102. Neues Deutschland, 17th June, 1971> and Texte zur 
Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, pp. kOl-1+03*
103* Neues Deutschland, December 13th, 197U* See also
Alfred Kcsing: Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart,
Berlin (East), 1976.
on April 18th, 1972. His advocacy of ratification appeared
to contain a mixture of promises and threats:
’Eine Nichtinkraftsetzung der Vertrage von Moskau und 
Warschau wurae nicht . nur die Beziehungen zwischen der 
UdSSR, der Volksrepublik Folen und der BRD zuriickwerfen*
Sie wurde auch alles zunichte machen, was an Ansatzen 
fur die Entwicklung normaler Beziehungen zwischen der 
DDR und der BRD erreicht werden konnte. Die Geste des 
guten Willens der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, das 
heiBt die von der DDR ermoglichte zeitweilige Anwendung 
von Regelungen des Transitabkommens mit der BRD und der 
Vereinbarungen mit dem Senat von Vfest-Berlin war ein 
Beispiel dafur, welche hoffnungsvolle Entwicklung mog- 
lich ware. Eine Verweigerung der Ratifizierung des Mos- 
kauer und Warschauer Vertrages wiirde alle diese ffoff- 
nungen zerschlagen.*
There then followed the promise of improved relations be­
tween the two states after ratification:
TDie Deutsche Demokraitische Republik ist bereit, nach 
der Rat if izierung der Vertrage zwischen der UdSSR>#und der 
VR Polen mit der BRD in einen Meinungsaustausch liber die 
Herstellung normaler Beziehungen zwischen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
einzutreten und die hierfur erforderlichen volkerrechts- 
maBigen Vereinbarungen zu treffen. Es konnte eine Entwick­
lung eingeleitet werden - das mochte ich hier ausdriicklich 
wrederholen -, die zu einem friedlichen Nebeneinander 
zwischen der DDR und der BRD fuhrt, zu normalen gutnach- 
barlichen Beziehungen mit dem Ausblick zu einem Mitein- 
ander im Interesse des Friedens, im Interesse der Burger 
beider Staaten.1 10i|.
The ratification of the treaties on May 17th, 1972 had the 
cathartic effect of confirming Brandtfs German policy. It 
also facilitated demarcation by making it clear to the 
citizens of both German states that their governments ac­
cepted, the one totally and the’ other partly,•that there were 
irreconcilable features within the two societies.
104* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, pp !j.10-U11*
7* Prom the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties 
to the Basic Treaty.
i. The aftermath of ratification.
y The Moscow and Warsaw treaties, ratified by the Bundestag 
on May 17th, 1972, was followed by further agreements, in 
accord with Honecker’s claim that ratification was a prere­
quisite for improved relations between the two German states.^ 
The treaty on traffic (Terkehrsvertrag) between the two 
states, initialled on May 12th, was signed on May 26th. At 
this time the representatives of the two sides agreed to
begin negotiations on the normalisation of relations between
2the two states. The.preamble to the Terkehrsvertrag went 
some way towards supporting the DDR’s claim to be an inde­
pendent sovereign state, and the DDR' representative, Dr 
Kohl, claimed that this was the first state treaty between 
the two states.^ On June 3rd the final protocol of the 
Quadripartite Agreement was signed, and the transit agreement 
between the two states and the agreement between the DDR and 
the Senate of West Berlin on visits by West Berliners to the 
DDR came into force.
1. Neues Deutschland, 11th March, 1972.
2. Deutschland Archiv, 1972/6, p. 671 and 1972/7> P« 783-
3* The text of the Verkehrsvertrag is given in Texte zur 
Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, p. 527ff« Kohl’s remarks 
are quoted on pp. 5UO-5U2 of the same volume.
On the day following the ratification of the Moscow and 
Warsaw treaties Honecker declared that these treaties had 
legitimised the results of the second world war, and that 
they signified the recognition, binding in international law, 
of the frontiers of Europe, including the frontier between 
the two German states.^ With the coming into force of the 
treaties, he argued, peace and security in Europe had been 
advanced* He repeated the offer made in Sofia in April 
that there should be an exchange of opinions between the 
two states on the normalisation of relations and the creation 
of the necessary agreements based on international law* 
However, any sense of euphoria among DDR citizens was tem­
pered by his statement that it was all the more necessary 
to stress that there could be no calm (Windstille) in the 
ideological struggle, at a time when peaceful coexistence was 
making progress. The irreconcilable struggle against anti­
communism, anti-sovietism, nationalism and against all other 
forms of reactionary bourgeois ideology remained the constant 
task of all party organisations.
In subsequent weeks it was constantly repeated that the 
ratification of the Ostvertrage was a success which had 
contributed to the international recognition of the DDR, 
which was an attempt to gain the international, and through 
this the domestic legitimation of the territorial and state
U* Neues Deutschland, 19th May, 1972
demarcation of the DDR from the Federal Republic. What was 
more difficult to persuade the population of the DDR to 
accept was the ideological justification for this demarca­
tion, based on the irreconcilability of the dominant ideo­
logies of the two states, the premise that peaceful coexist­
ence did not mean rapprochement, but an intensification of 
the ideological struggle as peaceful coexistence gained in 
success* The frequent repetition of these claims would 
suggest that the DDR leadership was dissatisfied with their 
level of general acceptance. Honecker*s speech of May 18th; 
was delivered to an audience of local (Kreis) party? secre­
taries, from which it might be inferred that it was still 
believed to be necessary to persuade the ordinary SED 
membership of the validity of these claims.
On the occasion of the signing of the final protocol 
of the Quadripartite Agreement the official DDR view was 
expressed in a joint party-state declaration. The declar­
ation noted the constructive policy of the USSR, and argued 
that the ratification of the Ostvertrage by the Federal 
government had made it possible for the Quadripartite 
Agreement to come into force. It was further claimed that 
the agreement had strengthened the legitimate interests and 
sovereign rights of the DDR in a form which was binding in 
international law, and it was repeated that the three
5* Neues Deutschland, 4th June, 1972
Wester-n powers: had recognised the DDR for the first time 
as a sovereign state, as well as the DDR’s sovereign rights, 
within its frontiers:.
A few days later, on June 6th, Honecker gave an interview 
on the question of Deutschlandpolitik. He claimed that the 
Western powers had recognised the sovereignty of the DDR, 
and had recognised that West Berlin was not a constituent 
part of the Federal Republic. It was declared that, by 
ratifying the Ostvertrage, the Federal Republic had recog­
nised the sovereignty of the DDR in a form binding in inter­
national law. Honecker claimed that the DDR’s action of 
introducing prematurely some of the agreements provided for 
in the Quadripartite Agreement, as ’Gesten des guten Willens’ 
had assisted the ratification of the Ostvertrage by the 
Bundestag. In commenting on the Terkehrsvertrag, he repeated 
that it was the first state treaty between the two states, 
and continued that it had the same international binding 
force as other treaties concluded by the DDR, and the Federal 
Republic with third states.
On the question of improvements in travel between the two 
states, Honecker remarked that the DDR was the country with 
the greatest tourist traffic in the centre of Europe. When 
the Verkehrsvertrag had been signed the DDR had announced
6. Neuee Deutschland, 7th June, 1972.
its intention of introducing further improvements in travel
after the treaty had come into force. He continued:
’Diese Mafinahmen - so verstehen das die Burger der DDR zu 
Recht - sina Teil unserer Politik der friedlichen Koexis- 
tenz zwischen sozialistischen und kapitalistischen Staaten.. 
Was die DDR angeht, so hat die Regierung bereits ihr Wort 
gesprochen und den Verkehrsvertrag der Volkskammer zur Be- 
handlung zugeleitet. Ein entsprechender Schritt in Bonn 
stent noch aus... Das Tempo der Verwirklichung hangt jetzt 
- also von der anderen Seite ab.f'
Although Honecker could claim credit for the arrangements on
visa-free travel between the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia,
the opportunities for DDR citizens, who were not pensioners,
to visit the Federal Republic and West Berlin, remained
severely restricted.
Honecker regretted that the Federal Republic had replied 
to the DDR’s goodwill gestures by blocking its internat­
ional recognition. He noted that 31 states had already- 
recognised the DDR, and claimed that the Federal Republic 
would not be able to stop this trend. He then repeated 
that relations with the Federal Republic could only be 
based on peaceful coexistence; intra-German relations were 
impossible, and related to the pan-German nationalism of 
Hitler Germany.
Honecker was then asked ho?/ he thought that relations 
with the Federal Republic would develop. He replied that 
the process of normalisation had already started and should 
be continued. He declared that he had already suggested 
this in his Sofia speech, and that the Federal Republic
had bound itself by Its declaration of intent in the Moscow 
treaty to establish relations with the; DDR based on univer­
sally valid international norms, and to renounce totally 
any attempt to discriminate against the DDR internationally. 
Furthermore,.the .entry of the two German states into the 
United Nations Organisation had been declared an urgent 
matter, and the Federal Republic had pledged itself with 
the USSR: to work for a European security conference, a 
move which was supported by the DDR.
Honecker was then asked whether it were possible for the 
two states to work peacefully alongside each other, and he 
replied that both working alongside each other (Nebeneinan- 
der) and with each other (Miteinander) were possible.
There were sufficient areas of cooperation, and this was 
what was understood by a policy of active peaceful coexist­
ence. However, he added that peaceful coexistence did not 
do away with the unbridgeable contradictions between soc­
ialism and capitalism.
On June 19th Honecker repeated that there could be no
ideological coexistence between the two German states."^
fNUr unter Beachtung der unbestrittenen Tatsache, dai3 es 
sich bei der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der 
Bundesrepublik urn zwei Staaten unterschiedlicher sozialer 
Ordnung handelt, um zwei Gesellschaftsordnungen mit einander 
ausschlieBenden Ideologien, nur^auf der Grundlage der all- 
gemein anerkannten Normen des Tolkerrechts kann es zu einer 
spurbaren Normalisierung der Beziehungen zwischen der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der BRD und damit. 
zu einem friedlichen Nebeneinander kommen.1
7* Neues Deutschland, 20th June, 1972.
This quotation was repeated at the 6th plenum. Honecker 
again conceived of eventual Miteinander in a speech deliv­
ered at the end of June, but on condition that the Federal 
Republic gave up all interference in the internal and exter-
Q
nal policies of the DDR. However, Honecker*s interpret­
ation of Miteinander differed from Brandt’s. It was not 
viewed as a step towards unification, but as the formal­
isation of the split between the two states. It meant 
cooperation, but within the framework of peaceful coexist­
ence as defined by Honecker.
ii. The 6th SED plenum
At the 6th plenum the report of the Politburo^ reviewed 
the German policy of the DDR. It was claimed that the 
effectiveness of the coordinated foreign policy of the USSR 
and its allies could be measured by the international agree­
ments which had been recently concluded, and that these 
agreements had unequivocally made clear the position of the 
two German states in international law. Despite these all­
eged successes of DDR foreign policy, the report appeared 
to express dissatisfaction with the continuing negotiations 
between the two German states:
fWie aus den Massenmedien der BRD entnommen werden kann, 
versucht die Bonner Regierung ungeachtet der Tatsache der 
souveranen Gleichheit der Staaten, Probleme in den Mei-
8. Neues Deutschland, 28th June,1972.
9. Ibid, 7th July, 1972.
nungsaustausch zwischen DDR und BRD einzufiihren, die nichts 
mit dem AbschluB eines Vertrages liber die Grundlagen der 
Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD zu tun haben.
Ganz zu schweigen von der bekannten Tatsache, daB die we it­
er e Normalisierung der Beziehungen zwischen DDR und BRD 
nichts mit der Aufnahme der DDR und der BRD in die UNO zu 
tun hat. Das in Kraft getretene Vertragswerk hat hierzu 
bereits entsprechende Grundlagen geschaffen.f
Some evidence of the policy differences on the question 
of the normalisation of relations between the two states 
subsequently came to light on August 31st, 1972, when the 
West German and DDR negotiators, Egon Bahr and Michael Kohl, 
presented in television interviews the aims of their respec­
tive governments.^0 Kohl declared that it was a question 
of establishing normal relations based on international 
law between the two states, which had differing, totally 
opposed social arrangements. The exchange of ambassadors, 
rather than plenipotentiaries, was a prerequisite for the 
establishment of normal relations. Kohl further rejected 
any kind of special relationships with the Federal Republic 
as illusory. Relations based on international law, he 
argued, required that each state should respect the sover­
eignty and independence of the other, should not interfere 
in the affairs of the other state, should maintain the 
principle of territorial integrity and, above all, avoid 
any kind of discrimination, for example in foreign relations, 
against the other state. In this last respect the Federal
10. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 130-132
Republic had given much cause for complaint
Conversely, Bahr maintained that the Federal government 
had no intention of abandoning its claim to special rel­
ations with the DDR, and this had to find expression in 
the proposed treaty. The Federal Republic and the DDR had 
recognised that they were linked together (aufeinander be- 
zogen) in their constitutions. In Bahr’s opinion the demand 
for an exchange of plenipotentiaries, and not ambassadors, 
remained the unchanged position of the Federal government. 
Thus the stumbling block remained the unity of the German 
nation, insisted on by the Federal Republic, and rejected 
by the DDR.
Although the word Abgrenzung continued to be little used, 
the 6th plenum was characterised by its concern for'ideo-. 
logical demarcation from the Federal Republic. The main 
contribution was made by Kurt Hager, who stressed the ir­
reconcilability of socialist and Western culture. At the 
same time, but not at the plenum, Albert Norden examined the 
relationship between ideology and peaceful coexistence. In 
a further contribution Norden expanded the two nation theory 
presented by Honecker at the VIII congress. These detailed 
policy statements, in accord with the claim for total demar­
cation, may have been inspired by a desire to maximise ideo­
logical security* before _■ the Basic Treaty was signed, since 
the treaty provisions would increase the opportunities for 
contacts between the citizens of the two states.
In the communique of the 6th plenum it was announced that 
a commission had been elected under the chairmanship of Hon- 
ecker to revise the SED programme which dated from the VI 
congress of 1963* Paul Vernei* was to chair a further com-
1 "V
mission to revise the party rules (Statut). x Such revision
was long overdue, especially in view of the change in policy
12'on the national question.
Hager*s speech at the plenum on questions of the cultural
policy of the SED was notable for the renewed references to
socialist realism, a term which had tended not to be used
13
since the i+th plenum# H..-D. Sander., saw this as an ideo­
logical restoration, as a return to a defensive position 
in literature and art."^ Hager- stressed the role of cultural 
policy in the development of socialism and the combatting of 
Western counter-ideology# Socialist realist art, he argued, 
enriched the spiritual world of the workers through its 
representation of the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint (Parteilich 
keit), its links with the people (Volksverbundenheit) and 
with real life, and through its socialist intellectual con­
tent (sozialistischer Ideengehalt). He claimed that the 
humanism of socialist culture and the anti-humanist culture 
of imperialism, infested with decay, were sharply opposed to
11. Neues Deutschland, 8th July, 1972.
12. The need for revision was considered by Fred Oldenburg 
in Deutschland Archiv, 1972/8, pp. 788-789*
13* Kurt Hager: Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED, Berlin 
(East), 1975*
II}.. Deutschland Archiv, 1972/8, pp. 793-796.
each other. The cultural power of socialism, which found 
its highest expression in the achievements of Soviet culture, 
was playing an ever increasing role in the struggle between 
socialism and imperialism. Accordingly, he argued, the 
cultural policy of the SED had the task of supporting with 
all cultural means the political and ideological offensive 
of socialism. Socialist culture also had a role to play 
in the development of all-round socialist personalities, 
in the overcoming of the remains of the former capitalist 
society and against the ideological influence of the im­
perialist class enemy.
fDer reale sozialistische Humanismus und die massenhafte 
Herausbildung^freier sozialistischer Personlichkeiten haben 
eine immer starkere Ausstrahlungskraft auf den Kampf der 
Volker gegen den Imperialismus. Die Auseinadersetzung urn 
die ZUkunft und den Platz des Menschen in der heutigen Welt 
tritt immer^mehr in den Mittelpunkt des ideologischen Klassen- 
kampfes. Biirgerliche Ideologen wie die des Sozialdemokra- 
tismus versuchen die Illusion zu erwecken, man konne unter 
den uberlebten, anti-humanen Verhaltnissen des Imperial­
ismus einen neuen Menschen hervorbringen. Zu diesem Zweck 
wird viel vom „mundigen Burger”, von der „menschlichen 
Selbstverwirklichung”, von der „Gleichheit der Chancen” 
gesprochen.’ 15
Hager continued that under conditions of capitalism,.which
were driving the workers to physical and mental exhaustion, and
in view of the growing social insecurity and fears for the
future (Existenzangst), these slogans were being used by
the bourgeoisie and right wing social democrats to lead
the workers astray and to disguise the imperialist system of
domination.
15. Zu Pragen der.Kulturpolitik der SED, p. 12.
Examples were given of the alleged reality in the West:
These included references to the level of' child abuse and 
to the high crime rate in the Federal Republic. Hager claimed 
that this was a decaying society which was doomed to des­
truction, a society in which man was the enemy of man. Only 
socialist society, he declared, could guarantee the all­
round development of the personality, and in this respect 
cultural progress was a natural (gesetzmaiBig) and necessary 
element in the development of socialism.
With regard to the artist s portrayal of,the Individual
and his-personal life, Hager declared:
!Kunst hat es immer mit vielen personlichen Fragen zu tun. 
Diese aber aus ihren gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhangen, aus 
dem Klassen gefjige, durch das sie letzten Endes bedingt 
sind, herauszulosen ist ein ernster VerstoB gegen die Lebens- 
wahrheit und fjihrt zu einer Preisgabe sozialistischer 
Positionen. Biirgerliche Ideologen reden einer Trennung des 
Individuums von der Gesellschaft das Work. In demagogischer 
Weise wird^die „Freiheit des Individuums ” und seine angeb- 
liche personliche Unabhangigkeit und Bindungslosigkeit zum 
Gradmesser der Individualitat erhoben. Die Verlogenheit 
des burgerlichen IndividualismusA der auch von prominenten 
Sozialdemokraten in der BRD^verkundet wird, daG alle Men­
schen sich frei entfalten konnen, ohne die Fesseln der 
Ausbeutung zu sprengen, ist langst und wird taglich neu 
durch die kapitalistische Wirklichkeit widerlegt.T 16
He further suggested that laughter and ridicule should be
used to attack Western ideology, and to show up any defects
in socialist society, but, he warned, self-criticism should
not be used to become ammunition for the enemies of the DDR.
More attention should be paid to modern popular music, but in
16* Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED, p. kk*
this area there were 'complicated problems*. DDR dance music 
could never develop within the chains of Western fashions, but 
on the other hand, neither could it develop within a. locked 
greenhouse.
These remarks might be interpreted as an attempt to dis­
cipline : the East German artist. The frequent references to 
SPD policies on the freedom of the individual would suggest 
that they had been widely approved of by DDR citizens. The 
remarks might also be viewed as' further evidence of official 
insecurity caused by the matters which the West German side 
was raising in the discussions on the normalisation of 
relations between the two states.
In accord with earlier DDR policy statements, Hager claimed
that socialist society had the exclusive right .to inherit.
the progressive cultural traditions of the past. He declared:
*Die imperialist!schen Ideologen in der BRD sehen sich auf 
Grund unserer Erfolge in der Pflege und Aneignung des kul- 
turellen und kunstlerlichen Erbes zunehmend gezwungen, ihr 
bisheriges Verhaltnis zum kulturellen Erbe zu andern. Sie 
versuchen, sich dem Kampf urn die besten Traditionen des 
deutschen Volkes zu stellen und - naturlich mit alien erdenk 
lichen Verfalschungen - Besitzanspriiche auf diese Tradi- 
tiouen anzumelden. 17
Particular attention was devoted to the Federal Republic 
in the section of Hager*s speech entitled: The struggle 
against socialism and imperialism in the field of culture.
17. Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED, p. 55• In their 
book:^Die auswartige Kulturpolitik der DDR, Lindemann 
and Muller described how the DDR attempted to maintain 
the claim to have inherited German cultural traditions 
internationally.
Hager’ claimed that the growing strength of socialism had 
forced imperialism to take up the challenge of peaceful 
coexistence and peaceful competition between opposed social 
orders* Imperialism had modified its anti-communist strategy 
and tactics, and was intent on using the new opportunities 
for international cooperation for the deliberate undermining 
of the socialist states* These intentions extended from 
attempted annexation of the DDR to the crude denigration of 
the artistic .achievements of the DDR and of the other soc­
ialist countries. Hager argued that ideological sabotage 
had become one of the main forms of contemporary anti-communism
'Wie in anderen Gebieten der Ideologie geht auch in der 
Kultur eine Schlacht urn den EinfluB auf das BewuGtsein der 
Menschen vor sich. Immer starker wird^die Anziehungskraft 
des^Sozialismus. Das fuhrt zur Verscharfung aller Wider- 
spruche des Imgerialismus• Er kann den Menschen keine 
Perspektive^eroffnen. Seine allgemeine Krise verscharft 
sich gegenwartig nicht nur politisch und wirtschaftlich.
Sie ist zugleich eine Krise aller Seiten des Leb'ens, der 
Moral und der Kultur.* 18.
Western popular culture was condemned as 'imperialist mass 
c u l t u r e I t  was viewed as being closely related to the 
anti-humanistic way of life which arose from capitalist re­
lationships based on exploitation. It resulted from the 
dominant political, educational and cultural concepts of 
imperialism, he argued, and from the extensive subjection 
of cultural productions in the mass media to the class 
interests of the monopoly which were hostile to the people.
The glorification of brutality and crime as phenomena which
18. Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitk der SED, pp. 61-62.
were ’normal', 'everyday' and 'part of life' was the main 
content of this so-called mass culture. Hager further 
condemned the various forms of revisionism and reformism 
in the cultural sphere, which were allegedly attacking the 
fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism.
With regard to the Federal Republic, Hager declared:
'Die herrschenden Kreise in der BRD verfolgen gegeniiber der 
DDR die nationalistische Linie des HFortbestandes der 
Einheit der deutschen Nation”. Eine wesentliche Rolle 
spielt dabei die biirgerliche These von der einheitlichen 
„Kulturnation”:. Dsa die Existenz zweier Staaten von nie- 
mandem mehr zu leugnen ist, wird die langst widerlegte 
Behauptung von einer angeblich geschichtlich begrundeten und 
und weiter fortbesthenden lfEinheit der deutschen Kultur” 
aufrechterhalten.' 19
Here Hager claimed from the Marxist-Leninist class-based
viewpoint that history had shown that there had never been •
a unified German culture. After 19^5 the East Germans began
to construct an anti-fascist-democratic culture, but in the
three Western zones, under the demagogic slogan of freedom
and democracy* the newly founded parties of reviving German
imperialism, with’the support, and participation of.the' right--
wing leadership of the SPD, had persecuted all democratic and
socialist initiatives. He continued, giving perhaps the
clearest expression of SED cultural demarcation so far:
'Mit dem Entstehen zweier Staaten und ihren entgegenge- 
gesetzten gesellschaftlichen Systemen hat sich auch der 
grundsatzliche Gharakter der Kultur in der DDR und in der 
BRD voll herausgebildet. Die sozialistische Kultur in der 
DDR entfaltet sich als die Kultur der Arbeiterklasse und 
der mit ihr verbiindeten Klassen und Schichten des Volkes*
19. Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED, p. 63.
Demgegenuber herrscht in der BRD die imperialistische 
volksfeindliche Verfallskultur. Somit stehen sich heute 
zwei Kulturen gegenuber, die ihrem Inhalt und Klassenchar- 
akter nach unvereinbar sind.'
On July 5th, 1972, in an article published in Pravda,
Albert Norden developed the theme of ideological conflict
between East and West under conditions of peaceful coexis- .
tence. The article aligned DDR foreign policy with that
of the USSR, and its publication in Pravda would indicate
Soviet approval of its contents. It was not published in
Neues Deutschland until 3 days after the 6th plenum had 
20ended. Norden declared that peaceful coexistence had been 
difficult to achieve, since it had had to be wrested from 
the aggressive Western powers. Nevertheless, it offered the 
chance of checking their aggression. As a result of the 
increasing strength of the socialist states, they had been 
forced to support detente, and were even claiming to have 
invented the policy.
It was argued that at the present time the task of soc- 
ialist foreign policy was to create the most favourable ex­
ternal conditions for the building of socialism-communism.
The socialist states had allegedly led the way in promoting 
peace and detente in Europe, as evidenced by the ratification 
of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. The DDR, it was claimed, 
had made a concrete contribution to this end through the
20. Neues Deutschland, 10th July, 1972.
transit agreement with the Federal Republic, and through 
the agreements with the West Berlin senate which had been 
provided for in the Quadripartite Agreement.
Norden remarked that the imperialists had been forced 
b y  the new situation to change their tactics, but they re-, 
mained imperialists. They were increasingly militarising 
their economies and engaging in an arms race. In an appar­
ent reference to the border with the Federal Republic, he 
declared that the imperialists were especially dangerous 
where they directly opposed the defensive Warsaw Pact 
(Warschauer Verteidigungspakt), and where every military 
action was connected with the risk of an immediate world 
war. They were attempting to achieve old goals by new 
means, and here politics, economics and ideology were now 
playing a greater part than formerly.
Norden then posed the question why the West was making 
intensified efforts in the ideological class struggle.
His answer was that the West .had resorted to non-military 
means internally (nach innen), in order to secure domestic 
support within the crisis-ridden Western societies, and ex­
ternally (nach auGen), to subvert the citizens of the soc­
ialist countries. In the West, he argued, overt and clumsy 
anti-communism was becoming less effective, and the citizens 
of Western states were beginning to doubt the bourgeois 
'free democratic order', as a result of the sharpening
contradictions within the capitalist states. Imperialist 
and reformist ideology had therefore been given the task of 
securing the existing power relationships internally. At 
the same time the imperialists saw an opportunity for inten­
sified ideological sabotage externally, through the manifold 
political, economic and cultural relations with the soc­
ialist countries*
In the conflict between the two ideologies, he continued, 
a sharp struggle had begun for the heai»ts and minds of men. 
For the Marxist-Leninist parties, the dialectic of the 
struggle for peaceful coexistence consisted in uncompromis­
ingly attacking bourgeois ideology in step with every fur­
ther move towards detente. Anti-communism remained the 
main characteristic of bourgeois ideology. Under present 
conditions it had changed its form; now the anti-communist 
propagandists were acting in a pseudo-scientific and flex­
ible manner, employing political and economic means, and the 
methods of ideological sabotage, to undermine socialism.
Norden viewed the cultural policy of the imperialists 
as an example of the contemporary elastic and cautious form 
of anti-communism. It was claimed that some West German 
politicians were attempting to win trust and prepare the 
ground for bourgeois ideology in the socialist countries. 
They were camouflaging their aims under such headings as 
'objective factual analysis' and the 'scientific compar­
ison of systems'. So-called 'DDR-ology', 'sovietology'
and 'Eastern research (Ostforschung) had the task of de­
veloping new strategic and tactical concepts for the Federal 
government's new Ostpolitik, of producing the theoretical 
basis for the struggle against the USSR and the DDR, against 
the socialist community and Marxism-Leninism. Norden argued 
that the imperialist ideologists had been forced to change 
from a policy of ignoring and isolating the DDR to one of 
'preparation' (Praparierung). Here they had revived the old 
poison of national socialism. They no longer condemned the 
DDR totally, even praising its achievements, but suggested 
that these had come about despite the party and state.
Norden claimed they were attempting to drive a wedge between 
leadership and general population in the DDR, and to destroy 
the alliance with the USSR.
The right wing of international social dempcracy was play­
ing an important role in anti-communism. It saw itself as 
an alternative to communism, and was becoming increasingly 
active. But their anti-communist attacks had to be made 
from apparently socialist positions. Although within their 
own states they were supporters of monopoly capitalism, as 
the West German example proved, externally the formula of 
'’democratic socialism' served as an anti-communist key 
concept. Right-wing social democrats in the Federal Repub- 
lie saw that they had greater opportunities in the ideo­
logical struggle against the socialist countries than had
the overtly bourgeois parties. They wanted to get their 
foot in the door of the DDR; for years they had supported 
the introduction of so-called 'reform communism' into the 
socialist countries, where in reality the reforms meant the 
restoration of capitalism. They were at present attempting 
to oppose the natural development of demarcation (gesetz- 
maGige Abgrenzung) between the two states in all areas of 
social life.
If it were true,.as Brandt and Wettig had suggested above, 
that the majority of East German citizens was opposed to 
demarcation from the Federal Republic, then Norden's claim 
would be counter-productive. If DDR citizens agreed with 
Norden that the SPD was hindering demarcation, it was likely 
that this would increase the support for the SPD's policy, 
within the DDR. Again, assuming widespread support for the 
SPD - which Brandt*s visit to Erfurt on 1970 had demonstrated 
- then Norden*s claim that the SPD was in favour of reform 
communism would encourage those within the DDR who supported 
this movement. However, the claim that reform communism 
would lead to a restoration of capitalism was of doubtful 
validity. The DDR leadership condemned reform communism 
because - at least in its Czechoslovak version - it ques­
tioned the leading role of the party, and thus the legit­
imacy of the SED.
Norden turned to the national question in a speech deliv­
ered in July 1972, which was not published until several 
21months later. The delay in publication was significant, 
in view of the party control of the media. It was possible 
that the DDR leadership believed that publication in July 
might interfere with the Bahr-Kohl negotiations, where dif­
fering views on the national question played a major role.
U s e  Spittman saw Nordenfs speech as evidence of disagree-
22ment within the DDR leadership, which would represent a 
more likely reason for withholding publication.
NOrden declared that the West German claim of the unity 
of the nation, which had been reaffirmed during the rati­
fication debate in the Bundestag and subsequently, was the 
excuse for an international campaign against the recogni­
tion of. the DDR. He referred to the VIII congress state­
ment that history had long decided the national question, 
and to Honeckerfs claim in his speech of July 19th, 1972, 
that the united (einheitlich) Nation was a fiction.
’Heute ist die Lage doch’ so;> dai3 in^der'DDR die.neue, 
die sozialistische Nation wachst, wahrend in der BRD die 
alte kapitalistische Nation.fortbesteht. Zwischen ihnen 
gibt es Keine Klammer, weil eine vom Gesetz der Ausbeutung 
des Menschen beherrschte Nation und eine ausbeutungsfreie 
Nation von keiner^sogenannten nationalen Klammer zusammen- 
gehalten werden konnen. Die eine Nation entwickelt sich 
als Bestandteil des sozialistischen Weltsystems, wahrend 
die BRD zur imperialistischen Welt gehort, mit der uns 
liberhaupt keine Gemeinsamkeit verbindet und verbinden kann. 
Es gibt nicht zwei Staaten einer Nation, sondern zwei 
Nationen in Staaten verschiedener Gesellschaftordnung.1
21. Deutschland Archiv, 1972/11, pp. 1223-1225.
22. Ibid, 1972/11, p. 1124.
Norden then listed the criteria which in his view charac­
terised a nation. The nation should share the same terri­
tory, and the same economy, which was not the case with the 
two German states. He claimed that further national charac­
teristics not shared by the two German states were psychic 
and moral qualities, culture, and a common history. He 
rejected the criterion of language, arguing that German 
was also spoken elsewhere in Europe.
t
Irt was argued that Honecker s remarks on the national 
question at the VIII congress represented a claim for 
national demarcation, although that term was not used. 
Nordenfs statement of 1 two nations with differing social 
orders’ was an unequivocal expression of national demar­
cation, which I would view as the logical extension and 
culmination of the policy of total demarcation. If the 
list of criteria which Norden considered to be character­
istic of a nation is examined, it may be seen that each 
element represents an area of possible demarcation. When 
aggregated under the general heading of the nation, these 
elements complement each other.
The two German states occupy different territories and 
have different economic systems; it is also true that 
different nations may speak the same language, although 
Norden might have mentioned the lexical differences in 
the German language used in the two states, which reflect
their differing forms of social organisation, and their 
different dominant ideologies. The remaining criteria 
used by Norden was more controversial, since it could 
equally be argued that the two states did share common 
psychic and moral qualities, culture and a common history.
The distinguishing factor used by the SED to justify its 
claims that the two states differed in these areas was 
ideological; it was argued that under socialism the feel­
ings of the working class were fundamentally different 
from those of the private capitalists in the Federal Re­
public, socialist culture was the opposite of West German 
imperialist culture, as Hager had argued at the 6th plenum, 
and the history of the working class differed from that of 
the capitalists. To support the latter argument Norden 
referred to Disraeli's concept of two nations within the 
same country, the nation of the rich and the nation of the 
poor. He continued:
'Indem das Proletariat - wie Marx und Engels im ffKommu- 
nistischen Manifest" begrundeten - die politische Herr- 
schaft erobert, erhebt es sich zur nationalen Klasse, 
konstituiert es sich selbst zur Nation. Mit der Errichtung 
der Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Macht und dem Aufbau der sozialis- 
tischen Gesellschaft entwickelt sich ein neuer Typus der 
Nation, die sozialistische Nation. So ist es in der Deut­
schen Demokratischen Republik im Gegensatz zur BRD. Dort 
besteht die biirgerliche Nation fort, dort wird die natio- 
nale Frage weiterhin durch den unversohnlichen Klassen- 
widerspruch zwischen der Bourgeoisie und den werktatigen 
Massen bestimmt, der im Verlauf des welthistorischen 
Prozesses beim Obergang vom Xapitalismus zum Sozialismus 
seine Losung finden wird.'
Here a demarcation betv/een the working classes of the 
two states was implied, which would seem to follow the
earlier abolition of institutions of all-German significance, 
after Honecker’s assumption of power. The working class in 
the Federal Republic was to be treated the same as the work­
ing class of any other capitalist state; the impression 
was given that the citizens of the DDR were to demarcate 
themselves from the whole population of the Federal Repub­
lic. The decisive importance of ideological demarcation 
could now be seen; the two nation theory derived its 
justification from the acceptance of the socialist/capital­
ist dichotomy, which might explain the attempts to convince 
DDR citizens that the dominant ideologies of the two states 
were irreconcilable, and, even if the Federal Republic was 
unable to use military force, its ideology had the aim of 
subverting the DDR.
Norden then considered the West German claim of the unity
of the German nations
’Der eigentliche Charakter der nationalistischen Bonner 
Konzeption und der daraus abgeleiteten politischen Taktik 
wird vollig klar, wenn man ihr Ziel ins Auge faBt. Es 
geht den herrschenden Kreisen in der BRD darum, mit der 
Parole von der angeblichen »Einheit der Nation« das vom 
proletarischen Internationalismus und vom sozialistischen 
Patriotismus gepragte BewuBtsein der Burger der DDR zu 
storen, den ProzeB der Integration der DDR in die sozia- 
listische Staatengemeinschaft aufzuhalten, urn eines Tages 
die DDR im Zeichen einer solch angeblichen »Gemeinsamkeit« 
doch noch in den Machtbereich des Imperialismus zuriick- 
fuhren zu konnen.*
The demand for special intra-German relations was viewed
by Norden as a modern version of Adenauer’s reunificiation
policy; he claimed that ’intra-German’ meant interference
in the internal affairs of the DDR. He added that the nat­
ional question had nothing to do with the DDR’s desire to 
join the United Nations, since this was not an organisation 
of nations, but of states. These remarks clarified the 
reverse side of Norden’s definition of national demarcation; 
the rejection of all common national characteristics between 
the two German states was countered by the promotion of 
socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, 
where the Russian speaking workers of Moscow, the English 
speaking miners of Scotland, the French speaking Renault 
workers and the Italian peasants were claimed to be a 
thousand times closer to the citizens of the DDR than the 
German speaking capitalists of the Federal Republic. No 
mention was made of the German speaking workers of the 
Federal Republic.
iii. The further development of ideological demarcation 
before the signing of the Basic Treaty.
The question of ideological conflict under conditions of
peaceful coexistence was the main feature of the August 1972
edition of Einheit,-under the heading ’Coexistence and class
struggle’. An: article published on this theme, entitled
2 "3’Fight ideologically with conviction’, ^ dealt with the 
perceived dangers of Western ideology. Reference was made
23* Einheit, 1972/8.
to Honecker’s statement at the VIII congress that ’the 
development of socialist consciousness must be constantly 
bound up with the struggle against bourgeois ideology, 
which shuns no means of damaging the creation of a social­
ist society in our republic’, and to Norden’s above mention 
ed claim that in the struggle between socialism, and imper­
ialism a sharp struggle had begun for the hearts and minds 
of men.
The article claimed that, in order to counter bourgeois 
ideology, its class function had to be revealed. This was, 
all the more necessary today, since imperialism had reacted 
to the growing strength of the socialist camp and the deep­
ening general crisis of capitalism by producing a more re­
fined form of ideology. This was to be seen in the growth 
of convergence theory and futurology. Class contradictions 
had been falsely redefined, it was argued, as ’development 
problems of the scientific-technical revolution’, and the 
working masses had been deceived by the illusion that im­
perialism could be modified, that the class struggle was 
superfluous and a hindrance to progress. The article con­
tinued that refined, camouflaged anti-communism was the 
main political-ideological weapon of bourgeois ideology, 
that social democracy and revisionism were especially use­
ful forms of ideological sabotage, since they gave the 
impression that socialists, rather than imperialists, were 
calling real socialism into question.
It was declared that anti-sovietism was at the centre of 
anti-communism, hut an attack on the Soviet Union and the 
CPSU was an attack on all communists. The spreading of 
proletarian internationalism and above all the strengthening 
of the alliance with the Soviet Union were among the central 
tasks of the ideological work of the SED. This had two 
topical aspects: Firstly, the further extension of the -
developed socialist society depended on the success of soc­
ialist integration in the economic and scientific-technical 
spheres. However, it was argued that this was primarily an 
ideological task. This fact had also be noted by the class 
enemy, particularly by social democrat and revisionist ideol-
v
ogists, who had concentrated on reviving bourgeois national­
ism in the socialist countries and on discrediting the 
internationalism of the communist parties. They had become 
the advocates of economic !national autonomy1 in the indiv­
idual socialist states. It was claimed that the monopoly 
bourgeoisie was justifiably afraid of every step towards 
socialist integration, for in that way socialism grew 
stronger and destroyed the plans of the reactionaries to 
weaken socialism through the atomisation (Vereinzelung) of 
its states. For this reason it was necessary to promote 
socialist integration, particularly through ideological 
means, in the class struggle between socialism and imper­
ialism.
There was a second aspect which was especially applicable 
to the East German communists. Imperialists in the Federal 
Republic, with their dreams of so-called intra-German re­
lations, represented a form of bourgeois nationalism. But
0
nothing connected the citizens of the DDR with the monopoly 
social and state order of the Federal Republic, but every­
thing bound them to the socialist DDR, their socialist father­
land, which was firmly part of the socialist community.
There was only one answer to the- enemyf s attempts to separate 
the DDR from the other socialist states; this was to in­
tegrate the DDR even more firmly into the socialist commun­
ity, and to make the internationalism of the SED into the 
world-view and behavioural norm of all citizens of the DDR.
The next section stressed the primacy of the party and. the 
role of its membership The article declared that, in order 
to combat bourgeois ideology and spread Marxism-Leninism 
successfully, knowledge of the truth was not enough. The 
mass effectiveness of ideological work would be measured by 
how far it enabled the workers to strengthen their socialist 
consciousness:
fThe representation of our scientific world-view and of 
the struggle against imperialist ideological sabotage 
was never and will never be the preserve of scientists 
and propagandists. They are the duty of every comrade» 
every basic party organisation, and of every party 
executive committee (Parteileitung).
iv. The November conference on agitation and propaganda
The Basic Treaty (G-rundlagenvertrag) between the two
German states was initialled on November 8th and signed
2 iion December 21st, 1972. Between these two events the
negative influence of Western ideology upon the DDR was
further considered in a Politburo statement of November
7th, entitled ’The tasks of agitation and propaganda ih\
the further realisation of the decisions of the VIII con-
28gress of the SED’. The declared aim was to influence 
and involve all sections of the community in the building 
of the developed socialist society. It was argued that 
the conflict with imperialism and with all forms of its 
ideology ran like a red thread through the whole of the 
agitation and propaganda of the party, which had the task 
of fighting anti-communism, bourgeois nationalism, social 
democracy, revisionism and left wing opportunism. The 
unity and purity of Marxism-Leninism had to be defended and 
it was repeated that there could be no ideological coex­
istence. There were further condemnations of ^democratic * 
and ’human1 socialism, of.the ’industrial society’ and con­
vergence theory. A further task was claimed to be the un­
masking of Maoism, which was considered anti-leninist, anti­
soviet, and an expression of great power chauvinism.
2k* The text of the Basic Treaty is taken from Texte zur 
Deutschlandpolltik, Vol. 11, p. 268ff.
25* Preprinted in:Agitation und Propaganda nach dem VIII. 
Parteitag der SED, Berlin (East), 1973? PP* 65-90.
Later in the same month the Politburo statement led to 
a conference of the SED central committee on agitation and 
propaganda, on November 16th and 17th. The conference was 
opened by Honecker, who, although optimistic about the 
Basic Treaty, warned that there should be no illusions on 
the nature of the relations between a socialist and a cap­
italist state. Ideological work was of great importance,
26and had to be more flexible and effective.
The main speech was delivered by Werner 'Lamberz. He 
echoed Honecker’s satisfaction at the initialling of the 
Basic Treaty. Supporting his conclusions with quotations 
from the Western press, he argued that West German imper­
ialism had been forced to recognise the independence and 
sovereignty of the DDR, not only de facto, but also de 
jure.. Some grounds for satisfaction may be understood if 
one considers the years of constant East German propaganda 
demanding recognition, and calling on the Federal Republic 
to recognise reality and cease to block this goal. Satis­
faction was also claimed by Lamberz from the alleged dis­
comfiture of some West German sources at having to give 
up their illusions and abandon their aims of first isolating 
and then incorporating the DDR into the Federal Republic. 
Lambers. maintained that the ’notorious’ West German news­
paper, die Welt, had calculated ’full of anger’ that -
26. The speeches of Honecker and Lamberz appeared in: 
Agitation und Propaganda nach dem VIIL Parteitag 
der SED.
quoting from die Welt - 'this treaty confirms the internal
f
and external sovereignty of the SED-state no less than 
seven timesf•
Lamberz continued that it should not be forgotten that
the treaty had been concluded between states with opposed
social orders. He noted that the treaty had left open
certain fundamental questions, including the national ques-
27tion, on which the two sides could not agree.
'In Her Tat gibt es zwischen der DDR und der BRD grund-
satzlich unterschiedliche Auffassungen in der nationalen 
Prage. Bekanntlich existieren heute die aozialistische 
Deutsche Demokratische Republik und die kapitalistische 
BRD. Es bestehen in diesen beiden Staaten gegensatzliche 
soziale und gesellschaftliche Ordnungen. In der DDR ent-
wickelt sich die sozialistische deutsche Nation, in der
BRD besteht die biirgerliche deutsche Nation mit all ihren 
Widerspruchen und Gebrechen fort. Das entspricht eben 
)fden historischen Gegenbenheiten" und dem Standpunkt, den 
der VIII Parteitag formuliert hat. tjrber die nationale 
Prage hat die Geschichte langst entschieden.1 28
Lamberz quoted the Italian newspaper Gorriere della Sera as. 
declaring that attempts by the West German government to 
save the theoretical principle of the continuing existence 
of the nation were pitiful fictions, that the two German 
states were sharply divided from each other, two separate 
sources of sovereign authority, and as such they would now/ 
and in the future be regarded by other states without ex­
ception. The Western press was also quoted on the subject
27. This was expressed in the preamble to the treaty. 
Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, p. 268.
28. Agitation und Propaganda nach dem VIII Parteitag 
der SED, p. U8 .
of demarcation. An Austrian newspaper had declared ’that 
the DDR, with the conclusion of this treaty, had been able 
to demarcate itself further, and in this case decisively 
from the Federal Republic, and its sovereignty was streng­
thened’ • Lamberz commented that the party’s ideological 
work should stress that this was indubitably true; it 
corresponded to the historical fact that an objective
: - V
process of demarcation, and not of rapprochement, was 
taking place between the two German states, as Honecker 
had declared at the 14th plenum of December 1970.
The significance of demarcation was then explained, and,
from Lamberz’ remarks, it appeared that some SED members
found it difficult to accept the official argument:
'Manchem scheinen Vertragsabschliisse mit der BRD und 
vor allem die damit erweiterten Besuchs- und andere Re- 
gelungen als ein Widerspruch zur Abgrenzung. Genossen, 
hier muB ganz klar geantwortet werden. Ohne die Politik 
der Abgrenzung von der BRD ware der jetzt sich vollzie- 
hende ProzeB der weltweiten volkerrechtlichen Anerkennung 
der DDR nicht erreicht worden. Das ist die Wahrheit.
Das Verhaltnis von zwei Staaten zueinander ist.bekannt­
lich nicht bestimmt vom Verwandtschaftsgrad des einzel- 
nen Burgers und der Dauer von Besuchen, sondern von den 
herrschenden Gesellschaftsordnungen. Nicht, weil wir 
etwas von unserer Souveranitat oder dem Charakter unserer 
Gesellschaftsordnung zugunsten irgendwelcher Gemeinsam- 
keit abgestichen hatten, gibt es Verwandten- oder tou- 
ristische Besuche sowie andere Regelungen, sondern weil 
sie, die BRD, unsere Souveranitat und eigenstandige 
Entwicklung als sozialistischer Staat anerkennen muBte.
Ob Hans aus den Heckert-Werken in Karl-Marx-Stadt und 
Fritz von Conti in Hannover sich besuchen oder nicht, 
das andert keine Machtverhaltnisse. Hans arbeitet im 
und fur den Sozialismus, und Fritz bleibt ausgebeutet 
bis zum Tage, da sich die westdeutsche Arbeiterklasse. 
befreit. Wir haben nicht die Absicht, die Revolution zu 
exportieren, aber die Einfuhr von Konterrevolution wird 
schon gar nicht zugelassen. Deshalb hat der Kommentator- 
von SFB schon in etwa richtig den BeschluB des Politburos 
zu Agitation und Propaganda interpretiert, wenn er nach
dem Studium des Dokuments feststelltr „Das Wort vom 
Ende des kalten Krieges mag also fur die Beziehungen der 
beiden Staaten auf staatlicher Ebene gelten; innenpoli- 
tisch bleibt die SED auf Abgrenzungskurs, ideologisch 
wird sie die Bundesrepublik auch kunftig als Gegner be- 
handeln. Erich Honeckers Wort bleibt' giiltig: Dnser
Feindbild stimmt,f.t 29
This was a further step towards total demarcation from the 
Federal Republic. Lamberz was proposing a demarcation be­
tween the East and West German working classes, and the 
latter would have to free itself alone from capitalism,
• 30since the DDR would not export its socialist revolution.
Lamberz: repeated:that peaceful coexistence did not mean 
ideological demarcation, but, on the contrary, a period of 
intensified conflict between socialist and bourgeois id­
eology. Three points had to be understood:
(a) Peaceful coexistence was the only alternative to 
nuclear war. It did not conflict with the revolutionary 
movement. Peaceful coexistence was a revolutionary policy, 
a class struggle, the scientifically based utilisation of 
the objective laws of social development. The party was 
convinced that peaceful development would lead to further 
changes in international power relationships beneficial to 
socialism.
(b) The reactionary and inhuman character of imperialism
29» Agitation und Propaganda nach dem VIII. Parteitag der 
SED, p. 49
30. The abolition of the KPD one year earlier symbolised
the differentiation between the working classes of the 
two German states.
Western visitors had come to the DDR in the first nine 
months of 1972, most of them Y/est "Germans .or West Berliners . 
Many of them had visited the DDR for the first time, or 
after a period of several years. After DDR citizens had 
shown them, with self-confidence and pride, what had been 
achieved there, West German periodicals had been forced 
to change their reporting, since the old anti-communist ... 
line was no longer believed. The visitors were categorised 
as progressive supporters of the DDR, interested sceptics, 
prejudiced persons, those using visits as an excuse for 
anti-DDR.activities, and the great mass of allegedly 
’apolitical’ visitors.
Lamberz then considered how this increased number of
Western visitors was to be dealt with:
’Von unserer Propaganda und Agitation ist dabei#<vor allem 
guter Kontakt zu den Menschen, Fingerspitzengefuhl und## 
parteiliche Konsequenz verlangt, vor allem noch mehr Fahig 
keit, die Grundprobleme unserer Zeit im Alltag' der Men­
schen sichtbar zu machen oder, wie Karl Marx es formu- 
lierte, unsere Theorie am Menschen selbst zu demonstrieren 
Es verlangt von jedem Burger der DDR ein ausgepragtes 
StaatsbewuBtsein, immer und in jeder Frage den Standpunkt 
seines Staates, seiner G'esellschaft klar und unmiBver- 
standlich zu vertreten.’ 31
Besides stressing the need for every party member to raise 
the quality of his ideological work, Lamberz further fol­
lowed the Politburo of November 7th in stressing the im­
portance of the DDR mass media in popularising the work
31. Agitation und Propaganda nach dem VIII Parteitag
der SED,. p. 53 •
of party propaganda; it was demanded of the mass media that 
their presentation should become more skilful. The Politburo 
declaration and the conference on propaganda and agitation 
appeared to have the aim of alerting the SED to the ideolog­
ical dangers believed to be presented by the increased num­
bers of West Germans who were likely to visit the DDR after 
the implementation of the Basic Treaty. The significance 
of the SEDrs concern with agitation and propaganda was 
summed up by Gerhard Wettig as follows:
fUnmittelbar vor der Paraphierung des Vertrages liber die 
Grundlagen der Feziehungen zwischen beiden deutschen 
Staaten im^November 1972 faBte das Zentralkomitee der 
SED Beschliisse, welche die Leitlinien der Abgrenzungs- 
politik festlegten und die zu ihrer Durchsetzung erfor­
der lichen MaBnahmen dekretierten. Alle denkbaren Appa- 
rate des Staates und der Parteien wurden eingesetzl. ’
Among further measures described by 'Wettig which were under­
taken from 1972 was the forbidding of party and state off­
icials and others with access to classified information
32to maintain contacts with West Germans,
v. The Fasic Treaty
Article 7 of the Basic Treaty provided for a series of
subsiduary agreements including improvements in border 
33
traffic, to allow West Germans living close to the DDR 
frontier to make one day visits within the border areas 
of the DDR, up tb a-maximum of 30 one-day visits each
32. Dilemmas der SED-Abgrenzungspolitik, p. 1 and p. 6 .
33- Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 278-282.
had to he laid bare through the scientific policy of the 
SED, through the evidence of contemporary imperialism, 
and through the SED's own bitter experience of the past.
(c) Increased conflict with bourgeois ideology was tak­
ing place, under conditions peculiar to the DDR, and 
bourgeois ideology was attempting to gain influence in 
the DDR.
It had to be quite soberly seen, Lamberz argued, that the 
class enemy would use all means, including detente and 'the 
successes of the DDRrs struggle for coexistence and sec­
urity in Europe, in order to extract new and direct op­
portunities from the international recognition-of the DDR* 
He claimed that the enemy up to now had attempted to gain 
influence in the DDR by seizing on the old outlook, customs 
and behaviour patterns which still existed in DDR society, 
and attempting to reactivate them. Here the enemy used 
the West German media to try to carry bourgeois ideology 
into the DDR. Lamberz; told his audience that they would 
have to fight more decisively and with better ideas against 
the hostile mass media, and they would have to demarcate 
themselves even more energetically from its utterances 
and falsehoods.
A further manner in which the DDR might be subjected to 
negative influences was through the increased numbers of 
Western visitors. Lamberz noted that over five million
year; for this purpose four additional road frontier
crossings were to be opened. The agreement on local border
traffic came into force on the same day as-the B'asic Treaty,
32±on June 21st, 1973* Et was to contribute to the increase m  
opportunities for personal contacts between the citizens of1 
the two states; together with the Verkehrsvertrag, the 
number of West Germans visiting the DDR increased by 
between 1972 and 1973 > from 1.5^ to 2.27 millions
Of more immediate significance was the exchange of letters
on 8th November between the two goverments permitting the
36journalists of each state to work within the other; this
37agreement became effective on the same day. In connection
with the exchange of letters the DDR declared:
'Reisekorrespondenten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erhal- 
ten in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Arbeits- und 
Bewegungsmoglichkeiten wie Reisekorrespondenten anderer>4 
Staaten einschliefllich der Bin- und Ausreise mit alien ub- 
lichen Verkehrsmitteln und der unverziiglichen Dbermitteln 
von Nachrichten,. Meinungen und Kommentaren. Sie konnen 
die Mittel der Nachrichtenubertragung benutzenr welche 
normalerweise der Cffentlichkeit zur Verfugung stehen.
Sie haben weiterhin das Recht, die der Cffentlichkeit und 
den Publikationsmedien allgemein zuganglich gemachten 
amtlichen Informationen zu erlangen und Auskiinfte von den 
dazu beauftragten Personen und Organen einzuholen. Nach 
Genehmigung der zustandigen Organe zur beruf.lichen Tatig- 
keit in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik konnen sie 
die zur personlichen B'erufsausubung notwendigen Gegenstande, 
Materialien und Unterlagen mitfuhren.’ 38
3k* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol 12. p. 78Iff.
35* Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundes­
republik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik, p. 35*
36• Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 29U-297*
3 7 . Fundstellennachweis B. Volkerrechtliche Vereinbarungen 
und Vertrage mit der DDR. Bonn, 1975> P* 367.
38. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, p. 298.
This declaration was expanded by the DDR in a decree of
February 21st, 19739 which regulated the activities of
39foreign media and their correspondants in the DDR. Some 
of the difficulties experienced when these agreements were 
put into practise were subsequently described by the West 
German television reporter, Lothar Loewe.^0 Such diffi­
culties arose from the interpretation of the decree of 
February 21st, which included the following requirements, 
that the journalist should not slander the DDR, its state 
organs and leading personages, or states allied with the 
DDR, and that the reports should be truthful and correct, 
with no malicious falsification of the facts. They tended 
to support Brandt *s claim of 18th January, 1973 > that the 
long years of hostility and non-relations (Nicht-Beziehung) 
between the two German states would initially be followed 
by difficulties and friction
Both sides expressed satisfaction with the provisions of 
the Basic Treaty. In an interview with an. American jour­
nalist on November 22nd, 1972, Honecker repeated that they
could be no confederation and no ideological convergence
2x2between the two German states. Both sides claimed that 
their policies had been confirmed in the treaty. Thus
39* Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 12, pp. 192+-199.
UO. Lothar Loewe: Abends kommt der Klassenfeind,
Fr ankfurt/M, 1977*
i+l. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 12, p. 21.
k2. Ibid, Vol. 11, pp. 329-3U2.
Brandt argued that his 20 point programme presented to
Stoph at Kassel in May 1970 had been largely realised 
in the Basic Treaty.^ Again, Honecker declared at the 
8th SED plenum on December 7th, 1972, that the Basic Treaty 
had confirmed the five point peace plan put forward at the 
VTII congress. He also claimed the success of the demar­
cation policy:
fEs hat sich als richtig erwiesen, die Frage der Abgrenzung; 
zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland so entschieden aufzuwerfen. Dies 
entspricht voll und ganz den Tatsachen. Bei der DDR und der 
BRD handelt es sich urn zwei Staaten mit unterschiedlichen 
sozialen Systemen. Die Verdeutlichung dieser Tatsache, die 
Ablehnung jedennMIschmaschs zwischen den nicht zu verein- 
enden Gesellschaftsordnungen, die allseitige Starkung der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ihre weitere Profilier- 
ung als sozialistischer Staat - das war die Grundbedingung 
fur die Einleitung des Prozesses der weltweiten Annerken- 
nung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, fur ihre 
gleichberechtigte Teilnahme am internationalen Leben,1 kb
Honecker continued that the extent and intensity of the
ideological struggle was increasing, and the SED had clearly
taken up its position on this question through the Politburo
declaration on propaganda and agitation of November 7th.
vi. The end of the overt demarcation policy
As had been the case with the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, 
the Basic Treaty was opposed by the CDU/CSU opposition’, 
being rejected by the Bundesrat, and delayed by the Bavarian
1+3 • Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 320-321+
1+1+. Ibid, Vol. 11, pp. 358-372.
claim before the Federal Constitutional Court that it was 
unconstitutional. As a result of these delays the Basic
} I R
Treaty did not come into force until July 21st, 1973* 
However, after the Basic Treaty had been passed by the 
Bundestag on May 11th it was followed by the 9th SED plenum,, 
which took place on May 28th-29th, 1973. The significance 
of this plenum may be inferred from Ilse Spittmannfs com­
ment that for the first time since the VIII congress the 
Politburo report had been delivered by Honecker, and that 
he had dealt with the period from the VIII congress, instead 
of just the period from the preceding plenum, as was usual
Honecker declared that the Basic Treaty had opened a new
chapter in the relations between the two German states. He
stressed that it was a normal treaty, based on international
law, between two independent sovereign states with differing
social orders. Once again he warned that there could be no
special relationship with the Federal Republic, and that the
national question was no longer open:
fKlar und eindeutig besagen die Bestimmungen des Berliner 
Vertrages liber die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der 
DDR und der BRD: Die DDR ist kein Inland der BRD und die
BRD kein Inland der DDR. Als definitive volkerrechtliche 
Regelung der Beziehungen zwischen zwei souveranen Staaten 
ist der Berliner Vertrag kein „Modus Vivendi", und nach 
der Logik der Dinge gibt es daru'm auch keine „offene deut­
sche Frage". Wer sich standig darauf versteift, das Gegen- 
teil zu behaupten, verschwendet nur Zeit.f 1+7
i+5* These events are described in Texte zur Deutshcland- 
politik, Vol. 12.
U6 . Deutschland Archiv, 1973/6, p. 567-
k7• Erich Honecker: Ziigig voran bei der weiteren Verwirk-
lichung der Beschliisse des VIII, Parteitages der SED, 
Berlin (East), 1973, p. 13* Note that the Basic Treaty 
was described as the Berlin Treaty in DDR parlance.
It was argued that the normalisation of relations between
the two states had confirmed the principles of peaceful
coexistence, yet the Federal Republic still represented a
danger to the DDR.
'Natxirlich miissen wir beriicksichtigen, da/3 die regierenden 
Kreise in Bonn versuchen, das Vertragswerk, insbesondere 
den Vertrag uber die Grundlagen#>der Beziehungen zwischen 
der DDR und der BRD, in einer fur sie vorteilhaften Weise 
auszulegen. Die westlichen Massenmedien, vor allem der 
Rundfunk und das Fernsehen der BRD, die ja bei uns jeder 
nach Belieben ein- oder ausschalten kann, machen daraus 
gar kein Geheimnis. Zugleich wird mit okonomischen Vor- 
teilen gewinkt; obwohl^jeder wissen sollte;> da/3 jeglicher 
Versuch, die Souveranitat der DDR einzuschranken, der Aus- 
weitung -unserer wirfrschaftli-chen Beziehungen mit den kap- 
italistischen Landern nur entgegenwirkt.f i+8
Honecker’s admission for the first time that East Germans 
were not forbidden to switch on radio and television pro­
grammes from the Federal Republic was noted by U s e  Spitt- 
uq
mann. She related this statement to the demands for more 
effective political work among the DDR population, as 
demanded by the party declaration of November 7th, quoting 
from a speaker at the plenum who wished to create an open 
atmosphere of trust as the best immunisation against imp­
erialist influences. The atmosphere of trust would also 
have been facilitated by the amnesty granted to prisoners
on October 6th, which for the first time had mentioned the
50existence of political prisoners. Honecker had commented
48. Ziigug voran bei der weiteren Verwirklichung der Beschliisse 
des VIII Parteitages der SED, p. 1U*
kS • Deutschland Archiv, 1973/6, p. 570.
50. Ibid, 1972/11, p. 1125.
that the DDR leadership had been encouraged to take this
step in view of the favourable internal development of the
DDR after the VIII congress and its growing international 
51recognition.
Honecker argued that a new picture of the DDR was devel­
oping in the Federal Republic. The reality of/two German 
states with differing social orders had been confirmed by 
opinion polls in the Federal Republic. He appeared to be 
modifying the strict cultural demarcation maintained by 
Hager at the 6th plenum, by suggesting that cultural and 
linguistic differences resulted from differing social 
structures.
1•..wer die Entwicklung der DDR und ihre Perspektiven 
einigermaBen iibersieht und begreift, der wird eingestehen 
miissen, daB nicht Sprache und Kultur die Grenze zwischen 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepub- 
lik Deutschland gezogen haben, sondern die unterschiedliche, 
ja gegensatzliche soziale Struktur... Die Deutsche De- 
mokratische Republik ist sozialistisch; in ihr ist das 
Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln abgeschafft. Die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kapitalistisch; in ihr- 
dominiert das Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln und 
gibt es nach wie vor die Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den 
Menschen. In dieser Frage sind wir bekanntlich einer 
Meinung mit Herrn Brandt, der mehrfach betonte, daB es 
hinsichtlich der Gesellschaftsordnungen in den^beiden 
deutschen Staaten keinerlei Mischmasch geben konne.f 52
As Norden in July 1972, he repeated that those speaking the 
same language often belonged to different states and diff­
erent nations. It was claimed that the DDR was the state 
embodiment of the best traditions of German history.
51. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, p. 331.
52. Zugig<#voran bei der weiteren Verwirklichung der 
Beschusse des VIII Parteitages der SED, p. 19
'In der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik entwickelt sich 
die sozialistische Nation unter. Fuhrung der Arbeiterklasse. 
In der sozialistischen Nationalkultur unserer Republik 
lebt all das fort und erfahrt eine neue Blute, was in 
friiherer Zeit an kulturellen Schatzen geschaffen wurde.
Von der Geschichte, der Kultur und der Sprache werden wir 
nichts preisgeben, was es an Positivem zu erhalten und zu 
pflegen gibt, was den humanistischen und den revolutionaren 
Traditionen entspricht.' 53
Honecker continued that in the era of nuclear weapons 
relations between socialist and capitalist states could 
only be based on peaceful coexistence, which was more than 
non-war, but the way of sensible cooperation. However, 
peaceful coexistence did not abolish the social and ideo­
logical differences between socialist and capitalist states. 
He appeared to mention demarcation almost as an afterthought, 
not as a continuing process, but as something which had long 
since been completed:
''Im iibrigen wurde die klassenma&ige Abgrenzung zwischen 
der sozialistischen DDR und der kapitalistischen BRD 
bereits zu Zeiten Adenauers vollzogen. Das Rad der Ge­
schichte laBt sich nicht zuruckdrehen. Die DDR hat jetzt, 
da bereits 82 Staaten diplomatische Beziehungen zu ihr 
unterhalten, die ihren nationalen Interessen entsprechende 
Politik fortzufiihren.' 5U
I would regard this statement as a signal to end the overt 
campaign of ideological demarcation from the Federal Re­
public, which began in September 1970, reaching its high 
point at the beginning of 1971? and being used less often 
from the time of the VIII congress. Spittmann had commented
53- Ziigig voran bei der weiteren Verwirklichung . der 
Beschlussed des VIII Parteitages der SED, p. 21.
5h* Ibid, p. 23-
on the lack of references at the 9th plenum to both demar-
55cation and social democracy. ^ Wettig commented that from
1973 ’entdamonisierte sich das Image der SPD in gewissem
Umfang’, when the main agreements with the Federal Republic
had been concluded, and the DDR leadership began to see the
56advantages of the new relationship. The ratification
debate had to some extent contradicted the SEDTs claim that
the German policies of government and opposition were the
same. One reason for the end of the Abgrenzung campaign
might have been its unpopularity, even among party-members,
57suggested by Wettig. On November 1st, 1973> Honecker pre­
sented the relationship- between recognition and demarcation:
’Friedlich geregelt wurde eine der wichtigsten Fragen der 
Nachkriegsentwicklung, die volkerrechtliche Anerkennung 
des Bestehens zweier voneinander unabhangiger, souveraner 
deutscher Staaten. Volkerrechtlich istidurch die Aufnahme 
in die UNO und die Festlegung der Vertrage von Moskau, 
Warschau und Berlin iiber die Anerkennung der- Grenzen... 
der ProzeB der Abgrenzung zwischen der- DDR und der BRD 
ein fur allemal vollzogen... 58
+
Thus Abgrenzung was presented as a completed process. Although
Honecker fs claims that--class (klassenmaBig-) and diplomatic
(volkerrechtlich) demarcation had been completed between the 
. 59
two states,' there seemed no chance of achieving total 
demarcation, particularly in view of the increasing*contacts 
be-tw-een the citizens of the two states.
55* Deutschland Archiv, 1973/6, p. 569-
56. Dilemmas der 3ED-Abgrenzungspolitik, p. 3»
57. Ibid, p. 4 .
58. Neues Deutschland, 1st November, 1973* Quoted from 
Staatsburgerkunde 7» Klasse. Unterrichtshilfen, Berlin, 
1974. -
59* Honecker at the 9th plenum of May 1973 and 13th plenum 
of December 197k> respectively.
vii. The consolidation of ideological demarcation from 
the Federal Republic
The DDR constitution of 1968 was extensively revised and 
replaced by a new constitution in October 197k • 'By7 the time 
of the IX SED congress of May 1976, the new versions of the 
party .programme and rules appeared, the work of the commis­
sions appointed at the 6th plenum of July 1972. All three 
documents were characterised by the breaking of all links 
with the Federal Republic, and by aspirations of closer 
relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist commu­
nity. Dietrich Muller-Romer commented on the new consti­
tution as follows:
fMit der Streichung aller Verfassungsbestimmungen in der 
Praambel und den ersten Artikeln, die auf Deutschland als 
Ganzes und die einheitliche deutsche Nation Bezug nahmen, 
hat die SED-Fxihrung auch verfassungsrechtlich dokumentiert, 
daB sie keinerlei Beziehungen besonderer Art zwischen bei- 
den Teilen Deutschlands mehr gelten lassen will und die 
Existenz des deutschen Volkes fur die Zukunft negiert. 
Dieser starren Abgrenzung nach Westen entspricht eine ver- 
fassungsrechtliche Aufwertung der Beziehungen zur sowjeti— 
schen Hegemonialmacht. Artikel 6 spricht jetzt nicht mehr 
bloB von Zusammenarbeit und Freundschaft mit der Sowjet- 
union, sondert statuier.t daruber hinaus, daB die DDR fur 
immer und unwiderruflich mit der UdSSR verbiindet sei.’ 60
Deutschland was replaced by DDR, the description of the DDR 
as a ’sozialistischer Staat deutscher NationT, and the'as­
piration of eventual -unification, contained in Articles 1 
and 8 of the old constitution, disappeared. Article 1 of
60. Die neue Verfassung der DDR, Cologne, 197k9 P* 10.
of the 197k constitution defined the DDR as a ’sozialis-
tischer Staat’, and the adjective National1 now applied
only to the DDR# Similar changes were noted in the new
party programme and rules. Fred Oldenburg commented that
’die hervorstechendste Neuerung ist die pieinliche Loschung
aller gesamtdeutsche Beziige sowohl im Programm als auch im 
6lStatut’. At the IX congress Honecker claimed that the 
new programme and rules had increasingly stressed and more 
precisely defined the leading role of the SED. The main 
task was-said to be the more effective spreading of Marx­
ism-Leninism and the uncompromising struggle against bour-
62geoiis ideology. Karl Wilhelm Fricke noted that the new 
programme did not contain a chapter devoted to the rela­
tions between the two German states, and that references 
to the Federal Republic were ostentatiously unostentatious­
ly spread throughout the document.' He'continued: '
’Im zweiten Programm der SED nun ist von einer Annaherung 
beider deutscher Staaten nicht mehr die Rede. Der deutsch* 
deutsche Grundlagenvertrag wird nicht einmal auch nur er- 
wahnt. In ihren zweiten Programm bekraftigt die' SED an- 
ders gesagt unmiBverstandiich schroff die radikale Wendung 
in ihrer Deutschlandpolitik. Das Verhaltnis zwischen bei- 
den deutschen Staaten soil ausschlieBlich^durch Abgrenzung 
bestimmt werden - durch die bewuBte, mit auBerster Ent- 
schlossenheit betriebene Abgrenzung der DDR von der 
Bundesrepublik.’ 63
However, the section of the programme devoted to foreign 
relations did mention the Federal Republic, to stress that
61. Deutschland Archiv, 1976/2, p. 113*
62. Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den IX Parteitag der
SED, Berlin (East), 1976, p. 132.
63* Programm und Statut der SED, Cologne, 1976, pp. Ii+-l6.
relations between the two German states were to be based
on peaceful coexistence and the norms of international law,
fcj i
with no mention of Abgrenzung.^-
At the 9th plenum of May 1973 Honecker had argued that 
a class-based (klassenmaflig) demarcation had been completed 
when Adenauer was in power; at the IX congress he claimed 
that this had been complemented by a diplomatic (volker­
rechtlich) demarcation between the two states in the period 
between the VIII and the IX congresses. The German ques­
tion was closed, he declared, the socialist German nation 
was developing within the DDR, and the DDR as a socialist 
nation state belonged inseparably to the socialist com­
munity*^
In June 1973 Hermann Axen spoke on the subject of the 
socialist nation in the DDR, which was claimed to be de­
veloping under the conditions of the developing social­
ist society. It was argued that social and class factors 
determined the character of a nation. It was only possible 
to speak of a genuine unity of the nation, that was to say
the unity of the socialist nation, under conditions of
66socialist production relationships. Axen continued:
6L\.» Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutsch- 
lands, Berlin (East), 1976, p. 62.
65* Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den IX Parteitag der 
SED, p. 18.
66• Zur Entwicklung der sozialistischen Nation in der 
DDR, Berlin (East), 1973, p. 18.
’Auf dem Territorium der DDR- herrscht die sozialistische 
Produktionsweise. Dieser entscheidende Faktor bedingt 
die Abgrenzung von der Gesellschaftsordnung, vom Staat 
und vom Territorium der kapitallstischen BRD. Die so— 
zialistische Nation in der DDR unterscheidet sich grund- 
satzlich von jeder kapitalistischen Nation durch ihr 
geistiges Antlitz. In der kapitalistischen Nation herrscht 
die burgerliche Nation in den verschiedensten Formen.’ 67
Axen declared that ethnic factors, such as language, geo­
graphic milieu and customs were not characteristics which 
determined the existence of a nation. It was not a thousand 
years of German history, but the class struggle under cap­
italism which led to the development of the German nation. 
He: argued that the German national question had long been 
decided by history. For more than 25 years the DDR had 
participated in a qualitatively new historical movement, 
in common with the other socialist countries. West German 
claims to the unity of the nation were condemned.
’Die ebenso unwissenschaftliche wie scheinhellige Argu­
mentation liber eine angeblich-„nationale Gemeinsamkeit” 
zwischen BRD und DDR kann nicht den politischen Zweck, 
die Klassenziele der imperialistischen Krafte in der BRD 
verdecken..* Die Phraseologie vom angeblichen Fortbestand 
einer eihheitlichen „deutschen Nation” bezweckt nichts an- 
deres, als den Anspruch auf eine Eingliederung der DDR in 
den Machtbereich des Imperialismus aufrechtzuerhalten. ’ 68
Here the placing of ’deutsche Nation’ between commas was
significant, since in SED literature any concept placed
between commas is automatically to be rejected. The use of
the adjective ’deutsch’ was also avoided in the formula of
’die sozialistische Nation in der DDR’.
67* Zur Entwicklung der sozialistischen Nation in der DDR, 
P* 19.
68. Ibid, p. 25*
Fred Oldenburg argued that Honecker and a majority of 
Politburo members had felt that the demarcation strategy
had gone to far with the apparent rejection of fdeutschf
69 •by Axen.  ^ Oldenburg quoted a speech by Honecker de­
livered at the 13th plenum of December 197U* and noted that 
Honecker had referred to the two German states, using their 
full titles and not the abreviations, and that he had stated 
for the first time since the VIII congress that the DDR re­
presented Socialist Germany*. Honecker had declared that 
the overwhelming: majority;, of DDR citizens were of German 
nationality.
'Es gibt also keinen^Platz fur irgendwelche Unklarheiten 
beim Ausfiillen von Fragebogen, die hier und da benotigt 
werden. Die Antwort auf diesbezugliche Fragen lautet 
schlicht und klar und ohne jede Zweideutigkeiten: Staats-
burgerschaft - DDR, Nationalitat - deutsch. So liegen 
die Dinge.r 70
This question was pursued in a book by Alfred .Kosing,
which appeared In 1976 as a definitive exposition of the
71SED’s view of the national question. He addressed him­
self to distinguishing between nation and nationality.
''Die Unterscheidung von Nation und Nationalitat ist von 
groBer theoretischer^Fedeutung und hilft, einige Probleme 
der Nationsentwicklung im friiheren Deutschland und in der 
DDR und der BRD besser zu verstehen. Gerade im Hinblick
69. Deutschland Archiv, 1975/1* P* 2.
70. Ibid, pp. 93-9U
71. Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Berlin (East),
1976.
auf das Verhaltnis von Nation und Nationalitat bestehen 
viele MiBverstandnisse und erschweren die Einsicht in die 
gesetzmaBige Entwicklung der sozialistischen Nation in 
der DDR. Haufig werden Nation und Nationalitat miteinander 
identifiziert. Von diesem falschen Ausgangspunkt ist natiir 
lich nicht einzusehen, daB sich in der DDR und der BRD 
Nationen unterschiedlichen Typus entwickeln.' 72
The reference to 'former Germany', as though Germany no
longer existed, illustrated one of the difficulties faced
by the two nation theory. The replacement of 'Deutschland'
and 'deutsch* by 'DDRf has been noted above; Fred Oldenburg
had thought it likely that the SED would have dropped the
7 -z
'Deutschland from its name. However, the terms 'German* 
and 'Germany' have remained, and are shared with the Federal 
Republic. Since the DDR leadership could hardly claim that 
the citizens of the Federal Republic were not German, some 
way had to be~found of reconciling this, characteristic held 
in common by the two states with the policy of total demar­
cation. Kosing argued that nationality, which he defined 
as shared ethnic factors, could not justify the unity of, 
a socialist and a capitalist nation.
'Die sozialistische Nation in der DDR und die kapitalist- 
ische Nation in der BRD unterscheiden sich nicht ihrer 
ethnischen Charakteristik, ihrer Nationalitat nach, son- 
dern ihren sozialen Grundlagen und Inhalten nach, weil es- 
sich urn zwei qualitativ verschiedene historische Typen der 
Nation handel.t. Die Nation in der DDR ist die sozlalisti- 
sche deutsche Nation und die Nation in der BRD ist die 
kapitalistische deutsche Nation. Da sie als Resultat der 
fruheren Geschichte des deutschen Volkes und der deutschen
72. Kosing, p. 176
73* Deutschland Archiv, 1976/2, p. 11A*
C-i-lf. JU
Nation entstanden sind, besitzen sie beide die gleiche 
Nationalitat. Diese Nationalitat, das heiBt der charak- 
teristische Komplex ethnischer Eigenschaften, der seit 
rund.tausend Jahren als tfdeutsch,t bezeichnet wird, muBte 
sich notwendigerweise mit der sozialistischen Nation in 
der DDR verbinden, weil diese Nation auf einem Teil des 
deutschen Territoriums und von einem Teil des deutschen 
Volkes geschaffen wurde.1 7k
Kosing then considered the question of national feeling.
He claimed that in the capitalist nation the national feeling 
of the bourgeoise, composed of national egoism, antipathies 
and hostility was taken over by the working class and was 
used by the bourgeoisie as a means of oppressing and manip­
ulating the workers both ideologically and psychologically. 
Air-important part of the ideological educational work of 
the party in the socialist society consisted in bringing 
the national feeling of the workers in line with their 
class consciousness and with socialist internationalism, 
and in overcoming all national prejudices and other re­
maining elements of petit-bourgeois-nationalistic mentality.
A further important task was the creation of a new social­
ist national consciousness in the DDR.
'Die gesellschaftliche Grundlage des sozialistischen 
NationalbewuBtseins in der DDR ist die Formierung und 
weitere Entwicklung der sozialistischen deutschen Nation 
in der DDR, die damit verbundene Abgrenzung von der weiter- 
bestehenden kapitalistischen deutschen Nation in der BRD, 
die Existenz: und Entwicklung der DDR als sozialistischer 
Nationalstaat sowie die wachsende Zusammenarbeit und An- 
naherung der sozialistischen Nationen in der sozialistischen 
Staatengemeinschaft mit der Sowjetunion als Zentrum.' 75
7k• Kosing, p. 179- 
75• Ibid, p. 275-276.
Kosing continued that these processes would not automatically 
produce a socialist national consciousness. This required 
the ideological work of the party, state, education system 
and mass media. Socialist national consciousness was 
viewed as an important factor in the ideological"strengthening 
of the "DDR society, and in the immunisation of DDR citizens 
against ideological infiltration. Kosing quoted Western 
observers, among them Schweigler, who had concluded that 
an independent national consciousness had developed in the 
DDR -76
An Bast German'article published in'July/August 1978
quoted from a hearing of the intra-German committee of the
Bundestag, where it was claimed that more than half of
West Germans aged between 19 and 28 regarded the BSR and
the Federal Republic as two states and two nations, and,
if nothing else occurred, the German question, at least
77m  the Federal Republic, would solve itself. The 
article claimed that the slogan of the unity of the German 
nation was being used by the rulers of the Federal Republic 
to give a pseudo-scientific justification for the attempts 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the DDR. It was 
declared that two German nations existed, which were opposed 
to each other, and that any attempt to revive the national 
question to sabotage the’DDR would be doomed to failure.
76. Schweigler had claimed a TMeinungstrend in Richtung aiif
s ein eigenstaatliches KationalbewuBtsein der DDR-Bevolke-
■ rung’. Na.tionalbewuBtsein in. der BRD und in der DDR, p. 10L|..
77* Einheit, July/August 1978, pp. 818-819.
8 . The short- and longer-term effectiveness of Bast German 
ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic
After the Basic Treaty the DDR leadership was able to re­
cord two successes for the demarcation policy, which had 
strengthened its claims to legitimacy. There was firstly 
the ’volkerrechtliche Abgrenzung* claimed by Honecker at 
the IX congress* so important for the SBD with its formula 
of the dialectical unity between domestic and foreign policy. 
The DDR had become a full member of the international com­
munity, having joined the United Rations and having re­
ceived diplomatic recognition from most Western states.
This included de facto diplomatic recognition from the 
Federal Republic. Although relations between the two states 
were conducted through permanent representatives rather than 
through ambassadors, to satisfy West German reservations on 
the national question, the representatives functioned as 
ambassadors, as do the high commissioners exchanged between 
members of the Commonwealth.
Secondly, there was the evidence of a growing national 
consciousness - NationaibewuBtsein or Nationalstaatsbe- 
wuBtsein - specific to the DDR. During the Bundestag de­
bate on the Basic Treaty in May 1973, Brandt had declared:
'Nichts spricht zur Zeit dafiir, daB der zerbrochen deutsche
Nationalstaat in alter form wieder erstehen konnte1 1
1. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 12, p. 523-
This statement might be construed as an admission of 
nationalstaatliche Abgrenzung. In his speech Brandt re­
ferred to Volk and Nation in an all-German context, but it 
might be argued that the claim that they were united was 
justified by nothing more than Kosing’s definition of
p
nationality, ’die Gemeinsamkeit ethnischer Faktoren’.
•Z
Further, from the data quoted by Schweigler , and the. July/ 
August 1978- edition of Einheit, there were signs that West 
Germans were beginning to conceive of a separate Federal 
German nation and state. By doing so, they would demarcate 
these concepts from the nation and state of the DDR.
However, it:■ rematned-7_to.be-seen what effect upon*these 
changes might be produced by the provisions of the Basic 
Treaty, which offered greater opportunities for personal 
contacts between the citizens of the tv/o states* It was 
possible that increased contacts might check or reverse the 
growing-apart of the two states. On the other hand, the 
opposite result might be achieved; East and West Germans 
meeting after long separation might be alienated by the • 
differing social conditions of the tv/o states. Schweigler 
argued that support by DDR citizens for their nation state 
might be increased by contacts which demonstrated that they 
were different from the West Germans.
2. Kosing, p. 179-
3- NationaibewuBtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p< 106ff. 
i+. Ibid, p. 10Z+.
i. Increased contacts between the citizens of the two 
states
The annual number of West Germans visiting the DDR rose 
from 1.25 million in 1970 to 3*12 million in 1975, 3*12 
million in 1976, and 2.9 million in 1977-^ Annual totals 
for West Berliners visiting East Berlin and the DDR were 
3.2 million in 1975 and 3*4 million in 1977* For one day 
visits by West Germans in the border areas of the DDR, the 
estimated totals were 463,190 in 1975 and 443,000 in 1977* 
In the reverse direction, the annual figures in millions 
for DDR pensioners visiting the Federal Republic and West 
Berlin were 1.04 (1971), 1.25 (1973), 1.33 (1975) and 1.3 
(1977)* Other than pensioners, the total number of DDR 
citizens visiting the Federal Republic and West Berlin, 
chiefly for pressing family reasons, had reached 131,600 
by the end of 1975 and 215,000 by the end of 1977*
The annual totals in millions of West Germans and West 
Berliners who were in transit through the DDR were 7*25 
(1969), 7-63 (1971), 10.48 (1972), 13.67 (1973), 14*79 
(1975) and 18.0 (1977). Further, the number of East - 
West telephone calls had reached 12 million annually by 
1977, and the number of areas within the DDR which could
5. The data on personal travel and telephone calls between 
the Federal Republic, West Berlin and the DDR is taken 
from various editions of the Jahresbericht der Bundes- 
regierung, Bonn. 1977 figures are provisional.
be reached by direct dialling increased steadily. In this
respect the official West German view that the telephone
and postal traffic played an important role in maintaining
and developing the contacts between the populations of the
6two German states might be noted.
The DDR appears to have coped fairly efficiently with the 
large increase in the number of West Germans and West Ber­
liners visiting and passing through East German territory. 
The effect of this traffic was examined by Honecker at the 
13th plenum of December 1974^  -Hie--argued,that the socialist 
consciousness of DDR citizens had been strengthened under 
conditions peculiar to the DDR. Every day, every hour 
bourgeois ideology entered the DDR from West Germany and 
West Berlin. In connection with the world-wide recognition 
of the DDR in international law* its frontiers had been 
opened wide to Western visitors. . Honecker did: not:.try to 
play down the size of the numbers; he appeared to magnify 
their significance by quoting the total number of visitors 
since the treaties came into force. He also quoted aggre­
gate totals for DDR visitors to the West, without mention­
ing that most of them were pensioners.
Honecker continued that these facts had made and would 
continue to make heavy demands on the political-ideological
6. Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung, 1975, PP« 451-452.
7. Neues Deutschland, 13th December, 1974*
work of the party and of the mass organisations. The mass 
media had an important role to play in stressing the ideas 
and achievements of the DDR and in fighting bourgeois ideol­
ogy, By raising the quality of their broadcasts to a high 
level, in order to strengthen the bonds between the cit­
izens and their socialist state.
The increased numbers of Western visitors to the DDR were 
accompanied by a rise in the number of East Germans travelr 
ling abroad, and by an increase in visitors to the -DDR from
o
Eastern Europe, principally as a result of the introduction 
of visa-free traffic between the DDR, Poland and Czecho­
slovakia. Honecker had approved of the growth of tourist 
traffic as a benefit from the success of peaceful coexist­
ence, and had claimed that the DDR was the country with the
Q t
greatest traffic in the centre of Europe. Honecker. s 
claim appeared to be justified: , The number of visitors to 
the DDR had reached 16.1 million in 1975, and this did not 
include the total transit traffic of 14*7 millions for that 
year. East Germans had been given greater opportunities 
to travel abroad as part of this traffic growth; the av­
erage annual number of visits abroad for the years 1973- 
1975 was nearly 13 million, with slightly more than five 
million East Germans visiting Poland annually, with an equ­
ivalent figure of about four million visits to Czechoslovakia.
8*. This information is quoted from the relevant editions of 
the Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR, Berlin (East).
9- Neues Deutschland, 7th June, 1972.
10. For traffic data see also Handbuch DDR-Wirtschaft, 1977.
East Germans had been given greater freedom to travel
abroad - but mainly to the other socialist countries. From
the DDR leadership’s viewpoint, this served to further the
integration of the DDR into the Eastern bloc. Honecker
had declared at the 13th plenum:
fDas hat dazu beigetragen, ein neues, tief. im Volk der 
DDR verwurzeltes Verhaltnis der freundschaftlichen Ver- 
bundenheit zwischen unseren Volkern zu schaffen. Diese 
Begegnungen haben fur>#alle Beteiligten groBe Raume er- 
schlossen undt<die Annaherung der Volker und ihrer Kulturen 
gefordert. Fur die weitere Entwicklung unserer sozialis­
tischen Gemeinschaft ist dieser ProzeB heute und noch mehr 
in der Zukunft von wirklich historischer B'edeutung.’ 11
In 1975, out of 16.1 million journeys abroad by East Germans,
10.7 million were to the socialist countries. This left
approximately 2.7 million visits to the res;t of the world,
of which about half were to the Federal Republic or to
West Berlin. 'When it is considered that all but a small
percentage of these visits were made by pensioners or those
travelling for special family reasons - and the latter
group was small enough - the extent to which travel to
these destinations was restricted may be understood.
With respect to the first two above-mentioned groups, 
it might be argued that time was working for the DDR 
leadership. It was possible that cross-frontier family 
links might be progressively weakened by separation.
Moreover, the percentage of the population born in the 
DDR with no personal experience of Western Germany was
11. Neues Deutschland, 13 December, 1974*
increasing. However, the strength of family links was 
shown by the fact that both Ulbricht and Honecker had 
kept in touch with relatives in the Federal Republic.
The policy of restricting the numbers of East Germans
travelling to the Federal Republic and West Berlin was .
illustrated by Lindemann and Muller in their history of
12the cultural exchanges between the two German states.
The example was given for 1970 of 3,300 concerts performed 
abroad by DDR artists in non-socialist countries, but not 
a. single one in the Federal Republic. Since the Basic 
Treaty a cautious increase in mutual visits has been 
noted. These were not regulated by treaty, since agree­
ment in the field of culture, provided for in the Basic
13Treaty, had still not been achieved by the end of 1977- 
Lindemann and Muller concluded from their examination of 
cultural exchanges between the DDR and non-socialist 
states, other than the Federal Republic, that the DDR 
was pursuing a.policy of international cultural demar­
cation, with the aim of presenting a specific East German 
national culture which differed from that of the Federal 
Republic.^
12. Auswartige Kulturpolitik der DDR, pp. '2:6-29• *
13* An annual review of'the cultural exchanges between
the two German states is given in each edition of the 
Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung.
1 i+. Auswartige Kulturpolitik der DDR, p. 115-
It is difficult to estimate the effects of increased
contacts between the citizens of the two states on the
opinions of East Germans, since the results of official
surveys conducted within the DDR are not published. Some
15information was however collected by Gerhard Wettig. He 
quoted an official survey of spring 197U* which found that 
most young people in the DDR would emigrate to the Federal 
Republic given the opportunity. He. found dissatisfaction 
with the regime among younger rather than older citizens, 
among workers and those close to the SED rather than among 
members of the former bourgeoisie. These claims would seem 
to contradict the view that the DDR youth would be less 
oriented towards the Federal Republic.
Dissatisfaction among party supporters was explained by 
the prohibition of contacts between DDR officials and West 
Germans, which was strictly enforced. The prohibition 
applied to those undergoing or' having recently'completed 
military service, and to the personnel of large enter­
prises. Wettig claimed that these measures produced bitter 
resentment among those affected. His remarks shed doubt on 
Honecker!s optimistic evaluation at the 13th plenum of the 
effects on DDR citizens of increased contacts with West 
Germans and West Berliners •
15* Dilemmas der SED-Abgrenzungspolitik, p. 6.
Wettig could not reveal the sources of his information, 
since such a move would put his informants at risk. His 
claims appeared to contradict the data presented hy: Schweig­
ler and other West German researchers of increasing identi­
fication of East Germans with their own state. Wettig had 
further quoted an official survey of spring 1972 which
concluded that four fifths of the DDR population were
l6opposed to the demarcation campaign. It is argued that 
both sets of conclusions were accurate, that growing nat­
ional consciousness - NationalstaatsbewuBtsein rather than 
Nationalbewufitsein, to use Schweigler’s words - was accom­
panied by demands, for\closer"links with the.Federal. Re­
public. This would tend to support the conclusions dravm 
from SchweiglerTs data collected at the time of the Erfurt 
and Kassel meetings, that half the population of the DDR 
agreed with'the proposition that the Federal' Republic .should
recognise the DDR, but only on condition that recognition 
*
was accompanied by improvements for the citizens of the two 
states.1"^ The reluctance of Ulbricht to use the word demar­
cation, and then only a qualified ’staatliche Abgrenzung’ 
rather than Axen’s ’Abgrenzung auf alien Gebieten’, and 
Honecker’s retreat from his goal of ’vollstandige Abgren­
zung’, his disavowal of the uncompromising positions of Axen 
and Norden with his acceptance of a common German nationality
16. Dilemmas der SED-Abgrenzungspolitik, p. 1|. Hermann 
Weber claimed difficulties for the DDR leadership in 
attempting to gain support both for demarcation, and 
its complement, integration into the socialist camp.
Die SED. nach Ulbricht, Hannover, 131k., PP« 23-2^
17. Nationalbewui3tsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 99*
and of ethnic similarities between East and West Germans, 
may possibly be considered as realistic reactions to the 
finding of these surveys. The suggestion of dissent among 
young people and party supporters must have been particularly 
worrying for the DDR leadership, and was to pose a problem 
for the future.
nevertheless, the immediate problem of increased contacts 
with West Germans did no appear to have affected the phy­
sical security of the state. Perhaps more significant today 
is that, after the initial increase, the traffic appears to 
have stabilised, with the exception of transit traffic.
This meant that the ideological problems caused by the ex­
posure of East Germans to Western visitors, which Lamberz 
had raised at the SED conference on agitation of November 
1972, had become more manageable; a once and for all ef­
fort was required to achieve ideological stabilisation, 
to accept the higher level of contacts as normal, which 
was at least an easier task than having to deal with con­
tinuously rising numbers. Again, during the period of 
rapid growth, the DDR leadership had been able to influence 
the rate of increase by raising or lov/ering the amount of 
West German currency which had to be exchanged daily (Min-
-1 o
destumtausch) by the Western visitors.
18. Official ’West German sources have claimed that the
lowering of the Mindestumtausch in November 1974 had 
contributed to a rise in the number of West German 
citizens visiting the DDR. Jahresbericht der Bundes— 
regierung, 1975> P* 447-
ii. Economic pressures on the stability of the DDR
Economic factors played an important role in the ideolog­
ical demarcation of the DDR from the Federal Republic, 
since East Germans tended to compare their standard of 
living unfavourably with that of the Federal Republic.
There then existed the danger'that they-might translate 
economic dissatisfaction into a questioning of the DDR 
leadership and its legitimising ideology. Under Honecker- 
political propaganda in the field of economics had been 
closely associated with demarcation.' Two main themes had 
been followed, the condemnation of socio-economic develop­
ments in the Federal Republic*, and the promise of improved 
living standards. Anvexamination of Neues Deutschland in 
1971 shows that before Hfonecker assumed the leadership of 
the SED the Federal Republic was condemned for its militar­
ism and revenge-seeking, but after this time the criticisms
changed notably to describe the Federal Republic as a soc-
19iety with no future. Ulbricht had stressed the importance 
of economic rewards - to further remunerative power as a 
support for legitimation - with his ’Prinzip der materiellen 
Interessiertheit’. Honecker had used the slogan ’alles zum 
Wohle des Menschen1. The phrase ’leistunsorientierte Lohn- 
politik was used at the IX congress, and, as though
19* This was the title of a book published in 1972.
Gesellschaft ohne Zukunft. 33 Fragen und Antworten
zum Imperialismus der BRD, Berlin (East), 1972*
placing economic efficiency before ideology, the contri­
bution of private tradesmen in the provision of services was
20spoken of with approval. Joachim Navrocki quoted from a
Heues Deutschland article of June 1971 which appeared to
confirm this tendency:
’Die Bedurfnisse des Menschen, das sind erstens mate- 
rielle Bedurfnisse; ...es sind zweitens geistig-kulturelle 
Bedurfnis s e.’ 21
The DDR leadership was successful in maintaining relative 
economic stability through the changes of 1970-1973; d e s ­
pite difficulties through increased prices for raw materials 
and an uncertain long-term economic future, the increase, in
gross national product over the years 1963-197^ remained
22steady within the L$-6% band. The improvements in living 
standards promised at the VIII congress led t.o a consider­
able rise in purchasing power, especially in the years 
197U and 1975• However, between 1967 and 197U the DDR did 
not succeed in noticeably closing the gap between its own 
per capita gross national product and that of the Federal 
Republic, although a more favourable result was obtained in 
1975 due to a temporary slump in the Federal Republic.2-^
20. Direktive des IX Parteitages der SED zum Funfjahrplan 
fur die Entwicklung der Volkswir.tschaft der DDR" in den 
Jahren 1976-1980, Berlin (East), 1976, p. 9 and p. 21.
21. Deutschland Archiv, 1972/5, p. i+98.
22. Rudiger Thomas: Modell DDR, 1978, pp. 60-63, pp.
83-88 and p. 31U*
23* Herbert Wilkens: Das Sozialprodukt der DDR - ein Ost- 
VVest V'ergleich. Deutschland Archiv, 1976/5, p. 532.
Karl Thalheim argued that the gap in incomes between 
East and West Germans was widening. Die wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung der beiden Staaten in Deutschland, Berlin 
(West), 1978, pp. 111-112.
Furthermore, it remained to he seen whether the rising 
living standards of East German citizens could be main­
tained, in view of external factors. In the 1970s the 
international terms of trade worsened for the DDR. It has 
veen estimated that by 1976 the DDR had an unfavourable 
balance of trade with the Federal Republic of DM2.6 billions. 
For mid-1976, the total foreign currency debt, including 
the debt with the Federal Republic was estimated to be TJS$ 
3*5 billions. It is not possible to give accurate figures, 
since the DDR does not publish data on its foreign 'currency 
balance. Complications have arisen because de facto the 
DDR uses three currencies. The Mark der DDR circulates 
only within the country: At the tourist rate of exchange it
it has the same value as the West German Mark, but unoffic­
ially (and as quoted in West German banks) its rate fluc­
tuated at about 3-b East German Marks for- 1 West German 
Mark. Although the exchange rate was not necessarily an 
accurate reflection of the respective purchasing power of 
the two currencies, being based on supply and demand in the 
free market, it had the propaganda value of suggesting that 
the one Mark was ’good* and the other ’bad1. Trade with the 
Federal Republic was conducted in units of account (Verrech- 
nungseinheiten), and the unit of account v/as for all prac­
tical purposes the same as the West German Mark. For other 
international trade the Valuta-Mark was employed, which in 1 
1976 equalled DM0.72.’2i+
2i+. The information on the three currencies is taken from 
Handbuch DDR-Wirtschaft, 1977 edition.
The DDR leadership appeared to have sacrificed ideological
ft
for economic considerations in the area of trade between 
the two German states. This has expanded, whereas one 
possible interpretation of total demarcation would have 
suggested that it should be minimised. However, the econom­
ic advantages it brought to the.DDR were.considerable. The 
tarif benefits gained by de facto membership of the Euro­
pean Economic Community have been mentioned above. In 
addition, trade with the Federal Republic permitted the DDR 
to take advantage of advanced Western technology. Again, 
the DDR, which was short of foreign currency, enjoyed inter­
est-free credit from the Federal government to cover its
25deficit in intra-German trade. ^ It was notable that the
DDR leadership had always appeared to keep trade between the
two German states out of the area of political controversy.
in 1970 at the 13th plenum Stoph had condemned the Federal
Republic for allegedly following policies which had damaged
the DDR economically, but he continued:
fWenn nun mitunter durch gezielte Teroffentlichungen 
und luBerungen der Eindruck erweckt werden soil, die DDR 
ziehe aus der- Lage im AuBenhandel mit der BRD irgendwelche 
besonderen Vorteile, so hat das mit den Tatsachen nichts 
zu tun. 26
However, Ludz-claimed that the special nature of intra- 
German trade had been recognised in the Basic Treaty - 
where article 10 had declared that existing treaties and
25* Peter Christian Ludz considered the advantages and . 
disadvantages of intra-German trade for the DDR.
Die DDR zwischen Ost und West, Munich, 1977 > P"P« 31k- 
31ZJ.-316.
26. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol, 5> p. 308.
agreements were not affected by the Basic Treaty - and
that Honecker had openly admitted the special status of
27the trade in an interview of November 22nd, 1972. On 
that occasion Honecker had said that trade would continue 
as before, but that this was at the wish of the Federal
oQ
Republic.
Certain difficulties were caused by the relationship be- '
the West German Mark and the Mark der DDR. On the one hand
the DDR claimed that the two currencies were equal in value,
but on the other hand the free market rate" mentioned above-:
• *
and the black market rate within the DDR suggested that 
this was not so. The DDR could not ban the use of West 
German marks within its territory. It demanded payment for 
certain services in West German currency, which was a useful 
source of much-needed foreign exchange. Der Spiegel esti­
mated that the DDR made an annual gain of DM1.5 billion in 
such areas as the sale of visas and road usage fees.^ The 
situation under which certain services within the DDR could 
only be paid for in West German Marks was a limitation of 
the purchasing power of the Mark der DDR, and led to what 
Hartmut Zimmermann called 1 serious socio-Psychological 
consequences’. ^  Because of its need for freely-convertable
27* Die DDR zwischen Ost und West, p. 313•
28. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, p. 339 •
29- Der Spiegel, 1978/11, p. 38.
30. The GDR in the 1970s. Problems of Communism, March-
April 1978, pp. 38-39.
currency, Intershops were introduced in the DDR, selling 
high-quality goods only in exchange for hard currency. In 
1973 the East German government passed a law permitting DDR 
citizens to accept gifts of up to DM500, which could he 
spent in the Intershops. In the following year a further 
law was passed in an attempt to protect the Mark der DDR 
by stopping the illegal movement of foreign currency into 
the DDR.31
Two particular problems arose: Zimmermann claimed the
growth of friction between those DDR citizens with access 
to West German currency and those without, especially 
party and state functionaries for whom contact with West 
Germans was forbidden. The second problem was potentially 
more serious: The West German Mark has begun to circulate
generally as a second currency, as a means of obtaining 
services and goods in short supply in the DDR.
Some echoes of this problem appeared in a Neues Deutsch- 
land article of August 1978. The article quoted Bild- 
Zeitung, which had claimed that West Berliners crossing 
over to East Berlin for the day found large numbers of East 
Berlin women who were prepared to engage in prostitution 
for West German currency, which they could then spend in the
31. Eannsgorg Buck: Neues Devisenbewirtschaftsgesetz.
7/irtschaftlich kluge Einfalle, noch perfektere Kon- 
trollen. Deutschland Archiv, 197k/k$ PP* 388-39k •
32. Springer geht auf den Strich. Neues Deutschland,
8th August, 1978.
Intershops. It was further claimed in Bild-Z'eitung that West 
Berliners recrossing the border after the permitted time 
could escape with a fine, which naturally had to be paid 
In West German marks. Neues Deutschland did not attempt to 
refute these claims, but declared that they were an insult 
to the women of East Berlin, and continued that it ought to 
be considered whether stricter control over freely-convert- 
able currency should not be introduced, and whether only 
foreigners should be allowed to use the Intershops. It 
was true that Western goods could also be bought in East 
German currency. In 1975 I saw scotch whisky on sale in 
an ordinary East German supermarket - at 80 East German 
marks a bottle. The difference between Intershop and 
ordinary prices for the same article underlined the differ­
ence which the government itself saw in the real value of 
the two currencies. Der' Spiegel claimed that the rumours 
that East German citizens would no longer be permitted to 
hold Western currency and to use the Intershops had led to 
a 20% increase in turnover in the I n t e r s h o p s H o w e v e r ,  
as with the case,of personal contacts with West Germans, it 
appeared that the DDR would be powerless to stop the circ­
ulation of West German marks within the DDR - the best it 
could do was to introduce strict controls and to attempt 
to divert as much of this money as possible into the state 
treasury.
33* Hamsterkaufe mit Westmark. Der Spiegel, 1978/35,
p . 18.
iii. The growth of internal opposition to the DDR leadership
An examination of the view of perhaps the three most 
well-known recent critics of the regime, Havemann, Bier- 
mann and Bahro, would suggest at least the partial success 
of offically-promoted ideological socialistation, since 
all three claim to be communists, and to criticise the 
leadership's policies from a Marxist viewpoint. Their 
opinions might also be taken as evidence of the success 
of ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic, since 
none of them has suggested an alternative social democratic 
of capitalist model; they do not recommend that West 
German experience should be followed.
All three wished for greater personal freedom within a 
socialist society, and they had supported the DubSek ex­
periment of 1968. However, since these demands could only 
be satisfied by dismantling the centralised party control, 
they represented a direct threat to the SED apparatus and 
leadership. They remained uncompromising, and refused to 
accept the role of institutionalised revisionists. Having 
repalced Stalinist terror by socialist legality, the DDR 
leadership found it impossible to contain the critis, and 
responded by depriving Havemann of party membership and 
employment, and subjecting him to close surveillance, by 
expelling Biermann from the DDR and depriving him of DDR 
citizenship, and by arresting Bahro on the charge of 
espionage.
In his autobiography Havemann attacked what he called
the modern Stalinism of DDR society, with its centralised .
32istructure through which everything was decreed from above. ^
To replace this system, he demanded four freedoms, (l)
freedom of speech, to include freedom of access to the
media, (2 ) freedom of information, (3 ) freedom to decide
where to live, the right to decide whether to w.ork and
what work to do, and (I4.) freedom to form organisations and 
35parties. He also condemned what he viewed as the empty 
consumerism of fstalinistischer Gulaschkommuni smust and 
thereby attacked the policies of both Ulbricht and espec^ 
ially Honecker, which aimed to gain support through the 
achievement of rising standards of living for DDR citizens.-
Prom this it is argued that Havemann was advocating the 
abandonment of the leading role of the party. It was per­
haps significant that he described himself as a German 
Marxist, rather than Marxist-Leninist, in the secondary 
title, of his autobiography. In declaring that the DDR 
after the XX congress of the CPSIT was a neo-Stalinist party, 
he was in fact attacking Leninism, since the model of the 
centrally organised, strictly disciplined elite party had 
been developed by Lenin under the peculiar conditions of 
the final decades of Tsarist Russia. Given the insecurity
3k • Pragen Antworten Pragen, Munich, 1970, pp. 54-57•
35* Ibid, pp. 253-254.
36. Ibid, p. 155*
of the DDR leadership, and its memories of what happened in 
in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the sanctions taken against 
Havemann would seem relatively mild under East German con­
ditions, since he still finds it possible to give interviews 
to Western {journalists. He may have been spared imprison­
ment as a life-long communist with an unquestionable anti- 
Nazi record - he was held in the same.prison.of Brandenburg- 
Gorden as Honecker - and because of his close acquaintance 
with some of the present Politburo members.
In this respect Ludz had noted the importance of Have­
mann in the KPD and subsequent SED, and compared his fate
with that of another critic of official ideology, Rudolf
37Harich, who was imprisoned by Ulbricht. Lut'z declared 
that the difference between Harich and Havemann was that 
the former had tried to influence the party line with': the 
help of forces standing outside the party, such as the- 
SPD, whereas Havemann sought to revitalise the party, 
dialectical materialism and the policies of the SED from 
the inside
Radical changes were also advocated by Rudof Bahro - but 
in a much sharper and more precise form. Whereas Havemann 
had attacked the generalised target of Stalinism, which had 
already been partly discredited at the XX congress of the
37« Ernst Richert: Die DDR-Elite oder Unsere..'Partner von
morgen? Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1969, p. 105.
38. Ideologiebegriff und marxistische Theorie, Opladen, 
1976, p. 269.
CPSU, Bahro’s critique was aimed at ’real existierender
Sozialismus’, which was the secondary title of his book.
It was also the key term used by Honecker to describe the
contemporary society of the DDR. Bahro described the SED
leadership as a ’politburokratische Diktatur’. Echoing
Kautsky, he declared:
’..•sofern Kommunisten in dieser Gesellschaft macht- 
konformen EinfluB ausiiben und nicht^fur die ttberwindung 
des bestehenden Zustands kampfen, miissen sie wissen, 
daB sie an einer anderen Herrschaft des Menschen uber 
den Menschen beteiligt sind, an einem anderen System 
der Unterdriickung und der Ausbeutung, jawohl*. auch der 
Ausbeutung. Der ’realsozialistischer’ Funktionar, der 
Torgesetzte, der ’Natschalnik’, und zwar nichtt>nur in 
Gestalt des hohen politburokratischen Wiirdentragers, 
sondern bereits^des normalen Partei-, Staats- und Wirt- 
schaftsfunktionars, reprasentiert - oft gegen seinen 
Willen - den jiingsten Typ des. Herrn. Ich habe diese 
Rolle lange genug selbst mit gespielt und erfahren.’ 39
Bahro saw a rapid decay in the significance of ideology,
’seit der militarischen Polizeiaktion vom August 1968’.
He argued that the party apparatus, as the nucleus of state
power, was a ’sakularisierter Gottesstaat’. The party had
to regain ideological hegemony, to replace the ’Uberstaats-
apparat’ by a ’kollektiver Intellektueller
Like Havemann, he condemned consumerist communism, but 
he went further. The growth-oriented economy of the DDR was 
was declared to possess a ’kapitalismustypische Dynamik1, 
which in a historically short period would become econom-
39* Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus. Sechs
Vortrage uber das Buch ’Die Alternative’. Rudolf Bahro 
Eine Dokumentation, Cologne-Frankfurt, 1977> P- 13*
40. Ibid, pp. 33-37
ically, politically and psychologically untenable.^1 Bahro 
condemned consumerism, not only for its ideological emp­
tiness, but also for ecological reasons - he was against 
the principle of growth.
Bahro defined his alternative as ’allgemeine Emanzipation*:
*Die allgemeine Emazipation ist ... die Befreiung der In- 
dividuen yon alien sozial bedingten Entwicklungsschranken, 
die ihren AusschluB von der Mitbestimmung' uber- die allge- 
meinen Angelegenheiten, von der bewuBten Verursachung ge- 
sellschaftlicher Veranderungen zu Folge haben muBten.f 42
Here it was clear that the conditions of general emancipation 
went far beyond the provision of material means in the nar­
rower sense. The whole system of rapid growth (erweiterte 
Reproduktion) would become untenable. Resources were being 
consumed, Bahro claimed, which other peoples and future 
generaltions would need to maintain life. He called for a 
new cultural revolution:
'Die sogenanntej/ylssenschaftlich-technische Revolution, 
die jetzt noch uberwiegend in dieser gefahrlichen Per- 
spektive vorantreibt, muB von einer neuen gesellschaft- 
lichen Umwalzung her umprogrammiert werden. T)ie Idee 
des Portschritts iiberhaupt muB radikal anders inter- 
pretiert werden, als wir es gewohnt sind.f 43
Bahro continued that the overcoming of subjection (Subal- 
ternitat) was the only alternative to the unbounded ex­
pansion of material needs. This required a redistribution 
of work, the end of piece work, the education of everyone to
41* Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus. Rudolf 
Bahro: Eine Dokumentation, p. 14*
42. Die Alternative. Zur Kritik des real existierenden 
Sozialismus, Cologne-Prankfurt 1977> P« 301.
43. Ibid, p. 311
the same level, and personal communication within small 
groups.
Bahro went even further by directly condemning the USSR:
fMein Buch ist eine Kritik des real existierenden Sozia- 
lismus. Und dessen Wurzeln, dessen Geschichte, dessen 
Struktur kann man nur begreifen, wenn man liber die Sow- 
jetunion geht, wenn man den Weg RuBlands - ich nenne das 
von der agrarischen zur industriellen Despotie - versteht, 
'das heiBt also: nicht einfach denunziert, sondern in
seinem Wesen, in seiner Notwendigkeit auch begreift und 
von dort dann neue Perspektiven aufzeichnet.1 .1+1+
This heresy was delivered on West German television for
most of the citizens of the DDR to see and hear. The
interviewer had suggested to Bahro that he was a heretic.
Bahro replied:
TKetzer - wir konnen ja diesen Begriff ruhig einmal beim 
Wort nehmen. Die Reformation, wenn man so will, also im 
ausgehenden Mittelalter, hat ja ihre Adressaten langst, 
bevor sie dann mit Luther endgiiltig zum Durchbruch kam, 
schon in den Kreisen gerade, die der Kirche durchaus 
nahe standen, in Theologiekreisen, in Monchskreisen, in 
Kreisen engagierter christlicher Laien, gehabt. Und wenn 
ich an unsere Verhaltnisse hier denke: Wir haben in der
Tschechoslowakei doch 1968 gesehen, wie viele Kommunisten, 
die in der KPC organisiert waren, in Wirklichkeit auf ganz 
anderen Positionen standen, als^sie partei-offiziell zum 
Ausdruck bringen muBten. Ich wiirde ganz entschieden sagen 
es denkt in der DDR. Hier sind zahllose Leute, die mit 
dem Marxismus einigermaBen vertraut sind, naturlich langst 
auf ahnliche Gedanken gekommen wie ich. ...die Problem- 
stellungen, die ich aufwerfe, die stehen in zahllosen 
Kopfen in der DDR auf der Tagesordnung. ’ 1+5
!+!+• Lutz Lehmann. Interviewsendung der ARD am 23- August 
1977* Zur Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus. 
Rudolf Bahro: Eine Dokumentation, nologne-Frankfurt,
1977, p. 100.
1+5 • Ibid, p. 98*
iv. The emergence of mass dissent in the DDR
When dealing with critics of the regime the DDR leadership 
could use sanctions against individuals, as long as such 
activity v/as confined to a small minority of intellectuals. 
This would however no longer be possible if such ideas were 
to gain mass support, and Bahrofs phrase .’es denkt in der 
DDR* had raised such a possibility.
A foretaste of such problems for the leadership was
shown by the widespread objection in the DDR and elsewhere
Ll Gto the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. Further 
difficulties appeared likely with the section dealing with 
human rights contained in Basket III of the Helsinki Agree­
ment of 1975> which had been fully supported by the DDR as 
part of its campaign for international recognition.^ The 
official East German interpretation of human rights was 
subsequently developed:
’Menschenrechte v/erden erst dort zur vollen Wirklichkeit, 
wo die werktatigen Menschen in der Tat die Macht haben, 
ihr Recht selbst zu bestimmen und wahr zu nehmen. Es 
gibt kein anderes Beispiel dafiir, daB all diese Voraus- 
setzungen von der Theorie zur Praxis wurden, als den
1+6 • Havemann claimed T leidenschaf tliche Emporung’ in the 
socialist countries after the intervention. Fragen 
Antworten Fragen, pp. 256-271. Havemann’s son was 
imprisoned for 18 months for painting pro-Dubdek 
- slogans in East Berlin*
1+7• The text was printed in full in Neues Deutschland,
2/3 August, 1975- See particularly pp. 8-10, headed 
’ Zusammenarbeit in humanitaren und anderen B-ereichen.’
realen Sozialismus. Und es ist unumstoBIich historische 
Wahrheit, daB die Geburtsstunde dieses realen Sozialismus 
im Oktober 1917 in RuBland geschlagen bat.’ 48
Just as classic socialist theoreticians, from Babeuf, Marx,
Lenin onwards had argued that true democracy depended on
economic equality, so it was claimed that true human rights
could only exist under socialism.
East German sensitivity on the human rights issue could
be seen from a statement made by Honecker:
’Verleumdung unserer Burger und ihrer Regierung, Sin- 
mischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der DDR, deren 
sich bestimmte. Korrespondenten schuldig gemacht haben, 
werden wir auch kiinftig nicht hinnehmen. Wir sind fur 
eine normals, objektive und sachliche E'er icht erst at tung 
und lehnen selbstverstandlich Kritik nicht ab. Wir er- 
warten von journalistischen Tertretern des- Kapitalismus 
gewiB nicht, daB sie sich auf den sozialistischen Stand- 
punkt stellen. Unterschiedliche Auffassungen sind also 
vorausgesetzt. Aber die BchluBakte von Helsinki, die 
den Interessen des Friedens Ausdruck gibt, muB geachtet 
werden. Dort heiBt es, daB die Zusammenarbeit unter 
voller Achtung der die Feziehungen zwischen^den Teil- 
nehmerstaaten. leitenden Prinzipien durchgefiihrt werden 
sollte. Eines dieser Prinzipien ist unabdingbar die 
Hichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines 
anderen Staates.t= 49
Here Honecker had raised the question of West German 
journalists in the DDR. They represented a danger to the 
official ideology not only for what they reported, but 
also because their reports - such as the ARD interview with 
Bahro - could be received by East Germans. In connection
48. Ueue Zeit,^17th February, 1977* Quoted from Dettmar 
Cramer: Biirgerrechte ’77, Cologne, 1977> P* 50
49* Honecker in interview with Saarbriicker Zeitung on 19/20 
February, 1977* Quoted from Biirgerrechte f77> PP« 53-54*
with the Basic Treaty, the two German states had agreed to
exchange correspondants, and West German reporters were
50granted wide facilities to work in the DDR. . Lothar Loewe,
in a somewhat over-dramatised account of his experiences
as the first reporter for the West German television service
ARB, declared that the agreement sounded like a Magna Gharta
51for journalistic activity in the DDR. Given the excessive 
preoccupation with internal security characteristic of all 
Marxist-Leninist states, it was perhaps inevitable that 
difficulties arose in the interpretation of these rights.
Loewe described these as the tight supervision of his act­
ivities by the DDR foreign ministry, and the DDR Journal­
ist enver or dnung of February 1973* particularly paragraph 
5, which required the correspondants 'wahrheitsgetreu, sach-
bezogen und korrekt zu berichten sowie keine boswillige
** 52Verfalschung von Tatschen zuzulassen. . . Loewe-was expel­
led from the DDR on December 22nd, 1976:
1...wegen grobster Diffamierung des Volkes und der Regierung 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, wegen schv/eren Ver- 
stofies gegen die Rechtsordnung der DDR, gegen die »Verord- 
nung uber die Tatigkeit von Publikationsorganen anderer 
Staaten und deren Korrespondenten in der DDR« vom 21.2.1973 
und wegen grober Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten 
der DDR...’ 53
This was to be the first -of several expulsions of West German 
journalists from the DDR.
50. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol.11, pp. 29^-300.
51• Abends kommt der Klassenfeind, p. 22
52. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 12, p. 195-
53* Loewe-reproduced the text of his expulsion order on 
page 137 of his book.
It might be argued that Loewe should have proceeded more 
cautiously, that he should have been more aware of the fact 
that he would have been carefully observed as the first ac- 
creditied West German television reporter in the DDR. But, 
as Loewe himself wrote, he was not a diplomat, it was his 
duty to ask questions. His activities fulfilled the useful 
function of testing the system to its limits. I find the 
fact that he was able to accomplish so much more significant 
than the restrictions and harassment to which he was sub­
jected. His dinner table conversations with Erich -Honecker 
and Werner Lamberz, and the latter giving him his telephone 
number at the central committee building, his impromtu in­
ti erviews with Margot Honecker and other delegates in the 
capacity of an invited Western reporter to the IX congress 
of May 1976 would have appeared unbelievable a few years 
earlier.
LoeweTs account of his work within the DDR shown that 
the introduction of accredited West German journalists 
into the DDR had broken the SED's monopoly of the internal 
media. East Germans had always been able to learn of not 
only international events but also 'of events within their 
own state from West German television. Now West German 
camera teams could film actual events within the DDR, 
transmit the film unhindered to the Federal Republic, 
where it could be very rapidly shown on television pro­
grammes which could be seen by 80% of East German citizens.
In this v/ay it is suggested that the West German television 
services had become of truly all-German significance.
Loewe recounted how he had received all kinds of anonymous 
detailed information, and this had only become possible 
because he was stationed in East Berlin. This meant' that 
if the internal censorship were to suppress reports of, 
say, an influenza epidemic, such action would increase the 
tendency of East Germans to watch West.German television. 
However, internal ideological security could now be broken 
by West German television reports on such sensitive subjects 
as human rights. It is suggested that these reports played 
an important role in the development of mass opposition by 
offering an alternative communications network within the 
DDR, by demonstrating to the individual or individual group 
opposed to the leadership’s policy on any given issue that 
they were not alone, but part of a wider movement.
The undesirable effects of this change, from the viewpoint 
of the DDR leadership, was illustrated by Loewefs exper­
ience, when a planned .interview with Havemann was stopped 
by the Volkspolizei blocking the street where Havemann 
lived - and the altercation with the police was filmed 
and shown on television for most East Germans to see. ^
A further example related by Loewe, perhaps even more
5k* Abends kommt der Klassenfeind, pp. 106-109*
unwelcome, was the case of a doctor in Riesa, Bezirk Dresden, 
who accused the DDR authorities of violating his human 
rights by not answering 52 official requests he had made 
to settle in the Federal Republic. 66 East German cit­
izens had joined with him in signing a petition requesting 
permission to emigrate, citing the general declaration on 
human rights, the final act of the Helsinki conference, 
and the DDR constitution. He was arrested, and his wife was 
forbidden to give any television interviews to Western 
journalists. However, in accord with the regulations 
covering foreign journalists in the DDR, Loewe was permitted 
to film in Riesa. On September 11th, 1976, 13 policemen 
and women stood in front of the doctor*s wife’s house, 
but hid when Loewe’s team began filming. He explained 
to the doctor’s wife why he had decided not to interview 
her. Then the neighbours appeared and offered to be inter­
viewed, explaining why they were dissatisifed with life 
in the DDR and why they wished to go to the Federal Re­
public. When this report was shown on West German tele­
vision, it produced man^ r requests about the doctor and 
his case from DDR citizens. This incident showed that 
East Germans were no longer afraid to speak their mind to 
Western correspondants, and it demonstrated this fact to 
most of the population of the DDR.
55* Abends kommt der Klassenfeind, pp. 85-90.
Evidence of wiaespead disapproval of some of the policies
of the DDR leadership, both among intellectuals and the rest
of the population, was shown by the reactions to the Biermann
affair. Biermann suffered expulsion from the DDR and loss
of DDR citizenship (Ausburgerung), after he had performed
at a concert in Cologne, singing songs which the leadership
56considered defammatory. The. expulsion- order was pub­
lished on November 16th, 1976 in Neues Deutschland. In 
an accompanying article signed Dr. K. (Gunther Kerzscher),. 
it was declared of Biermann:
fEr befindet sich in der Front derer, die 'ihre Hetz- 
kampagne, ihre psychologische Kriegfuhrung gegen die DDR 
wieder auf eine Hohe getrieben haben, die hinter der Zeit 
des kalten Krieges kaum noch zurucksteht. In dieser 
Front ist er einer unter vielen, ganz konform und kaum 
zu unterscheiden. Er verschwindet in der dunklen Masse 
der antikommunistischen Krakeeler.* 57
Kerzscher justified the expulsion by claiming that citizen­
ship required loyalty (Treuepflicht) to the state. Coming 
from the Federal Republic, Biermann had been granted DDR 
citizenship, but through his own fault, through his hos­
tility to the DDR, had lost it again. Here Kerzscher 
appeared to be implying a demarcation between DDR and 
Y/est German citizenship, although the latter applies to
all Germans, so that most DDR citizens would automatically
58enjoy full civil rights on entering the Federal Republic.
56. The Biermann case was documented in Deutschland Archiv, 
1977/1? PP* 69-105. See also Manfred Jager: Das Ende
einer Kulturpolitik. Die Falle Kunze und Biermann, 
Deutschland Archiv, 1976/12, pp. 1233-1239*
57* Neues Deutschland, 17th November, 1976.
58. See the preamble and Article 116 of the Basic Law.
The news of Biermann’s expulsion and deprivation of DDR
citizenship provoked an open letter from within the DDR
dated November 17th, which, while not agreeing with all of
Biermann’s behaviour, and disassociating itself from the
attempts to misuse the affair against the DDR, protested
against the expulsion order and requested the case to be 
59reconsidered. The expulsion was criticised in unequi-
vocable terms:
fUnser sozialistischer S'taat, eingedenk des Wortes aus 
Marxens »18 Brumaire«, demzufolge die proletarische Re­
volution sich unablassig standig kritisiert, muBte im 
Gegensatz zu anachronistischen Gesellschaftsformen eine 
solche Unbequemlichkeit gelassen nachdenken ertragen 
konnen.’
The letter was signed.by 12 prominent DDR artists, five of 
whom were executive members of the DDR writers’ union.
The letter was supported by nearly one hundred DDR artists 
between November 17th and 21st. Furthermore, the Biermann 
concert was publicised‘.throughout the DDR when it was broad­
cast on West German television on November 19th.
In accord with the principles of socialist realism and the
60’Bitterfelder Weg’, the artist had always been considered 
to play an important role in supporting the policies of the 
leadership. A greater percentage of the population than 
would have been the case in the West had been officially
59• The letter was published in the West German newspaper 
Frankfurter Rundschau on 23rd November, 1976.
60. For an East German interpretation of socialist realism
and the ’Bitterfelder Weg’ see Kulturpolitisch.es Worter- 
buch, Berlin (East), 1970.
61encouraged to take an interest in the arts. Moreover,
in a society where the internal media were censored, the
ar»ts were a means of transmitting ideas, often allegorically,
and were regarded in that light by the general population.
Never before had such a high level of dissent been found
among DDR artists, who were supposed to function as an
extension of the party. The significance of this protest
was considered unique by Havemann, who declared:
’Bisher haben wir niemals solch eine Solidaritat mit 
einem Menschen, dem..Unrecht getan worden ist, erlebt 
in einem solchen Umfang. Es ist ein Politikum ersten 
Ranges... ^Entscheidend ist, dai3 die SED von der Methode 
der Einschuchterung nun absehen muB und versuchen muB, 
gewissermaBen sich mit den gleichen Waffen zu verteidigen, 
mit denen sie angegriffen wurde.* 62
The West German commentator Erik Nohara described the reac­
tion to Biermann*s Ausburgerung as a new’development which 
was •''all the more threatening to the DDR leadership, since 
the artists who had signed the letter of protest were al­
most exclusively well known outside of the DDR, and in the
past had enjoyed official approval and reward as represent-
65tatives of DDR culture. The DDR leadership reacted to 
the protest by mobilising other writers in support of the 
expulsion, by obtaining the partial retraction of some of 
the signatories, and through sanctions, which included a 
number of- arrests, but stilX published some of the works
61. Zimmermann: The GDR in the 1970s, p. 30
62. Abends kommt der Klasenfeind, p. 107•
63. Erik Nohara: Biermann - Reaktion und Gegenreaktion. 
Deutschland Archiv, 1977/1? P- 15-
of the signatories. The uncertain reaction of the leader­
ship to the protesters was described by Harald Keinschmid
6li
as a fKulturpolitik der Widerspruche’.
At the beginning of 1978 Der Spiegel published a document
65entitled ’Manifest der Opposition’, which condemned the 
single-party dictatorship, the dictatorship of the prole­
tariat, democratic centralism, advocating party pluralism, 
an independant parliament and cooperation with non-Marxist~ 
Leninist parties, including the West German social democrats. 
The document approved of some aspects of Maoism and euro-
communism. The DDR authorities reacted sharply by closing
66the Spiegel offices-:in East Berlin; However, the authen­
ticity of the document is questionable, partly because of
67the terminology in which it was written. It differs from 
the style of Havemann or Bahro, but this may be the result 
of compromise caused by the presence of non-Marxists among 
the group. Secondly, the authors of the document are un­
named, and there is a long tradition of Marxist polemics 
in which one or two persons have claimed to represent a 
non-existent opposition movement. Thus there is no way of 
knowing how large the organisation of the protesters may be. 
Nevertheless, such an organisation could come into being as 
a result of publicity through the West German media, and
61+. Deutschland Archiv, 1977/6, p. 566ff.
65. Der Spiegel, 1978/1 and 1978/2.
66. Deutschland Archiv, 1978/2, p. 221.
67* Peter Bender considered the authenticity of the document
in Deutschland Archiv,. 1978/2, pp. 113-116.
this was perhaps the main reason for the closure of the 
Spiegel offices.
I would suggest that the original aim of ideological 
demarcation as a defence mechanism has been relatively 
successful, in view of the evidence that East and West 
Germans are increasingly identifying with their respective 
states. For the DDR leadership demarcation is still necesr . 
sary, but in a form similar to that practised by the leader­
ships of the other Warsaw Treaty member states, 'against 
negative ideological influences..which affect them. all. For 
the- DDR leadership the main threat is no longer affect for 
a united Germany, but the ideas of the Czech experiment of 
1968 and of. eurocommunism, which call the leading role of 
the party into question. The SED must accept the unwelcome 
fact that internal criticism cannot be silenced by intim­
idation; Bahrofs example may be followed, and most of the 
artists who supported Biermann have not retracted their 
views. Again, the extent to which the DDR leadership can 
condemn euro communism' is., limited, since this is the policy 
of Western communist parties with which the SED is theo­
retically allied. I would claim that the only possibility 
for the SED is to accept the need for greater tolerance 
towards dissident groups; the possiblity for compromise 
already exists, for the Biermann supporters declared that 
they did not'wish to damage the DDR, and Bahro had expressed 
the hope that his actions would not be taken.,advantage of
by such West German politicians as Franz-Josef StrauB.^
It is to be hoped that the DDR leadership has learned from 
recent Eastern European history. Severe persecution of 
internal opposition might prove dysfunctional, and lead 
to a situation similar to that of contemprary Czecho­
slovakia, where ten years after the intervention a war is 
being waged between the party and the majority of the 
population. On the other hand, Kadar and Gierek, who 
came to power after upheavals in Hungary and Poland, have 
succeeded in.regaining the support lost by their prede­
cessors. The sophistication and skill of the DDR leader­
ship would suggest that they would prefer this alternative. 
There remain two factors against this: Firstly, the Soviet
Union would be nervous of any so-called liberalisation, in 
view of the strategic position of the DDR. Secondly, one 
measure undertaken by Kadar and Gierek, the granting of 
permission to visit the West, would cause difficulties 
for the DDR leadership, since the attraction of West Germany 
still remains, and the 197k survey suggested that 80% of 
East German youth would like to emigrate to the Federal 
Republic. But the general permission to travel to the 
Federal Republic is the ultimate test of ideological de­
marcation; a situation must be created through improved 
living standards and greater personal liberties where 
any emigration loss could be tolerated, and might even be 
balanced by immigration from the Federal Republic.
68. Rudolf Bahro: Eine Dokumentation, pp. 98-99
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